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This dissertation explores literary economies of prose in German-language literature from 
the 1830s to the early twentieth century, granting particular focus to questions of economic 
value. The problem of value, this study argues, becomes a central literary concern after the end 
of the Kunstperiode (Heine) when the question of literature’s relation to everyday life – the 
central problem of prosaic art – turns into a reflection on the value of literature as art, as 
commodity, as work. While value remains an elusive problem in aesthetic, economic, and moral 
discourses of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, literary authors such as Ludwig Tieck, 
Gottfried Keller, and Robert Walser generate an arsenal of value forms (Marx) that, in different 
ways, interrogate and shape relations between literature and the world, life and art, work and 
play, and, most of all, the status of the economic in literary texts. I analyze three value forms in 
Tieck, Keller, and Walser: lack and surplus; credit and debt; performance (Leistung) and 
invention. The problem of prose’s value is literalized in Ludwig Tieck’s novella Des Lebens 
Überfluß (1838), which documents how a last-resort Romantic attempt to turn the lack of poetry 
in a prosaic world into surplus runs up against value’s sine qua non: finitude or, in Tieck’s 
novella, need. I then analyze relations of credit and debt in Gottfried Keller’s 1874 novella 
Kleider machen Leute, which, I argue, engages central discussions about what constitutes value 
in late-nineteenth-century political economy, philosophy, and aesthetics as it reframes the older 
narrative trope of fortune in terms of a capitalist transfiguration: the risky turn from insolvency 
 to solvency and vice versa. A last chapter argues for a subtype of literary genre, which I call the 
Leistungsroman, and which I trace specifically to Robert Walser’s novel Der Gehülfe (1908). 
Walser’s novel about clerical work and the insolvency of an entrepreneurial engineer pivots not 
around the question of Bildung but around the clerical employee’s (often written) job 
performance in the context of a division of labor between invention and performance (Leistung). 
The move to a Leistungsroman enacts a transvaluation of the modern novel, and the values of 
human and literary innovation and productivity that underwrite it, by reconfiguring the novel’s 
relation to work, action, and invention.  
  iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Nathan Taylor received his B.A. in German Studies and Economics from Austin College in 
2005. From 2010 to 2017 he studied in the Department of German Studies at Cornell University, 
receiving his M.A. in 2014 and his Ph.D. in 2017. In 2014-2016 he was a guest at the Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main on a DAAD Research Grant and a Mellon International 
Dissertation Research Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council. Since January 
2017, Nathan Taylor teaches and works as wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in the Institut für 
deutsche Literatur und ihre Didaktik at the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main.  
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am deeply grateful to my committee of advisors in Ithaca who provided unrelenting 
support and inspiration for this project. Paul Fleming, my advisor at Cornell, provided 
indispensible feedback, encouragement, and good spirits at critical points along the way. I thank 
him first and foremost for all the support, guidance, and good company. My other committee 
members – Leslie Adelson, Patrizia McBride, and Geoff Waite – are equally deserving of my 
thanks for their precise comments, critical input, and helpful advice. I would like to thank the 
larger German Studies community at Cornell for the years of dialogue and camaraderie, which 
provided a good sense of place and direction. To Elke Siegel, Annette Schwarz, Peter Gilgen, 
Peter Uwe Hohendahl I am grateful for conversations and courses that provoked further thought. 
To Miriam Zubal and Cierra Rae I am grateful for the indispensible administrative support. 
Beyond the German Department at Cornell, I owe a great deal of thanks to Eva Geulen and 
Heinz Drügh for their support in Frankfurt. Both have provided a warm and exciting community 
in Frankfurt and aided in the transition to a new academic setting. Colleagues in both Ithaca and 
Frankfurt have helped shape this project in crucial ways. Particular thanks go to Timothy 
Attanuci, Marvin Baudisch, Felix Christen, Lars Friedrich, Jette Gindner, Maria Kuberg, Florian 
Sprenger, and many others for their input and conversation. For feedback on early work on this 
project in the context of a writing group sponsored by the Mellon Foundation and Cornell’s 
Society for the Humanities I am grateful to Bruno Bosteels, Paul Fleming, Amanda Goldstein, 
Antoine Traisnel, and Johannes Wankhammer. For the opportunity to present work and receive 
excellent feedback I thank Iuditha Balint and Jochen Hörisch in Mannheim as well. This project 
was inspired in other ways by Dan Nuckols and Truett Cates, and through courses, reading 
groups, and conversations with Annie McClanahan and Joshua Clover.  
Research for this project was generously supported by the DAAD and by a Social 
Science Research Council’s International Dissertation Research Fellowship, with funds provided 
by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. 
  v 
 
My friends in Mainz and Ithaca have provided community and company that directly and 
indirectly supported this dissertation work. I am particularly grateful to Johannes Wankhammer 
who has been a source of consistent friendship, distraction, dialogue, and support. Matteo Calla 
offered solidarity and a fresh perspective on everything under the sun (in addition to a good 
coffee); Kevin Duong a steady hand in the kitchen, great conversation, and much inspiration; 
Dan Sinykin was an excellent porch interlocutor and an excellent friend from near and afar. Carl 
Gelderloos, Anna Horakova, Bret Leraul, Becquer Medak-Seguin, Hannah Miller, Seth and 
Maggie Soulstein, Kartik and Ali Sribarra, and Facundo Vega made Ithaca an exciting and warm 
place to be. In Mainz Agitha Anandarajah, Daniela Berner, Björn Bertrams, Daniel Borgeldt, 
Stefan Born, Jochen Dörrscheidt, Till Hilmar, Jan Peter Ibs, Judith Schmidt, and Judith Wagner 
made me feel at home and have over the years at kitchen tables, in raunchy bars, and now in 
living rooms with crawling kids provided good times and good energy to balance the life at the 
desk. Javier Burdman, Klara Schubenz, Carly and Dominik Ottenbreit also helped me recharge 
and offered excellent input and dialogue for this work. To my parents in California I am grateful 
for the encouragement to pursue a PhD. 
Finally I owe the greatest amount of thanks to my partner Lena Krian, who stood by me 
with unbelievable commitment through this dissertation and without whom not a single word 
would ever have made it on the page. I thank Lena for the immeasurable support, steadfast love, 
and heartwarming companionship that was unwavering throughout the ups and downs of this 
dissertation. And to Henry, for making me wear that glittering-green cowboy hat when writing 
the last words of this dissertation, and just generally for all your wacky fun. 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
   
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS VI 
LIST OF FIGURES VIII 
INTRODUCTION 
 THE VALUE FORM OF LITERATURE 1 
A KIND OF PREFACE: PROSE IN THE COMPTOIR 1 
TALK OF VALUE 12 
THE SUPERFLUOUS VALUE OF PROSE 19 
THE VALUE FORM AS METHOD (MARX, SIMMEL) 22 
ÜBERFLUSS, SCHULDENVERKEHR, LEISTUNG 26 
CHAPTER ONE  
SUPERFLUOUS PROSE: TIECK’S LAST ROMANTIC GESTURE 35 
EXHAUSTED MEANS 35 
POETIC WASTE 40 
AN ECONOMIC GOSPEL (NOVALIS ON GOETHE) 45 
BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE BOURGEOISIE: THE WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER OF THE NOVELLA 55 
SUPERFLUOUS MARVEL (DES LEBENS ÜBERFLUSS) 61 
THE LOVE-CHILD OF LACK AND PLENTY: EROS 69 
CYNICISM AND ASCETICISM 71 
THE HERMENEUTIC CIRCLE OF LIFE 79 
NOVELISTIC CHIT-CHAT – POLICING THE FRIVOLOUS 81 
CHAPTER TWO  
SCHULDENVERKEHR: CONJUNCTURES OF FORTUNE IN KELLER 86 
TRANSFIGURATION AND TRANSVALUATION 86 
THE FALL OF THE DEBTOR 91 
NARRATING WASTE 99 
THE “FÜGUNG” OF FORTUNE I (KLEIDER MACHEN LEUTE) 105 
MARX, NIETZSCHE, KELLER 106 
THE “FÜGUNG” OF FORTUNE II (KLEIDER MACHEN LEUTE) 113 
CHAPTER THREE  
PERFORMANCE & INVENTION: ROBERT WALSER’S LEISTUNGSROMAN 131 
SCENES OF PERFORMANCE 131 
THE LEISTUNGSROMAN 134 
THE INSTITUTION OF LEISTUNG 139 
THE TECHNE OF LEISTUNG 144 
CLERICAL FEHLLEISTUNG 147 
  vii 
PERFORMANCE ANXIETY 161 
DISRUPTION OF SERVICE 170 
THE SERVICE WORKER (LEISTUNG AND IMMATERIAL LABOR) 177 
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE 183 
PERFORMANCE, INVENTION, OR REALIZATION? 188 
WALSER’S PREIS-LEISTUNGSVERHÄLTNIS 199 
CONCLUSION  
GELD ODER LEBEN: VALUE AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 205 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. Robert Walser’s Clerical Handwriting  ................................................................................. 160 
Figure 2. Advertisement for Carl Dubler’s Gnom Steam-Trap Device  ............................................... 185 
 
 
  1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Value Form of Literature 
 
 
 “In Kunst ist mit mehr Fug von Wert zu reden als sonstwo” 
Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie 
 
A Kind of Preface: Prose in the Comptoir 
In the last decade of the eighteenth century, as Schiller was drafting his treatise on how 
the fine arts might pave the way to a truly free aesthetic state, Goethe was grappling with how to 
make great art and still appeal to the taste of an emerging literary public, and Kant was 
inaugurating aesthetic autonomy by arguing for the judgment of the beautiful as distinct from 
practical and epistemological matters, another literary author in Germany was confronting the 
very question of what his art was worth in a particularly parodic, head-on manner. That author 
was Jean Paul, whose confrontation was marked by embracing, rather than shunning, the 
overlaps between art and the utilitarian sphere of the economic. Unlike his contemporaries in a 
decade in German letters devoted to staking out claims to aesthetic autonomy (against a rising 
commodity art market), Jean Paul seems unusually comfortable with the evaluation of his art by 
a consumer public and the proximity of his literary work to the mercantile work of the 
businessman. As a sort of résumé or vignette of the literary market of its time, the preface to Jean 
Paul’s novel Siebenkäs (1796) offers a prologue to this dissertation on the value of literature, an 
inventory of many of the economic tropes that will be explored in this study (from bookkeeping 
to promissory notes, to literature’s status as opulent/Leseluxus) that spells out the complex 
entanglements of commercial and aesthetic value in German literature around 1800.1 
                                                
1 Luhmann would seem to have Jean Paul’s preface in mind when, in his discussion of the literary market 
in Kunst der Gesellschaft, he mentions how the consolidation of the literary market at the end of the 
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Jean Paul’s preface, which bears the baroquish title “Vorrede, womit ich den Kaufherrn 
Jakob Öhmann einschläfern mußte, weil ich seiner Tochter die Hundpostage und gegenwärtige 
Blumenstücke etc. etc. erzählen wollte,”2 opens on Christmas Eve, 1794, when the writer “Jean 
Paul Friedr. Richter” walks into a store where a shopkeeper is busy preparing holiday gift books, 
specifically a type of book that around 1800 stands for a literature that has anything but high 
cultural value: the almanac.3 Making his way past the throng of last-minute Christmas-eve 
shoppers into the “Schreibkontor” of the lawyer and businessman Jakob Öhrmann, the first-
person narrator “Jean Paul” encounters another set of books: Öhrmann’s account books. 
Prompted by the “kaufmännische Kälte” he encounters in Öhrmann’s comptoir (16), Jean Paul 
digresses at this point in the preface: if the original intent of his visit to Öhrmann had been to put 
the accountant to sleep with a long-winded recitation of his literary works so that he can get to 
what really matters – sharing his most recent work with Öhrmann’s bibliophilic daughter whose 
father leaves her no time to read – Jean Paul reflects instead on the proper audience of his works. 
Jean Paul imagines a typology of possible audience members for his literature, organized into 
three categories: a “Kauf-Publikum,” a “Lese-Publikum,” and a “Kunst-Publikum” (16). Quickly 
dismissing the reading and art public as inconsequential – the former because they’ll read his 
work in any case, the latter because their indiscriminate “[Geschmack für] alle Arten des 
                                                                                                                                                       
eighteenth century provoked defensive reactions on the part of authors and led “zu einer in die Texte 
selbst aufgenommenen Polemik gegen Verleger und Rezensenten (Beispiel: Jean Paul).” Niklas 
Luhmann, Kunst der Gesellschaft, 268. Jean Paul’s preface, one could argue with Luhmann, demonstrates 
how the autonomous move from external to internal criterion for the evaluation of art, which occurs in 
tandem with the rise of the book market, is mirrored in the formal self-referentiality of the artwork. 
“Gerade literarische Texte sondern sich oft durch selbstreferentielle Hinweise dieser Art ab. (Einbau der 
Produktion des Textes in den Text, Ansprachen an den Leser, Seitenhiebe auf die Rezensenten sind die 
noch ziemlich groben Stilmittel bei Jean Paul, die zugleich der Ausdifferenzierung des Textkunstwerkes 
auf der Ebene der Beobachtung von Beobachtungen dienen)” (Luhmann, 188).  
2 Jean Paul, Siebenkäs, in Werke, vol. 2, ed. Gustav Lohmann, 15. All further citations are to this edition.  
3 On the rise of the almanac and the gift book, which emerges “at precisely the moment when books 
where overwhelmingly being defined by their status as commodities,” see Andrew Piper, Dreaming in 
Books, 123. See esp. chap. 4, “Sharing.” 
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Geschmacks” really prefers the ‘world-literature’ of “höheren, gleichsam kosmopolitschen 
Schönheiten” such as Goethe, Herder, Lessing, and Wieland – Jean Paul decides to bribe 
(“bestechen”) the ‘buying public’ and dedicate his novel to it as the public which, at bottom, 
drives the literary market and “eigentlich den Buchhandel erhält” (17).  
Jean Paul’s unabashed appeal to a public with purchase power – itself only a ruse or 
“Maske” as he describes it – is nevertheless striking for how, in tongue-in-cheek manner, of 
course, it mocks the sentiments of Jean Paul’s contemporary writers. “At a time when the artist is 
being described as just one more producer of a commodity for the market, he [the artist] is 
describing himself as a specially endowed person,” Raymond William writes of the period.4 A 
decade before Jean Paul’s preface, Karl Phillip Moritz5 – anticipating Kant’s inauguration of the 
autonomy of aesthetic judgment6  – defines the work of art as a self-sufficient object of 
disinterested contemplation by arguing that the artist ought to strive more for “innere 
Zweckmäßigkeit oder Vollkommenheit” than for the approval of his audience. Moritz condemns 
the artist for whom his “Werk nur in so fern werth ist, als es [. . . ] Ruhm verschafft.”7 In 
Dichtung und Wahrheit, Goethe writes retrospectively of the literary author’s scruples against 
remuneration of any kind, even in the form of an honorarium (as opposed to the craftsman’s or 
painter’s wage and the merchant’s profit): “die Produktion von poetischen Schriften [ . . .] wurde 
                                                
4 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950, 39.  
5 Jean Paul in fact sends his first novel for publication to Moritz in a (successful) attempt to bypass what 
he calls the “geistigen Sklavenhändler” of the “Buchändler Börse.” Jean Paul Friedrich Richter to Karl 
Philipp Moritz, Schwarzenbach, June 7, 1792, in Jean Paul, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Eduard Berend, vol. 3, 
bk.1, 353-354. 
6 See Martha Woodmansee, “The Interests of Disinterestedness” in Author, Art, and the Market: 
Rereading the History of Aesthetics. 
7 Moritz, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Poetik, 7. If earlier Enlightenment writers such as Nicolai had 
condemned writing for ‘private purposes’ – seeking fame, aiming to gain an office, praising a friend, 
debasing an enemy, etc. – this was because the purpose of literature lay in public edification. See Heinrich 
Bosse, Autorschaft ist Werkherrschaft, note 262, 191-192. Moritz, however, rejects any external purpose 
(educative or self-promoting), emphasizing solely the artist’s concern with the “Vollkommenheit” of the 
work.  
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als etwas Heiliges angesehn, und man hielt es beinah für Simonie, ein Honorar zu nehmen oder 
zu steigern.”8 Jean Paul’s bribery of the buying public is thus, in this context, like any good 
parody: a blasphemous desacralization of a literary and aesthetic enterprise envisioned by 
authors in the 1790s precisely not a means to an end, but an end in itself.  
Despite appearances, Jean Paul’s bribery of the “Kauf-Publikum” cannot be read simply 
as selling-out to the masses and the market. His typology of the literary public and his appeal to 
the part of this public that economically underwrites the book industry belongs rather, as he 
suggests, to a subtle repositioning of literature that, in making a mockery of those authors who 
would see their art as breadless, turns the commercialized status of the literary work against 
itself. More, therefore, than simply a jab at the Weimar cultural scene of literary elites such as 
Goethe and Wieland, and the reifying commercial procedures of the literary press and 
Buchhandel, Jean Paul’s ironic capitulation to the demands of a paying readership is an attempt 
to turn the author-reader relation itself into literary art. Quite literally bringing literature into the 
space of the accounting office9 – the comptoir of the merchant – Jean Paul turns the commercial 
topos into a literary one and thereby not only rewrites the relation of schöne Literatur to ‘prosaic 
                                                
8 Quoted in Bosse, 79. On the role of the honorarium in the early book industry in Germany see Bosse’s 
chapter “Die Synthese von Mitteilung und Honorar,” 65-98. 
9 Along with his own novels, Jean Paul brings with him actual financial instruments that are difficult to 
decipher from the other forms of literature in the preface (novels, books of account, etc.). The so-called 
“Wiener Briefe” Jean Paul brings for the merchant are a kind of promissory note that functions as a 
financial asset. Through the linguistic sleight-of-hands of the narrator, these ‘letters’ are likened to the 
apostle Paul’s epistles and poetic letters (presumably such as those of Goethe’s Werther). On the 
promixity of these sorts of monetary instruments to literary writing on a literary continuum of genres that 
mediate value prior to the complete differentiation of these genres at the end of the 18th century see Mary 
Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy. On the religious undertones to the “Wiener Briefe” and the 
preface more generally see Ralf Simon, “Herzensangelegenheiten (Jean Paul, Siebenkäs)” in Gabriele 
Brandstetter and Gerhard Neumann (eds.), Romantische Wissenspoetik: die Künste und die 
Wissenschaften um 1800 (Würzburg: Königshaus und Neumann, 2004), 273-286. 
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reality,’ as Hegel will call it,10 but also, in one paradoxical sweep, violates and reasserts what is 
perhaps the single most important criterion for aesthetic value around 1800: that a work of art be 
irreducible to any kind of use. Jean Paul’s preface violates this rule by pandering to, indeed 
bribing a buying public with his novel, dragging the work of art down into the dregs of the fully 
utilitarian business world (and framing art as a means to a romantic intrigue: wooing the 
daughter). But in a further move the preface reasserts the non-utility of literature through the 
very ruse of its narration: putting the merchant to sleep.11 A centuries-long Horatian imperative 
of literature – to please and to educate – comes to an end here in a scene of narration that makes 
of literature a “Schlafpulver” (23). Brazenly embracing the selling-out of literature to a consumer 
public, Jean Paul’s weaves its own idiosyncratic path to literary autonomy through rather than 
around the market: taken at its word, disinterestedness in the literary work puts its audience to 
sleep. The merchant is, Jean Paul explains, as the type par excellence of the “Kauf-Publikum” 
“gegen nichts so herzlich kalt  [. . .] als gegen meine Bücher” (22) and absolutely indifferent to 
any other books than the “Haupt und das Schmierbuch” (18), i.e. the accounting books. In other 
words, if the buying-public is both the financial underwriter of literature and its most indifferent 
audience, then the ruse of literature and literary autonomy, “die Maske,” will be to capitalize 
precisely on this indifference in order to access other audiences.  
Jean Paul’s preface is thus a profound and witty spin on the efforts of literary authors, 
                                                
10 The merchant’s bookkeeping, which the narrator Jean Paul explicitly likens to his own prose literature 
is a particularly expressive example of Hegel’s prosaic consciousness. Just as Hegel’s lectures on 
aesthetics mix prosaic form (unbound speech; non-verse) with prosaic subject matter (a prosaic 
consciousness characterized by ends-means rationality; a reality that mirrors this instrumentalization and 
one-sidedness), Jean Paul’s preface connects formal features of prose as unbound speech (digression, 
metonymy, etc.) with the content of its prose (the economy of literary industry).  
11 The reference to the “Leihbibliothek” is a tongue-in-cheek way of saying that as a consequence of its 
commercialization, ‘autonomous’ literature is now subject to the judgment of the masses. On this 
problem, see Paul Fleming, Exemplarity and Mediocrity. 
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philosophers, and aestheticians at the end of the eighteenth century to make a case for a special 
type of aesthetic or literary value, irreducible to market, cognitive, or moral value, and a case for 
a special type of judgment or reception of the work of art.  And in the face of a common project 
in the 1790s to secure a literary or aesthetic value sui generis, Jean Paul goes a different route, 
exposing the structure that motivated autonomy aesthetics. If the rise of a “Kauf-Publikum” of 
literary works towards the end of the eighteenth century prompted articulations of aesthetic 
autonomy and notions of singular aesthetic value in the first place, Jean Paul’s preface conjures 
the repressed side of schöne Literatur: the absolutely utilitarian, absolutely economic space of 
the comptoir. 
Through this conjuring, Jean Paul’s preface almost excessively points to the irritating 
overlap of the literary and the mercantile in the practice, material, tropology or form, setting, and 
institutional status of literature. More than a half-century before Alexis de Tocqueville will 
lament  “democratic literatures” that “swarm with these authors who perceive in letters only an 
industry,”12 Jean Paul provides a depiction of the literary industry that spells out the complex 
entanglement of literature and commerce in a marketplace of readers; and he does so in literary 
terms: Jean Paul’s prose is prose in and out of the comptoir,13 the accounting office wherein the 
literary author encounters the accountant merchant balancing his ledger books. Moreover, it is 
prose that narrates, in a condensed way, a series of structural confusions that haunted the project 
                                                
12 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 450. For a reading of the implications of this literary 
industry in mid nineteenth-century America see Marc Shell, “The Gold Bug: Introduction to the ‘Industry 
of Letters’ in America” in Money, Language, Thought, 5-23. 
13 While Jean Paul’s text does not inaugurate a literature of the comptoir, it anticipates the centrality of the 
Schreibkontor for nineteenth-century German literature. On the comptoir see Iuditha Balint’s forthcoming 
entry “Kontor” in Handbuch Literatur und Ökonomie, ed. Joseph Vogl and Burkhardt Wolf (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2018). 
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of writing literary prose in particular around 1800:14 from the confusion between the accounting 
books (the libro maestro) and the books of high literature (the magnum opus),15 to the confusion 
of business work (“Geschäft”) and literary work (“Werk”), to the confusion of the vocation of 
the literary author with other (literate) vocations that do not fit into a patrimonial Rangordnung 
or have the security of an Amt, such as that of the bourgeois merchant. The conundrum of great 
literature, the narrator seems to suggest with a winking eye to Kant, is that the genius poet can no 
longer be “gemacht” by an institution such as the “Reichs-Hof-Kanzelei” but nowadays must be 
“geboren” (17); and worse: “der Poet ist gar nichts und wird nichts im Staate” like, say, the 
philosopher.16 In a decade that opens with a critique of courtly patronage of the literary author 
                                                
14 These confusions are documented in great detail in Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy. In 
Jean Paul’s preface they concern, for instance, the relation between literary prose and the prose of the 
“Synodalschreiben” – an official document of the church. These confusions furthermore involve the way 
writing and books, as well as various literary practices, or even ‘cultural techniques,’ such as ‘prefacing,’ 
‘ collating,’ ‘recording,’ ‘epitomizing’ are used to describe the material and activity of the literary author, 
bookseller, merchant, and literary press/publishing world alike in Jean Paul’s preface. The merchant, for 
instance, “saß auch über einem Buche, aber nicht als Vorredner, sondern als Registrator und Epitomator, 
er zog die Generalbilanz des Libro maestro;” both the merchant and his sons ‘lesen und schreiben kein 
anderes und kein geringeres Buch als das Haupt- und Schmierbuch’ – the ‘Haupt- und Schmierbuch’ 
being technical terms borrowed directly from accounting, a transposition one finds most famously in 
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Südelbücher. On Lichtenberg’s bookkeeping-literary method as borrowed 
from the merchant’s double-entry bookkeeping method and the transition it announces from inventario to 
inventio see Markus Wilczek, “Ab. Lichtenberg’s Waste.” 
15 To be sure, this confusion is not Jean Paul’s alone. In Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister Wilhelm’s childhood 
friend Werner praises the merchant’s spirit against Wilhelm’s rather disparaging depiction of the 
merchant, and praises double-entry bookkeeping as “eine der schönsten Erfindungen des menschlichen 
Geistes,” presumably against Wilhelm’s “nicht im geringsten lobenswürdig[e] [. . .] Erfindung,” his 
youthful poem “Jüngling am Scheidewege.” Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, 36. The scene in 
Goethe’s novel will resonate throughout the reception of the novel: Schiller calls the “Apologie des 
Handels” “herrlich und in einem großen Sinn” (quoted in “Nachwort,” Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, 620); 
Schlegel calls the “Lob des Handels” “erhabene Poesie” (662). Novalis’ remarks on the “Evangelium der 
Ökonomie” in the novel are more ambivalent, if not incredibly influential for later Goethe readers such as 
the Romantic economist Adam Müller. See Chapter One of this study for more details on Novalis’ 
reading. See also Adam Müller, Die Lehre vom Gegensatze: “Das Evangelium der Ökonomie, wie es 
Novalis nennt, überschwemmt in den ‘Lehrjahren von Wilhelm Meister’ das fruchtbare Feld, auf dem 
man nur Blüten der Naturpoesie und Einflüsse des Wunderbaren erwartet hatte,” cited in Goethe im Urteil 
seiner Kritiker, 209.  
16 Citing a long history of the literary author’s liberation from the institutional confines of the Fürstenhof, 
Jean Paul’s preface links this freedom of the poet from the institutional office of the state and court – the 
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(Goethe’s Torquato Tasso), celebrates the emancipation of the poet from the conscripts of a 
Regelpoetik, and does its own work to contribute to the Ausdifferenzierung of the fine arts 
(Kant’s Third Critique, notably, emphatically separates the art of the craftsman as a Lohnkunst 
from that of the fine artist), Jean Paul’s prose of the comptoir presents autonomy aesthetics with 
a bill.17 
Jean Paul’s literature strives, however, on its own terms not to be business or Geschäft. It 
does so by halting and hindering the commerce of the mind. If, etymologically, commerce and 
business mark a negation of idleness or leisure, as Benveniste has suggested of the Latin 
negotium,18 literature marks its distance from commercial affairs by provoking a state of leisure 
or idleness (sleep). Jean Paul’s problem is, however, that insofar as literature is constituted by 
polyvalences (“mehr als ein Sinn” or what the narrator calls “allerlei Bildliches und Blumiges” 
                                                                                                                                                       
fate of the bourgeois author – to the ‘freedom’ to sell one’s works in a literary market. Marx will describe 
this structure of a double freedom (“frei in dem Doppelsinn”) – a freedom to sell one’s labor power and 
‘freedom’ in the sense of not having at one’s disposal any of the resources necessary for the realization of 
one’s labor power – the condition of possibility for the capitalist’s transformation of money into capital. 
Marx, Das Kapital I, 183.  
17 Luhmann, on the other hand, suggests a number of overlaps in the autonomy that characterizes both the 
art system and the economic system, overlaps that condition their “Kopplung” with each other but retain 
their “operative Geschlossenheit.” “Beziehungen zwischen Kunst und Geld kann es überhaupt nur geben, 
wenn diese beiden Medien und ihre Formen aus sich heraus im jeweiligen System regeneriert werden” 
(395). The art market, insofar as it liberates the arts from the patronage system, enables art’s own criterion 
for the judgment of its value and thus for the self-regeneration of the art system. The decline of a 
hierarchical schema for determining the value of art is crucial in this regard. “Die einschlägige Literatur 
des 16. Jahrhunderts diskutiert neben rein technischen Fragen [. . .] vor allem Rangverhältnisse. Wer steht 
höher: Raffael oder Michelangelo [. . .]? Die Gesellschaft denkt sich selbst und ihre Welt noch 
hierarchisch. Rangentscheidungen sind, wie immer umstritten, als Ordnungsentscheidungen schlechthin 
gefragt [. . .] Diese Diskussion, die die Kunst nach einem allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Muster 
behandelt und so der Gesellschaft zuordnet, kann auf den Kunstmarkt nicht übertragen werden. 
Selbstverständlich zählt auch hier Reputation. Sie drückt sich in Preisen aus. Aber man kann sich keine 
stabile lineare Ordnung des Ranges von Künstlern nach Maßgabe der Preise vorstellen, die für ihre Werke 
erzielt werden. Für Literatur ist das ohnehin unmöglich, die Bücher von Goethe würden damit 
unverkäuflich werden“ in “Sinn der Kunst und Sinne des Marktes – zwei autonome Systeme” in Schriften 
zur Kunst und Literatur, 389-400, here 392. 
18 Émile Benveniste, “An Occupation without a Name” in Indo-European Language and Society. See also 
Franco Moretti’s attempt to develop out of this point an entire set of keywords for the study of literature 
that concern the restlessness or non-idleness of the bourgeois merchant in The Bourgeois, esp. no. 17, p. 
8. 
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[22]), it reactivates the mind, and in the case of the merchant for whom every book is an 
accounting book, such polyvalences are quickly reduced to the unequivocal discourse of 
commerce (the businessman and thus the “Kauf-Publikum” have, in this sense, a doubly 
commercial attitude towards literature). For this reason, precisely when Jean Paul believes to 
have Öhrmann to sleep, the merchant is roused back into an active state by a commerce of the 
mind that hears in Jean Paul’s word “Solidität” the solvency of “solide Männer, welche zahlen” 
(21); or in response to Jean Paul’s acerbic comment on how banned books would be most 
securely prohibited in a public library – because the average librarian’s “verdrüßliche Miene” 
chases away readers better than any “Zensuredikt” (23) – the merchant, following the topos of 
licentiousness, is reminded of outstanding fees he is owed by a brothel. The businessman, in 
other words, is a figure that cannot be bored by literature by virtue of his occupation: “Keinem 
Menschen ist überhaupt schwerer Langeweile zu geben als einem, der sie selber immer austeilt; 
leichter getrau’ ich mir in fünf Minuten einer vornehmen geschäftfreien Frau Langeweile zu 
machen als in ebenso vielen Stunden einem Geschäftmanne.” The businessman’s incessant 
preoccupation with his “Geschäft” that leaves him at once activated by and indifferent to the 
literary author’s “Werk” points thus to a disinterestedness that always undermines itself, and a 
literature that can thus be simultaneously both against and for a “Kauf-Publikum.” Jean Paul is 
haunted here by the fifty-first paragraph of Kant’s Third Critique, where Kant, in an attempt to 
distinguish between poetic literature and rhetoric, famously defines literature as a free play of the 
imagination that seems to be a “Geschäft des Verstandes.”19 Whereas poetic literature for Kant is 
beautiful art, in the strict sense, because it provokes a commerce of the mind that it ultimately 
refuses to remunerate, a kind of occupation without ulterior purpose or pay (“unabhängig vom 
                                                
19 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 212. 
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Lohne” Kant writes to separate it from mercenary art and “Lohngeschäfte”), Jean Paul defines 
literature here as a business of the mind that is constantly turned into actual business by the 
merchant. And if the fifty-first paragraph of the Third Critique is the moment where Kant comes 
closest to defining aesthetic value as non-compatible with economic value precisely by defining 
beautiful or fine art as “in doppelter Bedeutung freie Kunst” (Kant, 212), an art that is free from 
external purpose and free from remuneration, i.e. not “eine Arbeit [. . .] deren Größe sich nach 
einem bestimmten Maßstab beurteilen, erzwingen oder bezahlen läßt,” Jean Paul feeds the value 
of literature through the economic in order to rescue it. Indeed, what the mental transactions (i.e. 
turning Jean Paul’s poetic speech into business affairs) on the part of the merchant suggest, even 
as they work against Jean Paul’s goal of providing disinteresting literature, is that literature’s 
value cannot be assimilated to the clean and precise arithmetic of the ledger book without 
remainder. Literature is, then, Jean Paul’s preface suggests, like the single Swiss penny that 
causes a discrepancy in the merchant’s balancing of the credit and debt columns in his double-
entry bookkeeping, a “Rechnungsverstoß” (19) or accounting mistake that cannot easily be 
balanced or attributed to either the positive or negative;20 it straddles the prose of the accounting 
                                                
20 In her analysis of double-entry bookkeeping as part of a discourse and practice that establishes the 
‘modern fact,’ Mary Poovey highlights how double-entry bookkeeping performatively creates an “effect 
of accuracy,” while simultaneously exposing discrepancies between nominal and real prices, that is, the 
gap of representation that is operative in accounting for economic value. Mary Poovey, A History of the 
Modern Fact, here 64. One could say that Jean Paul’s accounting mistake similarly highlights the 
fundamental and irreducible difference between literature’s value and price. Literature, one could see Jean 
Paul suggesting, never gives you what you pay for. See in the note above Luhmann’s remark that 
Goethe’s books would be unsellable if their value and price coincided. At stake here is, at least in part, a 
difference between material/economic and symbolic value of a literary work, a problem Bourdieu has 
addressed in great detail. What Bourdieu writes of the contemporary art moment applies already for Jean 
Paul: “Artistic work in its new definition makes artists more than ever tributaries to the whole 
accompaniment of commentaries and commentators who contribute directly to the production of the work 
of art by their reflection on an art which often itself contains a reflection on art, and on artistic effort 
which always encompasses an artist's work on himself. [. . .] The discourse on the work is not a simple 
side-effect, designed to encourage its apprehension and appreciation, but a moment which is part of the 
production of the work, of its meaning and its value.” Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, 170. On the 
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office and the prose of the library, is written on paper just like the “Löschpapier” of the 
commodified almanac (15), encompasses the promissory note and the literary preface, and 
indeed describes the act of prefacing a novel and the “mündlichen Vorreden” that the bookseller 
uses to advertise a book.   
What Jean Paul’s preface therefore makes clear, in a witty way, is that with literature’s 
emancipation from older poetics, with prose’s play of distinguishing itself from other forms of 
‘unbound speech,’ with literature’s release from the binds of the court to its new position as 
commodity object for a commercial public, with its freshly-gained autonomy, in other words, 
literary value is something that needs to be articulated. Neither a reduction of this value to the 
economic, nor an attempt to ground literary value in a self-sufficiency of purpose, Jean Paul’s 
preface generates a form in which literary value can be articulated in relation rather than mere 
reduction to, in productive conflation with rather than disavowal of, the economy of literature.  
This is, by analogy, the poetic problem of the modern novel in particular. If the modern 
novel faces the problem that it lacks any preordained poetics, rhetorical schemata, and indeed 
any ready-at-hand form, and must therefore, through its form, invent a poetics in every novel 
anew,21 then Jean Paul’s preface on the evaluation of his work by the merchant, his prose in the 
comptoir, can be read as an attempt to ground, or preface, the value of his literary work by 
grounding its form, which means by generating its own form of value (as opposed to the value 
                                                                                                                                                       
consequences of a numismatic disproportion between nominal and substantial representations of value 
(i.e. in coins) for the shift from a Renaissance to a Classical episteme see also Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things, 166-214. 
21 Of late Rüdiger Campe has elaborated the consequences of the novel’s constitutive formlessness and 
lack of poetics in various contexts. Of particular interest for this study, see Campe, “Robert Walsers 
Institutionenroman, ” 235-250. See also Blumenberg, “Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Möglichkeit des 
Romans” in Hans Blumenberg and Anselm Haverkamp, Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001). 
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forms of, say, the industry of book reviews).22 Just as the novel will distinguish itself from the 
‘bare life’ it represents by giving it a form, so too does Jean Paul’s preface distinguish itself from 
the commodity literature by inventing a form of value. Notably, the preface plays a central role 
for both: if the function of a preface in the novel is to provide a basis or justification for the 
‘form’ that the novel will take – underwriting or challenging its story’s fictional status, 
commenting on its probability or improbability – Jean Paul’s preface gives to the novel a 
different form: a value form. For an author whose forewords are more properly the main text 
than the actual main text,23 who churns out forewords he intends to sell in assembly-line tempo,24 
the comments on literary industry contained in the preface to Siebenkäs are very much the main 
text, and their setting – the comptoir – very much the central setting, not just of Jean Paul’s texts 
but of German letters around 1800 more generally.  
Talk of Value 
As a Vorrede, too, to the Rede von Wert that Adorno emphatically attributes to art, Jean 
Paul’s Vorrede sets up a kind of backstory, a prologue, to this dissertation on the problem of 
value in German-language literature after 1800. Picking up at the moment Jean Paul’s preface 
highlights when the value of literature, as one specific subset of the fine arts, becomes a problem 
that demands a formal answer, this study poses the following question: if, as Adorno claims, art 
is a sphere wherein talk of value is most justified, how does art itself talk about value (economic, 
                                                
22 Jean Paul’s preface features many preemptive jabs at the “Herren Redaktöre der Rezensenten und 
Rezensionen” (Siebenkäs, 19). 
23 See for instance Uwe Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors aus dem Geist der Herausgeberfiktion, esp. 331-
337. Cf. “Vorreden” in Max Kommerell, Jean Paul, 158- 182. 
24 See the preface to the ‘second, third, and fourth, volumes’ of Siebenkäs: “ob ich gleich schon seit 
einigen Jahren mehre Vorreden im voraus verfasse und auf den Kauf ausarbeite, worin ich künftige 
Werne nach Vermögen erhebe. Ja, ein ganzes Münzkabinett von solchen preismedaillen und 
Huldigungsmünzen, die ich für fremde Verdienste mit den besten Rändelmaschinen ausprägte, steht mir 
immer vor Augen und läuft täglich höher an” (Siebenkäs, 143).   
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aesthetic, and ethical)? What does it have to say about value, and how does its concern with 
value implicate the economic and the literary in conjunction and disjunction with one another?  
Two premises guide the argument of this study in major ways: the first is the assumption 
of a fundamental relation between the aesthetic and economic, the second is the claim of a 
structural affinity between increasing economization of literature and the contested status of 
prose. Regarding the first: following the work of scholars like John Guillory, Marc Shell, 
Richard T. Gray, Jochen Hörisch, and to some extent Joseph Vogl,25 this study assumes that the 
relation between aesthetic and economic value is historically rooted in coeval inquiries into the 
problem of value made by the fields of aesthetics (as discourses on the judgment of taste) and 
political economy (as an amalgamation of political arithmetic, knowledge of populations and 
territories, practical policies for securing the welfare of a social body, etc.), regardless of whether 
one describes this relation in homological, analogical, semiotic, or discursive terms. John 
Guillory’s study Cultural Capital (1993) provides a basis for this argument by tracking the 
emergence of these two “discourses of value” from out of the same domain of moral philosophy, 
joined together “in contradistinction to the concept of ‘use-value.’”26 Guillory shows in detail 
how a concept of aesthetic value is the product of a transformation of the problem of a judgment 
                                                
25 Despite lengthy analyses of discourses of economic value in political economy, Vogl’s major study of 
economy and literature, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, has little to say about the relation between aesthetic and 
economic value. Elsewhere, however, Vogl somewhat abruptly suggests a strong relationship between the 
aesthetic judgment and value in the financial economy, aiming it would seem at a kind of specular 
financial axiology: “Die auf dem Markt zirkulierenden Informationen [sind] nicht epistemologisch, 
sondern allein doxalogisch begründbar. Es geht nicht um die Feststellung eines gerechtfertigten Wissens 
vom ‘realen’, ‘wahren’ oder ‘fundamentalen’ Wert der Dinge, sondern darum, wie sich Wertschätzungen 
aus Meinungen formieren, die die Meinung über Meinungen spiegeln. Finanzmärkte funktionieren als 
fortlaufender Abstimmungsprozess, in ihnen herrscht der Druck von Konformität. In den Preisen 
kursieren die zur Norm geronnenen Resonanzen kollektiver Ansichten [. . .] Die Form dieses 
ökonomischen Urteilens hat darum, kantisch gesprochen, wenig mit Erkenntnisurteilen zu tun. Sie besitzt 
eher ästhetischen Charakter, wenn das Geschmacksurteil nach Kant den Vorgriff auf eine 
‘Gemeingültigkeit’ vollzieht und mit ihr eine ‘unbestimmte Norm’ aufruft, die - begrifflos - jedermanns 
Zustimmung erheischen könnte.” Joseph Vogl, Das Gespenst des Kapitals, 155-156.  
26 John Guillory, Cultural Capital, 302. 
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of taste in Kant, Hume, and others, a transformation cemented through the exceptionalization of 
the work of art against other commodity goods and craft objects.27 In Guillory’s analysis, value 
can become affixed to the word aesthetic only at a specific historical juncture marked by the 
divergence of political economy and aesthetics as disciplines in a “mutual forgetting” of their 
common origin. In this regard, “the very concept of aesthetic value betrays the continued 
pressure of economic discourse on the language of aesthetics.”28 In its insistence on the 
belatedness of a concept of value in aesthetics, Guillory’s argument, moreover, contributes to a 
major point in this dissertation, namely that the problem of value becomes a literary one when 
literature becomes ‘autonomous,’ and as a response to a (discursive) divorcing of economic and 
aesthetic value. But against Guillory, and others that assume that “the very concept of aesthetic 
value betrays the continued pressure of economic discourse on the language of aesthetics” (317), 
this dissertation argues that economic discourses in the literary text betray the pressure of 
aesthetic value. That is to say: autonomy is, for the literature in question here at least, not the 
point. Rather, raising the question of value through rather than in strict opposition to the 
economic, these literary texts are already, in a certain sense, post-autonomous. Or, if they are 
(still or again) autonomous, this is the result of them engaging the economic as the problem of 
their own value. Aesthetic or literary value can never be pure,29 in the sense of fully severed 
from the realm of the useful, but, as the chapter on Walser’s Leistungsroman argues for instance, 
                                                
27 See also David Wellbery’s critique of Guillory (and of Herrnstein Smith and Bourdieu) for how they 
“replace the dead-end discourse on aesthetic value with economic value” and his argument for Kantian 
aesthetic evaluation not as a claim to a sort of imperialistic universality rooted in a spurious subjectivity – 
as the charge against Kant goes – but as a form of articulation with a different kind of normativity. 
Wellbery, “Evaluation as Articulation: A Defense of Kant on Literary Value,” 193. 
28 John Guillory, Cultural Capital, 317. 
29 For a recent attempt to develop ‘non-pure’ vernacular aesthetic categories premised not on ‘the 
beautiful’ but on “clashing” and “equivocal” feelings and judgments see Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic 
Categories. 
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certain forms of use or praxis can, through recourse to the aesthetic or the literary, wrestle some 
form of value away from what might otherwise seem to be dominant value-imperatives of the 
economy. If the literary texts discussed here insist on their value as irreducible to the economic, 
they do so only in conscious conjunction with it; this distinguishes them from autonomy 
aesthetics even as they may stake a claim to a kind of literary autonomy. Unlike in Richard T. 
Gray’s study, there is no “economic unconscious” at work in these texts – the economy is on the 
surface,30 what lies below is a problem of meaning.  
Guillory’s point that “there is a discourse of aesthetics long before there is any 
conception of aesthetic value,” recalls the fact that the concept of value enters the equation only 
when one sphere or object is compared to another. In this regard, aesthetic value is not really 
aesthetics, or, as Guillory puts it, in a more pronounced fashion, “the point is precisely that the 
comparison of authors or works to one another need not [. . .] be expressed as the comparison of 
their relative ‘aesthetic values,’ because neither the concept of the aesthetic, nor the concept of 
value, are as yet defined in such a way that they can be yoked together” (303): whereas aesthetics 
emerges as a discourse on the training of sensory perception, inaugurated with Alexander 
Baumgarten in the mid-eighteenth century as part of an exercise analogous to rational 
understanding,31 talk of aesthetic value is an import from British and French discourses on taste, 
in which what is at stake is, as La Rouchefoucauld writes of good taste at the end of the 17th 
century, the ability to “evaluat[e] each thing [. . .] appreciate its full value” [donner le prix a 
                                                
30 Cf. Richard T. Gray, Money Matters: Economics and the Cultural Imagination, 7. 
31 While there has recently been much emphasis on pre-Kantian aesthetics as a science of sense 
perception (and not as a genealogy of aesthetics in treatises on taste), some recent philosophers of 
aesthetics such as Christoph Menke see both the acts of evaluation that taste implies and the acts of 
sensory perception as analogous to thought as products of a certain disciplinary regime of bourgeois civil 
society in the 18th century. See for instance Christoph Menke, “Ein anderer Geschmack. Weder 
Autonomie noch Massenkonsum;” Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin. 
Baumgarten in der Perspektive Foucaults.”  
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chaque chose, qui en connaît toute la valeur”].32 In this regard, it seems surprising that Kant’s 
Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), largely credited with founding an autonomous notion of aesthetic 
value and arguing for the distinctness of aesthetic judgment, excises value from the sphere of the 
aesthetic altogether.33 In the Third Critique, value is presented as solely a practical matter, i.e., a 
moral issue and fully alien to the type of pleasure (“Wohlgefallen”) Kant wants to attribute to a 
judgment of taste in his analytic of the beautiful: “Das Angenehme, das Schöne, das Gute 
bezeichnen also drei verschiede Verhältnisse der Vorstellungen zum Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, 
in Beziehung auf welches wir Gegenstände oder Vorstellungsarten von einander unterscheiden [. 
. .] Angenehm heißt jemandem daß, was ihn vergnügt; schön, was ihm bloß gefällt; gut, was 
geschätzt, gebilligt, d.i. worin von ihm ein objektiver Wert gesetzt wird.”34 Value, as Kant sees it 
in the third critique, is the product of a value judgment, i.e. a moral deliberation, and not part of 
the ‘mere pleasure’ provoked by beauty, which if it is to have value at all, would, in the Kantian 
framework, have to be rooted in the subject’s “ansinnen” of other’s consent.35  
In the history of the German aesthetic tradition, one of the first formulations of aesthetic 
value thus comes not in the Third Critique but in the work of Karl Philipp Moritz. Up until 
philosophers and writers like Karl Philipp Moritz and Immanuel Kant lay the groundwork for an 
autonomy aesthetics at the end of the eighteenth century, the arts, writes Martha Woodmansee, 
“had been perceived as intervening directly in human life—as imparting and empowering 
                                                
32 “Taste” in La Rochefoucauld, Collected Maxims and other Reflections (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 219-218. See also Christoph Menke, “Ein anderer Geschmack. Weder Autonomie noch 
Massenkonsum,” esp. 228. 
33 On this problem of aesthetic value see Gérard Genette, “What Aesthetic Values?” in Gérard Genette, 
Essays in Aesthetics, 29-47. 
34 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 56. 
35 Where Kant does speak of aesthetic value, in paragraph 53, it is not about the autonomous validity of a 
judgment of taste. Value enters the equation when comparison is at stake; it serves the purpose of 
distinguishing and ranking the various fine arts on the basis of their respective merits.
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beliefs, as communicating truths [. . .] in a pleasing form—and their value and excellence as 
works of art had been measured instrumentally in terms of their success [. . .] in serving these 
broad human purposes.”36 Through the aesthetic debates between Gottsched and Breitinger 
around the middle of the eighteenth century – that in many ways first begin to address the value 
of literature – and up to the Enlightenment aesthetics of Mendelssohn or Lessing, a Horatian 
heritage continued to exert its influence on notions of what art was and what it was worth: art 
educated, entertained, and moved an audience; good art was art that exhibited formal perfection 
or worked on the perfectibility of humans.37 With the rise of autonomy aesthetics, however, art 
becomes, as Woodmansee formulates it with regards to Moritz, “a discrete realm of ultimate 
purpose,” “a perfectly self-sufficient totality that exists to be contemplated disinterestedly” 
(Woodmansee,12). And its value becomes “intrinsic” (italics in original). 
The disentanglement of aesthetic value from function, from a world of external purposes, 
a nexus of utilitarian relations, that begins to occur with Moritz’ emphasis on the work of art as 
an end in itself and – though tellingly he never speaks of aesthetic value in this sense – Kant’s 
emphasis on beauty’s purposiveness without purpose, is in fact less a severing of aesthetic from 
instrumental value as it is an articulation of art in terms of value at all. Indeed, the “radical 
departure from the two millennia of theorizing about the arts” that Woodmansee sees in Moritz 
Versuch can be measured in the fact that Moritz speaks of (aesthetic) value only in order to 
distinguish a beautiful work from a utilitarian object or non-aesthetic object – the mechanical 
work such as a clock or a knife – which has, Moritz writes, “keinen eigenthümlichen Wert” 
                                                
36 Woodmansee, Author, Art, and the Market, 12. Woodmansee’s italics.  
37 On how Mendelssohn bridges perfection as it is thought in the Rationalist paradigm of Wolff and 
Leibniz up to Baumgarten and German classicism’s idea of perfectability, see Kai Hammermeister, The 
German Aesthetic Tradition.  
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whatsoever.38 The intrinsic value of the aesthetic, supposed to be irreducible to the artwork’s 
cognitive, moral, economic, or otherwise practical value, is, however, intrinsic and indeed a 
value sui generis only in relation to a sphere of utility, which includes objects that have less a 
‘value’ than a ‘use.’ If beauty is precisely what is not useful to its observer, it follows that the 
value attributed to an aesthetic object in Moritz’ framework is tied to the observer’s selfless 
(“uneigennützig”) desire to revere (“huldigen”) rather than consume the beauty of the object. 
The emphatic articulation of an intrinsic value of art occurs, therefore, precisely at the 
moment emphasized in Jean Paul’s typology of audience members: the moment when the criteria 
of art’s value are simultaneously relegated to a “Kauf-Publikum.” As is well documented, by 
Woodmansee and others, the autonomy of aesthetic value is accompanied historically in 
Germany by the emergence of a mass literary public and an increasingly consolidated printing 
culture and market for the proliferation and sale of works of art, especially literary ones.39 When 
Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werther (1774) becomes an overnight bestseller, it becomes 
clear: autonomous literature is up for sale. The intrinsic quality of aesthetic value is thus at the 
very moment of its first articulations in the final decades of the eighteenth century, haunted by 
the valuation of art in an extrinsic market sphere, which art, if it is to have aesthetic value at all, 
must paradoxically acknowledge and disavow at the same time – acknowledge, because the 
concept of value, as Moritz’s remarks clarify, depends on the comparison of competing spheres 
and works; and disavow because the concept of autonomous value at the same time represses this 
dependency. And this means that art’s value will be defined ex negativo, as invaluable, as that 
                                                
38 Karl Philipp Moritz, “Versuch einer Vereinigung aller schönen Künste” in Schriften zur Ästhetik und 
Poetik, 4. 
39 This is the main point of Woodmansee’s study, especially her chapter on Moritz, “The Interest in 
Disinterestedness.” On a related note, i.e. not in terms of aesthetic value but in terms of the exemplarity of 
art, in the face of a rising literate public and the danger of mediocrity this situation entails see Paul 
Fleming, Exemplarity and Mediocrity. 
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which has no exchange value, i.e. as art’s claim to a kind of validity, a kind of value, sui 
generis.40  
The argument of this dissertation is, in this context, not that “art was invented to stem the 
commercialization of literature,” as Woodmansee suggests, but, inversely, that the 
economization of literature produces a different kind of art. Put differently, the point is not that 
aesthetic autonomy requires a discourse of (economic) value but that the discourse of economic 
value – in the literary text, at least – is a discourse on whatever might or might not be aesthetic 
autonomy.  
The Superfluous Value of Prose 
Taken to its extreme, the antithetical aspect of art’s invaluableness becomes absolute and 
threatens to lapse into worthlessness, sterility, or insignificance. The problem arising from this 
dynamic forms the second premise of this study. As Goethe will suggest allegorically through 
the figure of the “Knabe Lenker” in the famous Mummenschanz scene of Faust II, poetry 
becomes, by this logic (an art that sells), “Verschwendung:” “Bin der Poet, der sich vollendet/  
Wenn er sein eigenst Gut verschwendet.” Against the market’s law of value, poetic literature 
takes the Bataillian path: it becomes expenditure; its perfection (“Vollendung”) no longer its 
internal coherence as a hermetic seal against the nexus of utilitarian relations but an auto-
                                                
40 See Bourdieu on Flaubert for an extension of the problem into the second half of the nineteenth 
century: “The symbolic revolution through which artists free themselves from bourgeois demand by 
refusing to recognize any master except their art produces the effect of making the market disappear. In 
fact they could not triumph over the 'bourgeois' in the struggle for control of the meaning and function of 
artistic activity without at the same time eliminating the bourgeois as a potential customer. At the moment 
when they argue, with Flaubert, that ‘a work of art [ . . .] is beyond appraisal, has no commercial value, 
cannot be paid for,’ that it is without price, that is to say, foreign to the ordinary logic of the ordinary 
economy, they discover that it is effectively without commerical value, that it has no market. The 
ambiguity of Flaubert's phrase, saying two things at once, leads to the uncovering of a sort of infernal 
mechanism, which is set up by artists and in which they find themselves caught: making a necessity of 
their virtue, they can always be suspected of making a virtue of necessity.” Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, 
81. 
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affective act of waste. This is, indeed, the flipside of literary autonomy, as Werner Hamacher has 
suggested in his reading of Goethe’s Faust: 
Bloße Literatur zu werden, das war die Gefahr, der sich die Literatur am Anfang ihrer 
frühen Moderne ausgesetzt sah. Nicht bloß auf dem Papier zu stehen, sondern dem 
Leben, seinen Affekten und individuellen Regungen zum Ausdruck zu verhelfen, um 
selber ins Leben eingreifen zu können, diese Absicht charakterisierte den frühen 
Expressionismus, mit dem sich die deutsche Literatur in der zweiten Hälfte des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts von den Musterpoetiken ihrer Tradition und vom drückenden 
Vorbild der klassizistischen Nachbarliteraturen zu emanzipieren versuchte.41 
 
Autonomy, in this regard, not only marks an emancipation from the weight of authoritative 
poetic models or imitation imperatives, but, as Hamacher suggests in a reading of the paper 
money scene in Goethe’s Faust II with regard to a (capitalist) law of value, a loss of credit. The 
consequence of this emancipation is a literature mired in the paradox of its own groundlessness, 
indeed in the “Unverläßlichkeit, Unbeständigkeit und Wertlosigkeit” of its words, something to 
which the Faustian contract with the devil attests as a “Vertrag zwischen Unverträglichem” that 
in a Nietzschean manner, reveals only the impossibility of vouching for oneself or actually 
giving what one promises (134). The word that literature gives will have to, as Hamacher argues 
for the semiotics of the paper money issued by the “Kaiser” in Goethe’s play, depend for its 
value on an act of self-accreditation that would, like the public credit that serves as a “Credo des 
Kapitals” in Marx’s analysis of primitive accumulation,42 guarantee value only insofar as it rests 
on an original debt and makes this debt into the substance of a Credo that is constantly at risk of 
                                                
41 Werner Hamacher, “Faust, Geld,” Athenäum: Jahrbuch Für Romantik 4 (January, 1994): 131. 
42 “Der einzige Teil des sogenannten Nationalreichtums, der wirklich in den Gesamtbesitz der modernen 
Völker eingeht, ist – ihre Staatsschuld. Daher ganz konsequent die moderne Doktrin, daß ein Volk umso 
reicher wird, je tiefer es sich verschuldet. Der öffentliche Kredit wird zum Credeo des Kapitals. Und mit 
dem Entstehen der Staatsverschuldung tritt an die Stelle der Sünde gegen den heiligen Geist, für die keine 
Verzeihung ist, der Treubruch an der Staatsschuld. Die öffentliche Schuld wird einer der energischsten 
Hebel der ursprünglichen Akkumulation. Wie mit dem Schlag der Wünschelrute begabt sie das 
unproduktive Geld mit Zeugungskraft und verwandelt es so in Kapital [. . . ] Die Staatsgläubiger geben in 
Wirklichkeit nichts, denn die geliehene Summe wird in öffentliche leicht übertragbare Schuldscheine 
verwandelt, die in ihren Händen fortfungieren, ganz als wären sie ebensoviel Bargeld.” Karl Marx, Das 
Kapital, 782-783.  
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unwinding.  
In a perhaps slightly more positive manner, Jochen Hörisch has described this particular 
economy of a literature no longer ‘backed’, as it were, by the substance of, say, a Regelpoetik as 
a possibility rather than liability for literature:  
Schöne Literatur ist stets von dem Verdacht umgeben, funktional überflüssig zu sein . . . 
Das Überflüssige aber ist auch das, was im Überfluß lebt und sich deshalb leisten kann, 
was andere sich versagen müssen. Literatur begreift sich schon früh und verstärkt seit 
dem 16. Jahrhundert als das Medium, das die Probleme der Deckung nicht hat und diese 
Probleme gerade deshalb umso besser beobachten kann. Denn Dichtung stellt gar nicht 
erst den Anspruch, ihre Aussagen seien gedeckt. Dichtung ist eben Fiktion: sie muß nicht 
durch wirkliche Ereignisse oder durch Realien gedeckt sein.43 
 
For the purposes of this study, this desubstantialization of value and literature means that 
literature, if it is to articulate its value at all, must necessarily generate the form in which its 
value can be articulated. This, I argue, is what the economic topos of Überfluss in Tieck, 
Schuldenverkehr in Keller, and Leistung in Walser does. Just as Jean Paul’s preface provides the 
economic framework in which his literature can stake its claim to value – how can literature’s 
value as irreducible to the accountant’s double-entry arithmetic be expressed without the set-up 
of the comptoir? – so too do the literary texts in discussion here imagine their value in the 
economic terms they themselves provide. Structurally, then, the poetic problem of literary value 
calls not for a grounding of value in the normative schema of canonization,44 of a literary 
axiology or Wertung,45 or concept of the work as a transmitter of other values,46 but for what 
                                                
43 Jochen Hörisch, Kopf oder Zahl, 19-20. See also Hörisch’s reading of Goethe’s Mummenschanz scene 
as a “Hermeneutik des Mangels” in Kopf oder Zahl, 184-189.   
44 See Guillory, Cultural Capital. Gayatri Spivak points to the problems of a literary axiology and raising 
the question of value in literary criticism, which, as she suggests, “surfaces [. . .] with reference to canon-
formation,” in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value,” 74.  
45 See Jochen Schulte-Sasse, Literarische Wertung. Barbara Herrnstein Smith offers the most substantial 
critique of what she calls “axiological logic” at stake in theories of judgment, taste, and evaluation. Her 
solution is to show value to be contingent in the sense of the product of multiple variables: “All value is 
radically contingent, being neither a fixed attribute, an inherent quality, or an objective property of things 
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Hans Blumenberg has called, in a different context, an “immanente Poetik”.47 In other words, if 
literary value can be grounded at all, such grounding will occur in and as form.48  
The Value Form as Method (Marx, Simmel) 
Form in this sense, and the value form as a concept that shapes this dissertation’s inquiry, 
relies on Marx’s definition of the Wertform in the first volume of Das Kapital (1867), a text that 
can be credited (along with Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral [1887]) with the most 
substantial discussion of value in the nineteenth century. The concept of the value form marks in 
a single word what makes Marx’s text a critique rather than just another variant of bourgeois 
political economy and distinguishes his from other labor-theories of value (in the vein of Ricardo 
or Say). Marx’s inquiry into the value form shifts the emphasis in the question of value from 
substance (what is value? Where does it come from? How is it measured?) to function and to the 
pivotal question, “warum dieser Inhalt jene Form annimmt, warum sich also die Arbeit im Wert 
[. . . ] darstellt.”49 Marx’s pivotal discovery was not the category of value itself, nor the labor 
                                                                                                                                                       
but, rather, an effect of multiple, continuously changing, and continuously interacting variables.” 
Contingencies of Value, 30. 
46 See for instance Terry Eagleton, “Marxism and Aesthetic Value” in Criticism and Ideology: “Literary 
value is a phenomenon which is produced in that ideological appropriation of the text, that 
‘consumptional production’ of the work, which is the act of reading. It is always relational value: 
‘exchange-value’” (166-167). 
47 Hans Blumenberg, “Sprachsituation und immanente Poetik” in Ästhetische und Metaphorologische 
Schriften, esp. 122. 
48 This is a slightly different point than claiming that literature’s engagement with the economic is part of 
its self-reflectivity. If literature, as Blumenberg has suggested, can problematize precisely what a given 
epoch considers “das Selbstverständlichste und Trivialste,” “was auszusprechen [. . .] nicht der Mühe wert 
wird,” and in this way critically engage an epoch’s dominant sense of what reality is, literature can also 
form a kind of self-evidence where there is none. See also Eva Geulen and Peter Geimer, “Was leistet 
Selbstreflexivität in Kunst, Literatur und ihren Wissenschaften?” 
49 Marx, Das Kapital, 95. This discussion of the value form in Marx is indebted to remarks by and 
conversation with Christoph Menke in Frankfurt, Germany. The remarks were made in a roundtable 
discussion at a symposium entitled The Value of Critique held in Frankfurt’s Städelschule on January 19, 
2017. Video of the roundtable can be found here: http://www.normativeorders.net/de/69-
veranstaltungen/5150-roundtable-labour-and-value. The conversation took place in Bistro Aida in 
Frankfurt’s Westend.  
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theory of value, but rather the social form in which value is expressed. Analyzing the value form 
allows Marx, in contrast to the labor theories of value proffered by Smith or Ricardo, to pose the 
question of how value forms labor-power into a social commodity, rather than the question of 
how labor constitutes value. What Marx discovered is that value is, first and foremost, a social 
relation, and neither just a quantity of labor congealed in a commodity nor a subject’s projection 
(of pleasure or displeasure) onto a good. Because value is always only given in formal 
expression and as a relation between signs, the language it speaks is a kind of “gesellschaftliche 
Hieroglyphe;” value knows only “form of appearance” [“Erscheinungsform”] and has qua 
representation or “Darstellung,” a “gespenstische Gegenständlichkeit.” Marx’s value form 
renders, in other words, value transitive and representational; not in the sense that value is purely 
differential or semiological,50 the product of an interplay of substitutions,51 but in the sense that 
the value form abstractly indexes a historically specific social practice (the comparison of 
commodities as products of labor, even if the commodity is money). In this regard, the value 
form is not only the product of a practice of evaluation (exchange) but itself productive of what 
can count (in what constellation) as value at all. The value form is thus the production of those 
formal parameters through which a thing, a commodity, a literary text can express its value or 
address value in the first place. To put it concretely: when Gottfried Keller writes of 
                                                
50 Saussure suggests this dimension of value connects linguistics and political economy. See for instance 
his example of the value of a coin as determined by similarity and dissimilarity within a given system in 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, esp. 135. 
51 Jean-Joseph Goux makes this the basis of his study of the ‘general equivalent’ in Jean-Joseph Goux, 
Symbolic Economies. “Now the notion of value, whether for exchange, compensation, indemnification, 
purchasing, or repurchasing, is implied in every replacement. Whether this exchange involves 
comparison, substitution, supplementation – or translation and representation – value enters into it. Value 
is presupposed by formal identity and by indemnity, even if no real permutation, no give-and-take trade 
actually makes the substitution of equivalents visible; even if no barter, no circulation, no apparent 
bargaining dramatizes the counterbalancing and Supplementary in all senses and all registers of the word, 
the interplay of signs, objects, and symptoms as governed by values—exchange-values. These values—
whether linguistic, commercial, sexual, or legal—may be seen in the interplay of ‘substitutive 
formations,’ in the ‘in the place of’ structure that inheres in every sign in general” (9-10). 
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Schuldenverkehr, this ‘value form’ will act as the medium (for Keller specifically) in which 
literary value – as the question of poetic transfiguration, the realist ‘valorization’ of the marginal, 
excluded, or unnecessary, the question of what is worth writing – can be articulated. And, 
furthermore, Schuldenverkehr will elucidate the specifically literary logic of stories of fortune or 
Glück, which, Keller’s novella suggests, can only be told with a remainder, a debt left 
uncollected, an obligation unfulfilled, a concatenation, conjuncture, or Fügung, in Keller’s 
words, that can never quite balance the books. In this context, the methodology of this 
dissertation is a kind of value formalism. The emphasis on form in this dissertation – and indeed 
much of this study’s approach to the relation between aesthetic and commodity value – is 
indebted to Adorno’s well-known dictum: “Die ungelösten Antagonismen der Realität kehren 
wieder in den Kunstwerken als die immanenten Probleme ihrer Form. Das, nicht der Einschuss 
gegenständlicher Momente, definiert das Verhältnis der Kunst zur Gesellschaft.”52 The value 
form of literature is in this sense a mediation of reality’s unresolved antagonisms (for instance 
the antagonism between the work of art and other forms of work, or what Keller will describe as 
a ‘right’ to the poetic and the literary in the age of the locomotive). But what Adorno wants to 
exclude from the equation (objective moments or ‘content’), this study doesn’t – or rather this 
study treats form as Adorno will define it in a different constellation: as “sedimentierter Inhalt” 
(15). Content matters; yet, as Marx’s concept of the value form demonstrates, it does so only as a 
“spectral objectivity,” that is, as a “Gegenständlichkeit” without substance, as it were; rooted, as 
it is, in a social practice which can never quite appear as such. 
Finally, the value form describes not only how literature addresses what it is worth, but 
also plays an integral role in the production of meaning. Any relation between literature and the 
                                                
52 Theodor Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, 16. 
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economic, this study argues, must be located in the relation between meaning-production and 
value.53 In addition, then, to Marx’s value form, this study draws on Georg Simmel’s notion of 
value as a crucial dimension of what constitutes “Bedeutsamkeit.” For Simmel, “Bedeutsamkeit” 
derives from a relation to objects of desire that resist being had:  “So ist es nicht deshalb 
schwierig, die Dinge zu erlangen, weil sie wertvoll sind, sondern wir nennen diejenigen wertvoll, 
die unserer Begehrung, sie zu erlangen, Hemmnisse entgegensetzen.”54 Meaning 
[Bedeutsamkeit] – as something different than sense [Sinn] – is the result of an accrual of value 
                                                
53 This distances this study from others such as Joseph Vogl’s that locate the relation between the 
economic and the literary on the level of ‘knowledge.’ The economic trope in the texts studied here is less 
about literature’s epistemological contribution to an ‘order of knowledge’ about the economy than it is an 
attempt to trace literature’s own formal or poetic response to the economic. The emphasis on form here is 
meant to win back a bit of what Vogl has to exclude, namely a relation between form and content: “Die 
Möglichkeit einer Beziehung zwischen Literatur und Ökonomie [. . .] liegt nicht in einer 
Wiederspiegelung, sie liegt weder in einem Abbildsverhältnis noch in einer Beziehung von Text und 
Kontext oder in einer Relation zwischen Stoff und Form. Die Konjunktion von ‘Literatur’ und 
‘Ökonomie’ verfolgt hier vielmehr den Zweck, das Wissenssubstrat poetischer Gattungen und die 
poetische Durchdringung von Wissensformen aufeinander zu beziehen und beide damit im Milieu ihrer 
Geschichtlichkeit festzuhalten.” Joseph Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 14. The emphasis on forms of 
knowledge leads Vogl to describe the economy and literature as two modes of representing or ordering 
empirical subjects and things, both participants in an order of knowledge or discursive field primarily 
concerned with the organization, ordering, and ‘steering’ of people and goods. While the figure of 
‘Steuerung’ – which appears more than seventy times in Vogl’s study – certainly captures much of what 
German Polizeiwissenschaft was about and how a certain dispositive of contingency management 
operated in theories and praxes of literature up to 1800, the primacy of this cybernetic reading tends– 
perhaps in the wake of Foucault’s Oder of Things – to locate its intervention solely on the level of 
Darstellung or representation (but not in the sense of Abbildung) and medialization (i.e. graphs, charts, 
semiotic systems, instruments, etc.), making at times a rather stringent decision in advance on the relation 
between literature and economy, as Rüdiger Campe has suggested. Campe writes: “In its involvement 
with the relationship between literature and scientific discourses, however, a ‘poetics of knowledge’ tends 
to have critics assuming that they already know what literature is, and how literature is distinct from, and 
relates to, scientific discourse. The general doctrine of the ‘poetics of knowledge’ is representation. 
Literature, according to this doctrine, is first and essentially representation, whereas knowledge is 
articulated in specific discursive fields. Accordingly, the ‘poetics of knowledge’ addresses the following 
questions: how does literature incorporate specific discursive fields in its general play of representation? 
To which extent are epistemic discourses already forms of representation in themselves? And, finally, in 
which ways do representation and scientific discourses contribute to an exchange between literary 
representation and epistemic discourse, both in literature and in science?” Rüdiger Campe, “Body and 
Time: Thomas Mann’s Zauberberg,” 231. This study, while it also emphasizes representation, attempts to 
avoid assimilating literature’s representation of the economic to a given relation between science and 
literature, opting instead to see Darstellung or the ‘poetic’ as a ‘practical’ response to the determination of 
value by the economic. 
54 Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes, 35. 
  26 
that for its part results from a kind of resistance or difficulty. In this regard, one could say value 
is also the result of a kind of reality principle, of a run-in with prosaic reality that is all the more 
meaningful for the difficulties it causes for literature.55 In the context of this study, the value 
form points to the procedures of generating meaning that result from literature’s difficult 
encounter with the economic. In Tieck, in particular, a (non-Romantic) value and meaning will 
emerge through the difficulties which material reality poses to an aesthetic imagination that 
would have rather just projected its own value onto the world.    
Überfluss, Schuldenverkehr, Leistung 
This study brings the question of literature’s talk and form of value to bear on texts by 
Ludwig Tieck, Gottfried Keller, and Robert Walser, all composed in a period from the 1830s to 
the early twentieth century, after the ‘end of the Goethean Kunstperiode’ (Heinrich Heine). If 
German Classicism and Goethe in many ways papered over the fact that the value of German-
language literature was not self-evident – either through attempts to ground a classical national 
literature or through appeals to the singular originality of the author – the end of the 
Kunstperiode also marks a new void in what literature is worth. If Goethe’s works were 
invaluable, where and what should be the measure of value for any serious literary work that 
comes in their wake? This is in many ways a symbolic question. With the exception of Heine, 
writers of German-language prose after 1832 do not tend to explicitly position themselves and 
their works vis-à-vis Goethe. But in Tieck, Keller, and Walser, for instance, the questions and 
                                                
55 See also Blumenberg on this point in Simmel: “Bedeutsamkeit entsteht auch durch die Darstellung des 
Verhältnisses zwischen dem Widerstand, den die Wirklichkeit dem Leben entgegensetzt, und der 
Aufbringung der Energie, die ihm gewachsen macht. [. . .] Wert ist eine funktionale Spezifikation von 
Bedeutsamkeit, die auf die Objektivierung des Vergleichs und damit der Tauschbarkeit tendiert, ohne je 
das subjektive Moment ganz preiszugeben, das im ‚empfundenen’ Wert des Begehrten steckt.” 
Blumenberg ties this to Sisyphus’s mythical futility from whom one can learn “was es ausmacht nicht nur 
von Wirklichkeit, und nicht nur von einer dazu, okkupiert und besessen zu sein, sondern eines moderaten 
Realismus zu genießen.” Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, 87. 
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forms of value that are invoked tend not only to be borrowed from the repertoire of economic 
problems that Goethe, the first to raise the question of literary value, as Jochen Hörisch has 
suggested,56 addresses in his works. Perhaps more importantly, the works by Tieck, Keller, and 
Walser addressed in this study respond to a structural problem that Heine names the ‘end of the 
Goethean Kunstperiode’: if Goethe’s masterpieces possessed an indisputable “selbständigen 
Wert,” they have since become impotent (“unfruchtbar”),57 an ornament for German literature 
but no longer a source of value. The literature that follows Goethe’s will have to produce its own 
value rather than symbolically rely on the ground of value Goethe’s works provided. With 
Foucault, one could say, “Value has ceased to be a sign, it has become a product.”58 This is true 
for the period following Goethe in another sense as well. The latter half of the nineteenth century 
to the beginning of the twentieth century is a period defined in a particularly marked way by 
discussions of value, from Marx’s first inquiries into a capitalist value form to Nietzsche’s 
“Umwertung aller Werte” to Georg Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes (1900), with its substantial 
discussion of value, to Weber’s program of Wertfreiheit and the discussions around the role of a 
fact/value distinction in the human sciences, to the value philosophies of Max Scheler and other 
axiologies in phenomenology and Lebensphilosophie, following in the wake of 
Kulturpessimismus. Moreover, it is a time in which a capitalist regime of value becomes 
consolidated and disseminated, from the introduction of Gewerbefreiheit in Prussia in 1810 to 
                                                
56 Jochen Hörisch, “Werther stellt die Wertfrage - Zur Ökonomie der Werte in Goethes Bestseller” in Man 
muss dran glauben, 95-108. See also Fritz Gutbrodt, “The Worth of Werther: Goethe’s Literary 
Marketing,” MLN 110, no. 3 (1995): 579–630. “In the second half of the eighteenth century subjectivist 
conceptions of value became increasingly important for the emergence of a diverse market economy, and 
it is no accident that Werther, a novel that unfolds the drama of overestimating the worth of subjectivity, 
should articulate eighteenth-century speculations on economic, aesthetic, and moral values in the name of 
its protagonist” (581). 
57 Heinrich Heine, Die Romantische Schule, 154-155. 
58 Foucault, The Order of Things, 277. 
  28 
the massive industrialization of Germany in the course of the nineteenth century, the boom and 
bust of the Gründerjahre up to the inflation of Weimar Germany, against a backdrop of a shift in 
economic thought from substantialist to functionalist conceptions of economic value, ranging 
from those rooted in human labor to those rooted in the human mind.  
Focusing specifically on three central problems of value (lack and plenty or surplus and 
need; relations of credit and debt; and questions of merit, achievement, or performance), this 
dissertation argues that in the wake of Goethe – and working with many of the loci Goethe 
provides – a concern with the economy of prose and with something as prosaic as the economy 
serves German-language literature as a means to both grapple with literature’s relation to 
everyday life (the central problem of prosaic art) and reflect on the value of literature as art, as 
commodity, as work. The economy of prose in this regard is in form as well as in content the 
figure through which literature reflects its own worth. Borrowed from Marx’s conceptual arsenal 
for describing value’s ‘ghostly objectivity,’ the term value form or “Wertform,” which gives this 
study its title, names the way in which an economic motif becomes linked to a formal concern 
with literature’s value. Yet unlike, for instance, the literary field that Pierre Bourdieu describes in 
great detail as a “locus where belief in the value of art – and in that power to create value which 
belongs to the artist – is constantly produced and reproduced,”59 the value forms at the center of 
this study (surplus or Überfluss, credit and debt, Leistung and inventiveness) involve topoi of 
value that are, first of all, located in the literary work itself and, secondly, so intricately tied to 
questions of literary form that the sociological perspective for which Bourdieu advocates would 
fall short.60 The accounting office or Kontor in Jean Paul’s preface offers a good example in this 
                                                
59 Bourdieu, The Rules of Art, 292. 
60 “Questions of the meaning and value of the work of art, like the question of the specificity of aesthetic 
judgement, can only find solutions in a social history of the field, linked to a sociology of the conditions 
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regard. As an actual locus of economic value into which the literary author Jean Paul enters to 
reflect on his position vis-à-vis different ideal types of readers (and consumers) of his work, the 
comptoir is not only a sign of the industry of letters; it indexes not only, say, the uneasy relation 
between the aesthetic ambitions of the poet and the utilitarian calculus of the accountant. More to 
the point, it provides the motif of accounting for value (and meanings) Jean Paul (wittily) 
exploits to expose the semantic surpluses that result from the transactions of the mind that 
literature provokes. In other words: this study poses a problem of form for which the analytics of 
the philologist are as crucial as those of the sociologist. 
The first chapter, “Superfluous Prose (Tieck),” begins by explicating the economy of 
prose in an analysis of Novalis’ reading of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Lehrjahre. For Novalis, 
Meister announces an “economic gospel” that threatens to lead to art’s self-destruction. This 
chapter frames discussions of the tension between prose and poetry around 1800 in the context of 
this economic gospel, arguing that the self-destruction of poetic art by the prosaic, which Novalis 
names the crux of Goethe’s economic gospel, can be understood as a problem of literary 
valorization or Wertbildung, one lodged at the heart of Romantic notions of the work of art and 
the economy. The chapter then turns to the uptake of this problem in the nineteenth-century 
novella, analyzing, in this context, how Ludwig Tieck’s novella Des Lebens Überfluß (1837) 
conjoins the prose-poetry problem to an economic one: the relation between need and surplus 
(Bedürfnis and Überfluss in Tieck’s words) or lack and plenty. Situated between Romanticism 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the constitution of the particular disposition which the field calls for in each of its states. [. . . ] But in 
the infinite regress towards the primary cause and the ultimate foundation of the work of art's value, one 
must stop somewhere. And in order to explain this sort of miracle of transubstantiation which is the 
source of the work of art's existence - and which, though commonly forgotten, is brutally recalled through 
moves a la Duchamp - one must replace the ontological question with the historical question of the 
genesis of the universe in which the value of the work of art is ceaselessly produced and reproduced in a 
veritable continuous creation - that is, the artistic field.” Bourdieu, Rules of Art, 290-291.  
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and Realism, Des Lebens Überfluß conjures eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century 
discourses on luxury in moral philosophy (from the extravagant uselessness of the diamond in 
political economy to that of literature in debates about Leseluxus) in order to address the fate of 
the Romantic imagination in the context of utterly prosaic economic need. The problem of 
prose’s value is literalized in Tieck’s novella, which documents how a last-resort Romantic 
attempt to turn the lack of poetry in a prosaic world into surplus runs up against value’s sine qua 
non: finitude, or concretely in Tieck’s text, insolvency. Turning lack to plenty – not incidentally 
a central desideratum in Tieck’s notion of the Wunder – succeeds in Tieck’s novella only with 
the right “Zusammenhang,” something that – figured in the novella as a staircase (idealism), a 
book of prose (actual prose), and ultimately finance capital (the poetic or marvelous prosaic) – 
the literary text alone can provide. 
Chapter two, “Schuldenverkehr: Conjunctures of Fortune in Keller” addresses ethical and 
material economies of value in Gottfried Keller’s collection of novellas Die Leute von Seldwyla 
(Part One 1856; Part Two 1874). Keller’s novellas merge two master terms in discussions of 
value in the nineteenth century, debt and exchange (social, communicative, commercial), in the 
composite Schuldenvekehr, making transactions of credit and debt into a central topos of the 
Realist text. Keller’s stories of insolvency, bankruptcy, indebtedness, etc., which in a riff on their 
theological and economic motifs I call Fallgeschichten, operate not according to a principle of 
transfiguration or Verklärung but, like Tieck’s novella, one of Verwertung, picking up and 
valorizing what falls out of circulation or is expended in what Keller calls the “Kreislauf der 
Dinge.” This chapter turns specifically to Keller’s novella Kleider machen Leute (1874) to 
analyze the narrative construction of fortune (in the double sense of wealth and luck or Glück). 
Closest to discourse analysis (and a version of ideology critique), this chapter reads Keller’s 
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story together with Nietzsche’s and Marx’s writings on credit and debt as part of a 
‘transvaluation of values’ (Nietzsche) that ties ethical to material values and shows how the 
bourgeois narrative of fortune rests on a conjuncture or “Fügung” that is not godly (i.e. deus ex 
machina) but contingent in way that leaves a structure of credit and debt in tact.  
 Chapter three, “Performance and Invention: Robert Walser’s Leitungsroman” argues for 
what I call the Leistungsroman as Walser’s particular response to the modern novel, and 
specifically the Bildungsroman. In an analysis of Walser’s Der Gehülfe (1908) as a paradigmatic 
instance of the Leistungsroman I track a division of labor between invention and performance 
that characterizes the novel’s account of the economy of technical and literary invention. 
Walser’s Leistungsroman is centered around various types of clerical assistants – including 
Walser himself – who, unable to invent in their own name and subjected to an imperative to 
perform (“etwas zu leisten”), develop a set of responses and practices that capitulate to and put 
pressure on the value demands on their work. In this regard the Leistungsroman is both a 
document of a kind of alienation and a (weak) attempt at the transvaluation of the value of 
human and literary productivity by reconfiguring the novel’s relation to work, action, and 
invention. 
One of the guiding arguments of this dissertation is that talk of economic value in 
literature is not simply one kind of statement in a larger discourse network of political economy. 
Nor is it a way of sanctioning or generating representational and practical modes through which 
a discourse of value congeals. First and foremost, this study argues, talk of value in literary texts 
is talk of literature’s own value, of literature’s meaning-making procedures (its poetics) as ways 
of adding or producing value to the world. In this regard, the texts in discussion here posit a 
relationship between value and literary meaning, an economy of sense that stands in explicit 
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relation to what is conventionally understood as the economic. The works of Tieck, Keller, and 
Walser analyzed here offer particularly strong incidences of literature’s reflection on its own 
value via recourse to the economic. The economic is not the only register through which these 
texts address literary value but the economic trope offers a privileged lens through which to view 
their addresses of value: the trope of need and overabundance in Tieck questions the value poetic 
literature might add to a prosaic reality seen as poor in meaning and subject to a bourgeois law of 
value that reduces ends to means and calculates worth in terms of a symbolic circulation of 
esteem; it also implicates an ethics, anthropology and hermeneutics of prosaic life in its value 
schema. Credit and debt in Keller similarly raise questions of transfiguration or Verklärung as 
questions of Verwertung: how one puts to use the resources one has at one’s disposal in order to 
‘make’ something of greater value. In doing so it also raises the issue of ethos and the estimation 
of character in moral economies. Leistung in Tieck concerns a clerk’s performance on the job 
and is injected into a plot of insolvency that raises questions about the value of inventiveness and 
the possibility of an (undervalued) mode of literary practice. The aesthetic questions raised by 
these literary economies depend, moreover, on a deeper affinity between the literary and the 
economic in these texts, which can be seen in how economic concerns usher in specifically 
aesthetic ones. On this analogical level, the issue of lack and plenty translates aesthetically into 
the matters of stylistics, minimalism or ornamentation, austerity or extravagance, to-the-point or 
digressive narration; the issue of credit and debt raises questions of aesthetic semblance and 
deception, readerly acts of crediting a story as probable, suspending disbelief, or crediting a 
character; and the question of the work of invention versus the work of Leistung probes what 
type of work the work of art is, what sort of techne it involves, and also provokes questions of 
virtuosity and artlessness. 
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Like case studies, these chapters make local and specific points about texts by Tieck, 
Keller, and Walser, which also aim to highlight broader dimensions of their literary-historical 
moments. In this regard, this dissertation provides an account of how the problem of value or the 
relation between literature and economy is taken up in Romanticism, Realism, and Modernism, 
respectively. Moreover, by virtue of the methodological intervention this dissertation makes in 
studies of literary economies by reading across the fault lines of discourse analysis, new 
historicism, poetics of knowledge, poststructuralism, and new formalisms, these chapters 
indicate how concerns in literary theory in the last half-century are related to the problem of 
value: in addressing the superfluousness of the poetic, the chapter on Tieck joins a logic of 
literature as supplement to relations of lack and surplus in an economic sense; the chapter on 
Keller brings issues of fictionalization and character, which have been addressed, for instance, by 
Barthes, but also questions of ritualistic exchange/payback, imitation, and the carnevelesque that 
thinkers like Bakhtin or Girard have addressed, to bear on relations of credit and debt; and the 
chapter on Walser points to a mode of operative inoperativity, which it calls Fehl-Leistung, as a 
response to theories of inoperativity as they shape a certain tradition of leftist poststructuralist 
theory (in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Agamben, et al.). 
Finally, the value forms that each chapter addresses are not easily isolated. While 
individual chapters focus largely on a single form or problem of value, others inevitably creep in, 
revealing more densely intertwined relations between individual foci in this dissertation. Credit 
and debt, for instance, plays a role in every text addressed in this study: from Keller’s fictional 
‘paradise of credit’ with its down-and-out debtors in Die Leute von Seldwyla, to the protagonist’s 
discredited social status in Tieck’s Des Lebens Überfluss, to the creditors that appear in the 
insolvent engineer’s front yard to collect their outstanding debts in Walser’s Der Gehülfe. 
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Indeed, the problem first arises in Jean Paul’s preface with the merchant who is unable to be put 
asleep by Jean Paul’s narration as long as he cannot stop thinking about debts he is owed. The 
issue of surplus or superfluous waste, to name a second focus, is a central problem not only in 
Tieck’s novella but also in the prefaces to Keller’s Seldwyla and to the extravagant expenditures 
in the Tobler mansion in Walser’s novel. Finally, a concern with Leistung or performance forms 
the crux of Walser’s Der Gehülfe but also haunts Tieck’s protagonist and Keller’s story of a 
mistaken count’s performance of character in Kleider machen Leute. 
Überfluss, Schuldenverkehr, Leistung – these, then, are the terms through which this 
study will address the value of literature and the form this value takes.
  35 
CHAPTER ONE 
Superfluous Prose: Tieck’s Last Romantic Gesture 
 
 
“Die Frage ist: können wir das Überflussige entbehren? Eine Antwort ist: nur dann wenn das 
Notwendige, den Bedürfnissen Genügende noch nicht glücklich macht” 
Hans Blumenberg, Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit 
 
“Dans la société formée il n'y a pas de surabondant en aucun genre.” 
“In der entwickelten Gellschaft gibt es überhaupt nichts Überflussiges.” 
Guillaume-François Le Trosne, quoted in Marx, Das Kapital 
 
Exhausted Means 
About forty years after Jean Paul drafts Siebenkäs, at the far end of Romanticism, the 
protagonist of Ludwig Tieck’s novella Des Lebens Überfluß (1838) desperately looks to Jean 
Paul’s humoristic eponymous character for a way out of his dire financial straits. In a remark to 
his wife upon assessing their bleak situation, he comments, “Du weißt, liebste Clara, wie sehr ich 
den Siebenkäs unsers Jean Paul liebe und verehre; wie dieser sein Humorist sich aber helfen 
würde, wenn er in unsrer Lage wäre, bleibt mir doch ein Rätsel. Nicht wahr, Liebchen, jetzt sind, 
so scheint es, alle Mittel erschöpft?”1 Later in the story, when running low on firewood and food, 
Tieck’s protagonist turns again to Siebenkäs: “wenn wir Millionärs wären wie jener Siebenkäs, 
dann wäre es keine Kunst, Holz anzuschaffen und selbst bessere Nahrung” (196). Exhausted, as 
it were, of all other means, Tieck’s protagonist – an insolvent writer like Jean Paul’s – turns here 
to art, to another literary author and another literary character (incidentally an Armenadvokat) for 
a way out of economic duress. In his recourse to Jean Paul, Tieck’s protagonist most certainly 
did not have the preface to Siebenkäs in mind. Nevertheless, Tieck’s novella picks up where Jean 
Paul’s preface leaves off in addressing the economy and value of literature in an increasingly 
                                                
1 Ludwig Tieck, Des Lebens Überfluss in Schriften,12:194. All further citations to this edition. 
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(over)saturated literary market: it ponders the status of the book in the age of the 
“Lesebibliothek” (Tieck, 249) and mass readership; the worth of the bourgeois author in a sea of 
dime novelists; as well as the viability of poetic fantasy and frivolousness of narrative fancy in 
the face of a bankrupt world of prose. 
Tieck in fact spends much of his literary career wondering about the value of art and 
literature in the time of its commercialization, from his emphatic early Romantic manifestos of a 
Kunstreligion to the late Biedermeier novellas that address, in hardly oblique terms, the 
commercial market for original works by famous painters (Wunderlichkeiten [1836] and Die 
Gemälde [1821]), the real estate market (Waldeinsamkeit [1840], Der Runenberg [1804]), the 
dissolution of the guilds and capitalist organization of labor (Der junge Tischlermeistler 
[1836]),2 and, most explicitly, in the novella under discussion in this chapter: the autarky of an 
(invaluable) poetic existence shielded from the value system of a bourgeois prose of the world in 
Des Lebens Überfluss. Unlike Jean Paul, however, who with a great degree of irony brings his 
prose into the merchant’s comptoir, Tieck would seem, as his early collaboration with 
Wackenroder suggests, to want to drive art out of the market and into the temple: “Bildersäle 
werden betrachtet als Jahrmärkte, wo man neue Waren im Vorübergehen beurteilt, lobt und 
verachtet; und es sollten Tempel sein, wo man in stiller und schweigender Demut, und in 
herzerhebender Einsamkeit, die großen Künstler, als die höchsten unter den Irdischen, 
bewundern, und mit der langen unverwandten Betrachtung ihrer Werke, in dem Sonnenglanze 
der entzückendsten Gedanken und Empfindungen sich erwärmen möchte.”3 This reformulation 
and sacralization of disinterestedness, voiced by the “Friar” character in Tieck and 
                                                
2 For a larger analysis of this moment and its consequences for a Romantic anti-capitalism, see Patrick 
Eiden-Offe’s excellent Die Poesie der Klasse, esp. Chapter One, section one, “Romantischer 
Antikapitalismus: Ludwig Tiecks Der junge Tischlermeister.” 
3 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, Werke und Briefe, 201. 
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Wackenroder’s inaugural text for early-Romanticism’s enthusiast religions of art, Die 
Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders (1796),4 is an impassioned attempt to 
disentangle aesthetic from commercial value not by distinguishing the aesthetic judgment from 
the ‘judgment, praise, and scorn’ of the merchant but by suspending judgment altogether, in 
favor of the quasi-monastic, solitary contemplation of art. The Romantic sacralization of art that 
occurs, for instance, under the aegis of a ‘new mythology’ in Tieck’s Jena friend Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Gespräch über die Poesie, finds its loudest proponents in Tieck and Wackenroder, 
and functions explicitly as a response to art’s newly gained-autonomy and simultaneous 
interpolation into an art market. As Tieck will ask again in collaboration with Wackenroder in 
their Phantasien über die Kunst (1799): “Können wir denn die Göttlichkeit der Kunst, das 
Höchste, was die menschliche Seele hervorbringen kann, nach der Elle des Kaufmanns messen, 
oder nach Goldgewichten abwägen?”5 If the answer of the early art enthusiast Tieck would have 
been an emphatic no, by the time Tieck drafts Des Lebens Überfluss in the 1830s the answer is 
more complicated.6  The protective space of the temple and the trope of art’s divinity will – 
against the backdrop of Restoration politics since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Hegel’s 
declaration of the end of art in his lectures on aesthetics, Tieck’s quarrel with members of the 
                                                
4 Tieck and Wackenroder’s collaborative text is drafted just while Jean Paul is finishing his preface to 
Siebenkäs. 
5 Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst in Wackenroder, Werke, 290-291. 
6 In a related vein, Heinrich Heine describes three “Manieren” of Tieck’s oeuvre and his inconsistent 
“Werth” as a literary author: the first is the Tieck that writes only with the support of his patronizing 
publisher, “auf Antrieb und Bestellung eines Buchhändlers”; these works are, Heine concludes, “sehr 
unbedeutend, ja sogar ohne poesie,” “geitzig” as if Tieck were saving all his “geistige Reichtümer” for 
later (Heine, Die romantische Schule, 180). Heine praises Tieck’s second style, inspired by the early 
Romantic circle around the Schlegel brothers, which includes his early novellas such as Der blonde 
Eckbert and Der Runenberg; the third style is, however, the death knoll of Tieck’s enthusiast 
Romanticism: “Der ehemalige Enthusiast, welcher einst, aus schwärmerischen Eifer, sich in den Schooß 
der katholischen Kirche begeben, [. . .] welcher die Kunst nur in der naiven Herzensergießung liebte: 
dieser trat jetzt auf als Gegner der Schwärmerey, als Darsteller des modernsten Bürgerlebens, als 
Künstler, der in der Kunst das klarste Selbstbewußtseyn verlangte, kurz als ein vernünftiger Mann” (182). 
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Junges Deutschland group7 – seem to have become superfluous, frivolous, luxurious.  
In this context, Tieck’s Des Lebens Überfluss responds to a growing concern with the economy 
of prose at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This chapter charts how a value form of 
literature emerged in a post-Goethe economy of prose to become a central concern for the 19th-
century novella. It begins by outlining this concern as it paradigmatically expresses itself in 
Novalis’ readings of Goethe’ Wilhelm Meister at the beginning of this chapter. The economy of 
prose, or in Novalis’ language the economic gospel, that Goethe’s novel articulates entails 
prose’s turn to those economic matters that shape a (bourgeois) prosaic consciousness, as Hegel 
will call it. The economy of prose describes, in this regard, a subset or specific inflection of a 
larger aesthetic topos in the first half of the nineteenth century, namely the relation between 
prose and poetry. The central literary project of transfiguring the prosaic world turns out in this 
context to be a project not only of aesthetic Verklärung but also of economic Verwertung, that is, 
the valorization of prose (literature).  
As this chapter’s reading of Des Lebens Überfluss aims to show, Tieck’s novella stages a 
last-ditch attempt at a literary valorization of the world of prose and the prose of the world, 
turning this gesture into its main narrative event; the novella ultimately ends in a kind of 
Wirtschaftswunder: a wondrous economic event that determines the fate of a poetic, Romantic 
imagination in a prosaic economy. What Tieck had developed as a central poetics of Romantic 
literature – a poetics of the Wunder – in an essay on Shakspeare (“Über Shakespeare’s 
Behandlung des Wunderbaren” [1793”) is brought to bear on the economy of prose in Des 
Lebens Überfluss. While the early poetics of the “Wunder” aimed, as Dorothea von Mücke 
                                                
7 On Tieck’s relationship to the Young Germany movement and on his position in the historical context of 
Restoration Germany, see the entries “Das Junge Deutschland” and “Tiecks Epochalität (Spätaufklärung, 
Frühromantik, Klassik, Spätromantik, Biedermeier/Vormärz, Frührealismus)” in Ludwig Tieck: Leben, 
Werk, Wirkung, 120-130; 131-147. 
  39 
writes, at a “critique of a narrow and ultimately reductionist view of reality,”8 Tieck’s late 
novellas respond to the problem articulated by the characters of Des Lebens Überfluss: “Wir 
leben eigentlich [. . .] so wunderlich, wie es nur in der Tausend und einen Nacht 
geschildert werden kann. Aber wie soll das in der Zukunft werden; denn diese sogenannte 
Zukunft rückt doch irgend einmal in unsre Gegenwart hinein” (235). This future was for Tieck 
beginning to seem largely determined by a prosaic economy whose encroachment on the poetic 
could be registered right down to the individual word. Tieck captured this relation between the 
marevelous and poetic and the prosaic economic in an observation from the beginning of his 
final novella, Waldeinsamkeit (1841). In a scene centered around a nostalgic retrospective 
reflection on the literature of the “vorigen Jahrhunderts”9 and in particular Tieck’s own literature, 
the characters at the opening of the novella comment on how Tieck’s neologism 
“Waldeinsamkeit,” which became a central topos of Romantic marvel, is appropriated for a real-
estate listing:  
Sonderbar genug [. . .] daß ein vor Jahren unerhörter Ausdruck, der sein poetisches 
Gewand nicht ablegen kann, ebenso in das alltägliche Geschäftswesen übergegangen ist, 
wie die Ausdrücke ‚ins Leben treten —  Leistungen — sich herausstellen — Begebnisse — 
etwas beleben,  statt erleben’ — und dergleichen mehr, oder wie 
‚Zunftzwang,  Fabrikanstalt, Besserungshaus’ — die mehr oder minder notwendig, oder 
uns für das Alltägliche aufgedrungen sind. 
As part of an apology for Tieck’s neologism, which in its first appearance in Tieck’s Der blonde 
                                                
8 Dorothea von Mücke, The Seduction of the Occult, 5. Von Mücke defines Tieck’s Wunder as a text-
immanent playing against each other of reality and illusion in the Romantic text that devises a mode of 
inviting acceptance of the fantastic as part of ordinary reality amongst an increasingly skeptical, 
Enlightnement audience. The marvelous provides in this way an “antidote to narrow, shallow, predictable, 
and imporverished constructions of reality” (6). 
9 The scene’s set-up of a previous Romantic and future prosaic generation of literary authors seems in a 
way to echo Tieck’s response to a polemic against him by members of the liberal Junges Deutschland 
group when he writes, “so viele dieser neuen großen Entdeckungen und Wahrheiten [of the younger 
literary generation] schön längst in meinen Schriften, zum Teil den frühsten, stehen.” Tieck, Der Junge 
Tischlermeister in Schriften, 11:12. 
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Eckbert (1797) was rejected by contemporaries, the opening of Waldeinsamkeit insists that 
poetic concepts cannot lose their poetic quality when transferred to the sphere of the everyday 
(what the narrative calls “Gewöhnungen”), even and especially in the utilitarian context of real 
estate.10 Des Lebens Überfluss turns this problematic into a novella by posing the question of 
whether the Romantic and poetic becomes – against an encroaching prosaic future – simply 
superfluous. 
Poetic Waste 
As suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, the last decades of the eighteenth 
century are characterized by a double move: aesthetic value becomes intrinsic and extrinsic at 
once. The time around 1800 witnesses the ascent of originality or genius authorship as the 
supreme value of modern literature; the first formulations of an art religion of the Romantics that 
sought to turn art’s liberation from imitation into a springboard for a speculative metaphysics; 
and the rise of the commercialized book industry, the copyrighted author, and the mass reading 
public.11  Precisely as German literature is turning to its own internal mechanisms and its author 
                                                
10 On the basis of this commentary on the “Immobilienanzeige,” a development of the early nineteenth 
century, Thomas Wegmann argues for a “Literaturgeschichte einer affektiven Immobilie.” see Wegmann, 
“Über das Haus.” Tieck’s novella coincidentally names “Leistungen” as another example of these 
“Gewöhnungen.” “Leistung” in this prosaic economic sense is the subject of chapter 3 in this study. 
11 For an account of the complicated emergence of originality as a prime value of modern literature 
against the backdrop of a democratization of literature, the rise of a book market and middle-class literary 
public see Fleming, Exemplarity and Mediocrity. The Romantic coupling of non-imitation with a new 
mythology resonates in many Romantic corners around 1800 and is central to, for instance, Schlegel’s 
Gespräch über die Poesie. In another context, Schlegel equates imitation with bad ‘economy’: “Alle 
Nachahmer in der Poesie und Philosophie sind eigentlich verlaufne Ökonomen. Jeder Mensch hat seinen 
ökonomischen Instinkt, der gebildet werden muß, so gut wie auch die Orthographie und die Metrik 
gelernt zu werden verdienen. Aber es gibt ökonomische Schwärmer und Pantheisten, die nichts achten als 
die Notdurft und sich über nichts freuen als über ihre Nützlichkeit. Wo sie hinkommen, wird alles platt 
und handwerksmäßig, selbst die Religion, die Alten und die Poesie, die auf ihrer Drechselbank nichts 
edler ist als Flachshecheln.“ Friedrich Schlegel, “Athenäums-Fragmente,” frag. 390 in Fragmente der 
Frühromantik, 72. On the rise of commercialized authorship in the context of copyright, see Heinrich 
Bosse, Autorschaft ist Werkherrschaft and Woodmansee, Author, Art, and the Market. 
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for its criteria of value,12 it finds itself confronted with a literary market and cannot (or no 
longer) deny its economy and status as commodity. The pressure to articulate literary value in 
terms of market value (even if ex negativo) leads literature into the curious position of declaring 
itself superfluous or extravagant, in short: a luxury good.13 As suggested in the introductory 
reading of Jean Paul’s preface to Siebenkäs, literature since the end of the eighteenth century will 
provide its own grounds for what constitutes its value and do so in explicit or implicit dialogue 
with the literary market.14 The story of literature’s autonomy is simultaneously the story of its 
release into an industry of letters in which the high value of literature will come to be articulated 
in a negative relation to the economy of the book market: in terms of invaluableness, non-utility, 
extravagance, or frivolity. On a structural level this liberation entails a hefty paradox for 
literature: it is forced to measure its value both in and outside the terms of the market. Rendered 
                                                
12 Luhmann emphasizes this point more generally for the art system on a whole and pinpoints this turn 
inward to the Italian Renaissance, in particular: “Erst seit dem späten Mittelalter kann man davon 
sprechen, daß Kunstwerke Kriterien zu genügen suchen, die in der Kunst selbst liegen [. . .] Aber wie 
konnte es kunstspezifische Kriterien geben, wenn man gar nicht gewohnt war, Kunst unabhängig von 
sinngebenden Kontexten zu beurteilen? Und wie könnte man die Beobachtung von Kunst als Kunst auf 
eigene Beine stellen, wenn es solche Kriterien noch gar nicht gab?” Luhmann, Kunst der Gesellschaft, 
257. In the context of Italian Renaissance art, Luhmann identifies the emergence of artistic virtuosity as a 
guarantor of aesthetic value: “die Einschätzung der Kunstwerke verlagert sich vom Wert des verwendeten 
Materials (Gold, teure Blaus) plus Arbeitszeit wie beim Handwerk in das künstlerische Können. Das hatte 
eine Aufwertung des Ansehens der schönen Künste und einzelne Künstler zur Folge” (258). 
13 For a detailed history of literature’s relation to luxury see Matt Erlin, Necessary Luxuries. This chapter 
converges with many of Erlin’s concerns, though Erlin connects these concerns to concrete historical 
developments in Germany’s national economy and book market, with a focus on the book itself rather 
than, as in this study, the poetic, formal, or philosophical implications of this relation between economy 
and literature. “Books and reading [. . . ] were also closely associated with aspects of the eighteenth-
century concept of luxury that are more alien to our contemporary sensibilities and can thus help us to 
grasp the historical specificity of the categeory: the association of luxury not just with the expensive or 
the rare or the ornamental, but especially with the excessive and the superfluous, with overstimulated 
senses and a runaway imagination. These characteristics of the book as artifact, together with the unique 
capacity of literary texts to take up a position vis-à-vis their own commodity status, made the literary 
sphere a privileged site for grasping the emergence and working through the impact of what eighteenth-
century observers perceived as modern luxury” (3). 
14 Even a literary programs as far from commercial concerns as Schlegel’s ‘new mythology’ is explicitly 
articulated as a challenge to a new reading culture and to the book market: “Durch die Myth.[ologie] wird 
die Lectüre und d[er] Buchhandel ein Ende nehmen. Das Lesen ist nah daran sich selbst zu vernichten.” 
Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, 18:257. 
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a singular commodity with little use-value in daily life, literature nonetheless must possess an 
exchange-value that it simultaneously disavows in order to qualify as literature. Irreducible to yet 
dependent on an industry of letters, literature is inscribed in a law of value it exceeds. It thus 
structurally faces the risk of being not just a luxury good but, worse, a superfluous one. I recall 
here Jochen Hörisch’s point, quoted in this dissertation’s introduction, that literature’s status as 
superfluous is both a consequence of its exceptional commodity status and a condition of 
possibility for its particular modes of imaginative practice and fictionality.  
Schöne Literatur ist stets von dem Verdacht umgeben, funktional überflüssig zu sein [. . .] 
Das Überflüssige aber ist auch das, was im Überfluß lebt und sich deshalb leisten kann, 
was andere sich versagen müssen. Literatur begreift sich schon früh und verstärkt seit 
dem 16. Jahrhundert als das Medium, das die Probleme der Deckung nicht hat und diese 
Probleme gerade deshalb umso besser beobachten kann. Denn Dichtung stellt gar nicht 
erst den Anspruch, ihre Aussagen seien gedeckt. Dichtung ist eben Fiktion: sie muß nicht 
durch wirkliche Ereignisse oder durch Realien gedeckt sein.15 
 
If literature in Hörisch’s account gains autonomy through its self-declaration as superfluous, 
Werner Hamacher’s reading of Goethe’s alignment between literature (“Poesie) and 
extravagance (“Verschwendung”) in the allegorical guise of the “Knabe Lenker,” steering the 
cart of the god of riches, Pluto (with Faust behind the mask), is far more skeptical. As Hamacher 
will pose the question in his reading of Goethe’s Faust: if value is, first and foremost, something 
that is represented, how can it have any substance at all? For Hamacher this question is 
simultaneously the question of language; and the insubstantiality of value simultaneously the 
insubstantiality of the contract between Faust and Mephistopheles, that is the insubstantiality of 
one’s given word:  
Aus der Prämisse der Insubstantialität von Welt und Sprache ergeben sich für Faust zwei 
zwingende und unaufhebbar widersprüchliche Konsequenzen: wo kein Wort Bestand hat, 
kann auch das Wort nichts gelten, das seine Unbeständigkeit verspricht . . . Zum andern 
muß aber da, wo kein Wort gilt, dasjenige Wort alles gelten, das die Unverläßlichkeit, 
                                                
15 Jochen Hörisch, Kopf oder Zahl, 19-20. 
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Unbeständigkeit und Wertlosigkeit des gegebenen Worts behaupte.16  
The economy of literature rests, by this logic, on a promise of meaning (and value) that in the 
moment of its articulation is already expended, used up, or squandered prior to any 
accumulation. As Joseph Vogl suggests in his Hamacher-inspired reading of the allegory of the 
Knabe Lenker, literature is like the “Knabe” in that both figure a “Verheißung, die Fülle 
verspricht und Mangel erzeugt.”17 In Hamacher’s reading, the expenditure or “Verausgabung” of 
meaning and wealth in Goethe’s play follows a logic of Schein or semblance that, beyond the 
phenomenal appearance of value, ultimately retains what cannot be fully expended in appearing. 
In other words, a certain ground of value remains, which Hamacher, following Kant and Goethe 
calls “Würde.” “Würde” as Kant describes it in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 
(1785) is distinct from both market and emotional value, from a value that is linked to “die 
allgemeinen menschlichen Neigungen und Bedürfnisse” and therefore has a “Marktpreis,” and 
from a value that, “auch ohne ein Bedürfnis vorauszusetzen, einem gewissen Geschmacke, d.i. 
einem Wohlgefallen am bloßen zwecklosen Spiel unsere Gemütskräfte, gemäß ist” and for this 
reason has an “Affektionspreis.” Only “Würde” as an “innerer Wert” has neither price nor 
“relativen Wert.” It is the value that constitutes the “Bedingung [. . . ] unter der allein etwas 
zweck an sich selbst sein kann.”18 When Goethe’s play announces that “Das Würdige beschreibt 
sich nicht” (5562), this becomes in Hamacher’s reading the possibility of rescuing a non-
positive, insubstantial (condition of) literary value out of its structural tendency towards 
superfluousness. 
 
                                                
16 Hamacher, “Faust, Geld,” 134. 
17 Joseph Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 326. 
18 Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, quoted in Hamacher, 156, note 26. 
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Hörisch has suggested that not Faust but Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister is marked by the 
interrelated observation of an “Überfluß der Bücher” and a “Knappheit des Geldes” as 
“komplementarën Daten.”19 As Hörisch describes it, quoting the novel: Wilhelm Meister “muß, 
Dramen schreibend, erfahren, daß ‘das goldne Zeitalter der Autorschaft,  . . . (in dem ) die Presse 
noch nicht die Welt mit soviel unnützen Schriften überschwemmt hatte,’ genau dann vorüber ist, 
wenn auch Schöngeistern (wie ihm) ‘der Wert und die Würde des Goldes’ unabweisbar werden” 
(Hörisch, 63). Indeed, if the Knabe of Goethe’s Faust allegorically links poetry with waste, 
Wilhelm Meister is taught the very prosaic lesson that art pays. This is the case, for instance, 
when, in the scene Hörisch quotes here, Wilhelm reluctantly receives monetary remuneration for 
his work as a writer. While the Baron who acts as Wilhelm’s patron here insists that Wilhelm see 
this “Gabe” not as a “Belohnung” of this talent but, quite simply, as an “Ersatz” for his time and 
“eine Erkenntlichkeit” for his “Mühe” – which because humans are not all “Geist” can be used as 
a “Mittel” in order to satisfy the “Bedürfnisse” of the body – Wilhelm sees the compensation, 
which turns his work of art into a means to an end, a medium of exchange, as an assault on the 
singularity of his artistic work and a hindrance to “das freie Spiel einer glücklichen 
Erinnerung.”20 In other words, what Wilhelm rejects when he first turns down the Baron’s 
payment is both the latter’s valuation of Wilhelm’s art qua work in terms of labor-time – albeit 
in the Classical sense of Smith and Ricardo as time spent by a given human worker 
manufacturing a product and not in Marx’s critical sense of socially necessary labor-time – and 
the latter’s instrumental reduction of the work of art to the satisfaction of needs. Wilhelm thereby 
                                                
19 Hörisch, Kopf oder Zahl, 63. 
20 Goethe, Wilhelm Meister, 203. 
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implicitly insists on the value of his work as superfluous to need at the same time that he accepts 
the payment as a compensation (and solution) for his otherwise poor economizing of time and 
money (“Ich habe sowohl mit dem Gelde als mit der Zeit [. . . ] nicht zum besten hausgehalten” 
[204]).21 In recognizing the “Wert und Würde” of the money “als ob [. . . ] zum ersten Mal,” 
Wilhelm navigates a third-way and can both have his autonomy aesthetics, with its imperative of 
singular, immaterial value (“Ehre” or “Würde”), and see his art reduced to way of making ends 
meet (through the “Wert” of money). Indeed, while the baron had insisted the payment was not 
an expression of the value of Wilhelm’s talent, Wilhelm can now see it as the “Erwerb, den er 
seinem Talent schuldig war” – that is, as both an economic and aesthetic valuation of his work, 
that both provides for him materially and intensifies his aesthetic sensibility. Wilhelm’s work of 
art is thus not the pure expenditure of poetry but the necessary surplus. 
An Economic Gospel (Novalis on Goethe) 
Even as it has become the locus classicus for discussions of art and economy, Goethe’s 
Faust is hardly the only text of the period to question the position of Poesie vis-à-vis a larger 
economy of literature (is it excessive, superfluous, extravagant, etc.?).22 I have already suggested 
that Jean Paul’s preface to Siebenkäs drives an analogy between letters and numbers to its 
extreme, rendering poetic literature (as opposed to, for instance, the Wiener Briefe or promissory 
notes Jean Pual carries with him) that which puts the merchant to sleep in its extravagant 
digressiveness. But perhaps the most famous novel of the 1790s, Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister 
launches even more explicitly discussions about the economy of prose and the value of the 
                                                
21 On Goethe’s own reserves about the Honorar see Bosse, Autorschaft ist Werkherrschaft, 79-80. Bosse 
suggests that only in the Goethezeit do literary authors become scrupulous about accepting an Honorar. 
22 Marx’s many citations of Faust in his theory of money are probably the start to this. Of late, see for 
instance the conclusion to Richard T. Gray, Money Matters; see also Marc Shell’s “Language and 
Property: The Economics of Translation in Goethe’s Faust” in Money, Language, Thought; see chapter 5 
of Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft. 
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poetic. In his fragmentary notes on Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, Novalis offers a biting, if telling, 
critical assessment of Goethe’s novel: “Gegen Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. Es ist im Grunde ein 
fatales, albernes Buch [. . .] undichterisch im höchsten Grade, was den Geist betrifft – so 
poetisch auch die Darstellung ist.”23 Having unequivocally praised Goethe’s novel up until 1799 
precisely for its poetic achievement as a masterwork of Romanticism,24 in his notes from 
February 1800 Novalis is at once emphatic and ambivalent in condemning Goethe’s text. 
Swaying between reproach for the novel’s lack of poetic spirit and praise for its poetic form, 
Novalis succinctly formulates what he sees to be the central paradox of Goethe’s novel in a letter 
to Ludwig Tieck: “[…] ich sehe so deutlich die große Kunst, mit der die Poësie durch sich selbst 
im Meister vernichtet wird.”25 The paradox of a work of art that artfully destroys what makes it 
great art – the novel’s poetic self-destruction – is for Novalis part of the “Farce” that lurks 
behind Goethe’s “poetisierte bürgerliche und häusliche Geschichte” (Schriften 3:639). In 
Goethe’s novel, poetry becomes the ‘harlequin’ of its own comedy of errors as the prosaic 
bourgeois relations of the novel take the upper hand. The art of Goethe’s novel thus lies neither 
in poetic potentiation (one of Novalis’ definitions of Romanticism) nor in fulfilling Schlegel’s 
famous definition of progressive universal-poetry but rather in poetry’s reflexive confrontation 
with its own impossibility in an age of prose, a confrontation that itself runs the risk of 
destroying the Romantic: “Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre sind gewissermaßen durchaus prosaisch 
[. . . ] Das Romantische geht darinn zu Grunde” (638). While Novalis’ remarks are hardly 
                                                
23 Novalis, Schriften, 3:646. 
24 See for instance frag. 87 in Das allgemeine Brouillon: “Romantik. Absolutisirung – Universalisirung – 
Classification des individuellen Moments, der ind[ividuellen] Situation etc. ist das eigentliche Wesen des 
Romantisirens. vid. Meister. Mährchen.” Novalis, Schriften, 3:256. 
25 Novalis to Ludwig Tieck, Jena, February 23, 1800, in Schriften 4:321-323. In this letter Novalis not 
only repeats verbatim his critique of the novel in his published fragments, he also announce his desire to 
write a review of Wilhelm Meister: “Wenn die Litt[eratur] Zeit[ung] nicht so jämmerlich wäre, so hätt ich 
Lust gehabt eine Recension von Wilh[elm] Meist[ers] L[ehrjahren] einzuschicken.”  
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unequivocal and shift erratically in tone26 – as they unfold the tension between the prosaic and 
the poetic that will become a definitive topos in the discourse on the end of (poetic) art around 
1800,27 they are consistent in one crucial regard: in linking the fate of poetry in Wilhelm Meister 
to the economy of prose in Goethe’s novel. “Sehr viel Oeconomie – mit prosaischen, wohlfeilen 
Stoff ein poëtischer Effect erreicht” (639). The economy of prose, it would seem, lies here in a 
kind of literary optimality: the achievement of maximum (poetic) effect with a minimum of 
poetic content;28 or, as Novalis expresses it, drawing an analogy between Wilhelm and 
alchemists of gold, in the surplus generated out of the contingency of prosaic relations: “Sie 
suchen viel – und finden zufällig indirect mehr.” But if the economy of prose in Goethe’s novel 
would seem to describe one particular possibility of poetic presentation, the pure ascent of the 
economic in the novel likewise spells out the self-destruction of poetry as Novalis describes in 
his letter to Tieck: “während sie [die Poesie] im Hintergrund scheitert, die Oeconomie sicher auf 
                                                
26 Novalis’ inconsistent comments on Wilhelm Meister are exacerbated by the complicated editorial 
history of Novalis’ writings. As the editor and commentator of the collection Goethe im Urteil seiner 
Kritiker, Karl Robert Mandelkow notes, Novalis’ negative remarks may be heavily redacted, if not 
forged, by Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich Schlegel, the editors of Novalis’ Schriften. “Durch Umstellung der 
originalen Reihenfolge und Weglassung wichtiger Textteile wurde die gegen Goethe gerichtete negative 
Tendenz der Fragmente verstärkt. In dieser Form haben die vielbeachteten Goethe-Fragmente des Novalis 
die Wirkungseschichte des Wilhelm Meisters nicht nur, sondern Goethes überhaupt wesentlich 
mitbestimmt.” Karl Robert Mandelkow (ed.), Goethe im Urteil seiner Kritiker, 544. Despite these 
editorial problems, Novalis’ review sets the tone for much of the reception of Goethe’s novel in the 19th 
century. See also Hans-Joachim Mähl, “Novalis’ Wilhelm-Meister-Studien des Jahres 1797.” 
27 Paul Fleming points out that Novalis’ comments on Wilhelm Meister anticipate Hegel’s lexicon of the 
end of art and contextualizes Novalis’ reading of Goethe’s novel as part of the aesthetic complex of 
Wilhelm Meister: how can art engage the average, mediocre, or ordinary and still remain art? See 
Fleming’s discussion of “The Art of Renunciation” in Exemplarity and Mediocrity, esp. 106-113. 
28 This optimality is noticed by other Goethe readers as well, for instance Schiller, who writes positively 
to Goethe of how “mit Wenigem [. . .] schon soviel ausgerichtet [ist]” in the novel. Schiller to Goethe, 
Hamburger Ausgabe. This sense of economy in terms of optimality is, at least implicitly, indebted to the 
metaphysics of Leibniz’s theodicy in which God “[realisiert] das Maximum der Existenz und das 
Optimum an Essenz des Seienden in einem gegebenen Raum durch Ökonomie und Sparsamkeit, indem er 
demjenigen folgt, was kompossibel ist.” Pierre Koslowski, “Maximierung von Existenz,” 58. Koslowski’s 
article points to overlaps in Leibniz’ sense of economy and the discipline of political economy. On 
Leibniz’ economy of optimalization and maximization and its implications for early theories of the novel 
see chapter three “System der Begebenheit” of Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, esp. 154-159.  
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festen Grund und Boden mit ihren Freunden sich gütlich thut, und Achselzuckend nach dem 
Meere sieht” (Schriften 4:323).  
Novalis’ usage of economy with regards to Goethe’s prose is two-pronged.29 On the one 
hand, it describes the economic subject matter, the Stoff of Goethe’s Bildungsroman, most 
notably Wilhelm’s struggle to negotiate between aesthetic (“Sinn für schöne Kunst”) and 
commercial (“Geschäftsleben”) aspirations;30 or the bourgeois economic teleology Novalis 
identifies in the novel: “Wilhelm soll oeconomisch werden durch die oeconomische Familie, in 
die er kommt” (Schriften 3:639). In fact, anticipating one of the central terms of Lukács Theorie 
des Romans, Novalis names the tension between the fine arts and commerce in Meister, between 
“Schönheit und Nutzen,”31 a problem of “Dissonanz” (2:518, italics in orginal) that the 
“wahrhaft poetisch[er], prosaisch[er]” novel turns into a “Konsonant.” As subject matter, then, 
the economy of prose Novalis identifies in Goethe points moreover to a larger theory of the 
Roman and of Romantic art.32 On the other hand, economy describes the novel’s formal 
                                                
29 Cf. Vogl: “Hardenberg spricht [. . .] von der Ökonomie in einem doppelten Sinn: von einer, die sich 
zuletzt durch Zweck/Mittel-Verhältnisse, egoistische Absichten, Resultatslogik und einen willkürlichen 
Plan definiert [. . .] und von einer anderen Ökonomie, in der Zwecke und Mittel, Ursachen und 
Wirkungen ineinander übergehen, in der es keine ökonomische Teleologie, sondern nur eine Teleologie 
des Ökonomischen gibt.” Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 268.  
30 Novalis, Fragmente und Studien, quoted in Goethe im Urteil seiner Kritiker, 171.  
31 Novalis, Schriften, 2:581. This is, after all, one of, if not the, central problem of literary and aesthetic 
value in the 1790s, as mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation. It haunts aestheticians, like 
Hutcheson, Hume, Kant, and Moritz, and literary authors alike. In a somewhat different vein, Franco 
Moretti has analyzed this tension with regards to the style of prose in bourgeois literature and links 
usefulness as a ‘keyword’ to an underlying principle of “Zweckrationalität” in modern prose. See Moretti, 
The Bourgeois, esp. 35-44. 
32 This point would require further elaboration that this chapter has no space for. In his theory of the 
novel, Lukács sees life’s dissonance – which is, in fact, the counter term to totality – as the central 
problem of form, which it is the latter’s task to resolve: “Jede Kunstform ist durch die metaphysische 
Lebensdissonanz definiert, die sie als Grundlage einer in sich vollendeten Totalität bejaht und gestaltet.” 
The modern novel, in particular, faces dissonance as a problem of what Lukács calls “das Nicht-
Eingehen-Wollen der Sinnesimmanenz in das empirische Leben.” Lukács, Theorie des Romans, 69. Of 
course, following the early Romantics, Lukács’ solution to the problem of dissonance in the novel is irony 
as the “Selbstkorrektur der Brüchigkeit” (74). In a different context, Lukács suggests that the consonance 
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organization, its narrative economy, the táxis or order of its prose with its ‘melodic’ distribution 
of elements.33 The economy of Goethe’s prose in both these senses is the fulcrum of Novalis’ 
reflections on the poetry of Wilhelm Meister: with the economy of its prose, the poetry of the 
novel rises and falls. In his earlier comments on the novel in Das allgemeine Brouillon, Novalis 
links the poetic rhythm with which the novel’s ‘ordinary’ material is presented to the 
“oeconomischen Vertheilung” of its adjectives.34 And the novel’s turn to the everyday, to the 
prosaic life of the ordinary and normal, is aesthetically redeemed through the absolute economy 
of this average world: the order of the domestic household (“die Nettigkeit und Ordnung ihres 
Hauswesens” – up until the nineteenth century economy retains its sense as the order of the 
house/oikos) in Meister; the orchestrated actions of Goethe’s moderately talented characters; the 
well-economized, “zweckmäßige” use and distribution of time all constitute the novel’s most 
                                                                                                                                                       
that Novalis is after marks the splitting point between Romanticism and Goethe, see “Zur romantischen 
Lebensphilosophie: Novalis” in Die Seele und die Formen, 73-88. On the role of dissonance and irony in 
Lukács’ Theorie des Romans see Eva Geulen, “Response and Commentary” in Romanticism and 
Biopolitics, ed. Alastair Hunt and Matthias Rudolf. December 2012. Romantic Circles. 18 October 2017. 
https://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/biopolitics/HTML/praxis.2012.geulen.html; Rüdiger Campe, “Form and 
Life in the Theory of the Novel” in Constellations 18, no. 1 (2011): 62-63. 
33 For Vogl, the dual valence of economy in Novalis’ notes on Goethe’s novel marks an epistemic 
difference between a late-enlightenment paradigm of economic order in terms of teleological/means-ends 
relations, i.e. a logic of result and plan, and a radically modern, Romantic economic paradigm of infinite 
process, anti-teleology, and autoregulative systematicity. Novalis’ writings signal for Vogl a turn to a 
paradigm of an autopoetic system that derives its ‘beauty’ from the degree to which it mobilizes a 
semiotic system of self-promulgating signs and media, that is, to quote Novalis: a “Proceß, wo das Mittel 
die Hauptsache und das Resultat die Nebensache wird: schöner Proceß” (quoted in Vogl, 268-270). See 
Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 255-88. 
34 Novalis, “Üb[er] W[ilhelm] M[eister], frag. 445 in Schriften, 3:326. By 1800 economy has already 
become a term that describes the order of a number of systems (linguistic/literary, monetary, psychic, 
etc.). The Grimm dictionary suggests that Ökonomie makes its way from the Greek-latinized oeconomia 
as a designation for the order of the household (“Haushaltungskunst,” etc.) into German in the 16th 
century, coming to be used in a general and figurative way to describe “die anordnung und zweckmäszige 
einrichtung eines ganzen.”  On the improper/figurative use of economy in rhetoric, see Burkhart 
Cardauns, “Zum Begriff der ‘oeconomia’ in der lateinischen Rhetorik und Dichtungskritik,” in Theo 
Stemmler (ed.), Ökonomie: sprachliche und literarische Aspekte eines 2000 Jahre alten Begriffs, 9-18. 
On semantic shifts in the term as evidence by a history of German dictionary entries, see Gisele Harras, 
Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm (Leipzig, 1854-1961), s.v. “Oekonomie.” See also 
the entry “Economy” in Barbara Cassin and Steven Rendall (ed.), Dictionary of Untranslatables.  
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memorable and aesthetically pleasurable moments. In his later, more condemning comments 
“Das Romantische” of Goethe’s novel perishes and the evisceration of Naturpoesie leaves 
behind nothing but economic nature: “Die ökonomische Natur ist die wahre – übrig bleibende.”  
As Novalis reads it, the “autocapitulation” of poetic art in the face of the economy of 
prose cannot be fully prevented in Wilhelm Meister, neither by Goethe, who for Novalis is a 
“ganz praktischer Dicther” that treats his literary works like the Brit his “Waren” (Schriften, 
3:640), nor by Meister himself who can merely slow down (“retardieren”) but ultimately cannot 
prevent “das Eindringen des Evangeliums der Ökonomie.”35 For all of its efforts to poeticize 
“gewöhnlichen menschlichen Dingen” (Schriften 3:638), Goethe’s novel can at best embrace the 
this economic gospel, the economy of its prose, which in the wake of poetry’s self-destruction 
establishes itself, as Novalis writes to Tieck, “auf festen Grund und Boden.” The economy of 
prose in Goethe’s novel thus paradoxically marks both the limit of Romantic art in the novel and 
the condition of possibility for poetic presentation; a limit insofar as economy marks an 
instrumental logic of means-ends, a possibility insofar as economy points to the generation of a 
surplus, the contingent, indirect ‘more’ of Wilhelm Meister’s alchemy. Novalis’ linking of the 
struggle between prose and poetry, as Friedrich Schlegel will describe it,36 to the formal and 
                                                
35 Novalis, Schriften, 3:647. Autocapitulation is Fleming’s term for Novalis’ account of what happens to 
art in “Goethe’s poetic affirmation of prosaic reality.” Fleming, Exemplarity and Mediocrity,  Novalis’ 
rather acerbic analogy between British commodities and Goethe’s prose works belongs to the same 
uneasiness expressed in Jean Paul’s preface to Siebenkäs about the status of literature as a ‘good’ to be 
peddled. 
36 “Der Roman überhaupt kann als die Poesie der Prosa, als ein Kampf gegen das ihr entgegenstehnde 
prosaische Element angesehen werden—als ein Bestreben, alles Prosaische zu überwinden, zu besiegen 
und poetisch zu gestalten.” Or, in a commentary on Tieck’s novel William Lovell that is similar in tone to 
Novali’s critique of Wilhelm Meister: “Das ganze Buch ist ein Kampf der Prosa und der Poesie, wo die 
Prosa mit Füßen getreten wird und die Poesie über sich selbst den Hals bricht.” Elsewhere Schlegel writes 
of Tieck’s novel: “Geist des Buchs unbedingte Verachtung der Prosa und Selbstvernichtung der Poesie.” 
Schlegel, quoted in Hamacher, “Friedrich Schlegel’s poetologische Umsetzung von Fichtes unbedingtem 
Grundsatz” in Modern Language Notes 95 (1980): 1175; 1178. As Hamacher points out, prose poses a 
danger to the novel insofar as it marks the beginning of the “Niedergang der Poesie in die Sphäre bloßer 
 
  51 
thematic economy of Goethe’s prose means that at stake in the economy of prose is precisely the 
possibility of Romantic art: can a prose literature that embraces something as prosaic as the 
economy still become Romantic Poesie without elevating the economic, as a logic of means/ends 
and sphere of utility, to a final purpose? Or, put differently, the possibility of Romantic art as this 
struggle between the prosaic and the poetic is, for Novalis, an economic question. This is the 
case insofar as the economic describes a principle of optimized narrative order in the work of 
prose: from the concatenation of events or Vorfälle, the constellation of characters, to the 
‘economic distribution’ of verbs, the steady pace of narration (“Der Text ist nie übereilt,” “Die 
Verweilung ist überall dieselbe,” “der poëtische Takt”), and the ‘melodic’ and ‘marvelous’ 
‘Romantic order’ of Goethe’s novel, which shows little concern for “Rang und Werth, Erstheit 
und Letztheit – Große und Kleinheit” (Novalis, Schriften 2:326). In other words, the narrative 
economy is, in short, the balance of intensivity (the condensed focus on the single event or 
character, the diction of the novel) and extensivity (the infinite spectrum of possible events and 
characters, etc.) that allows prose – otherwise lacking poetry’s meter, strict form, etc. – to 
become poetry. But even more crucially: what becomes clear in Novalis’ comments is that 
narrative economy is important insofar as the economic provides, to borrow Carl Schmitt’s 
description of this line, the prosaic occasion, as it were, for an infinite (poetic) Romanticism.37 
Novalis’ main definition of Romanticism as a “qualit[ative] Potenzirung” must be read 
then in conjunction with his comments on the economy of prose in Goethe as a logic of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mitteilung zu praktischen Zwecken” (1176). In other words, what Novalis will name economy is part of 
the larger complex of prose’s instrumentalized communicational function, the flipside of which, for 
Novalis as well as for Schlegel, is the “Bedingung ihres [Prosas] Aufstiegs zur Darstellung des 
Absoluten.”  
37 See Carl Schmitt’s reading of Novalis’ definition of Romanticism as a process by which “jeder Vorfall” 
might become the “erstes Glied einer unendlichen Reihe – Anfang eines unendlichen Romans.” Schmitt, 
Politische Romantik (Munich: Duncker & Humboldt, 1919), 70. 
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valorization, indeed as the logic of a self-reflexive process of generating value. What Marx will 
later call surplus value or Mehrwert in his discussion of the “Wertbildungsprozess” in the 
economic sphere of production is prefigured here in Novalis in poetic terms. While Joseph Vogl 
has drawn attention to the striking similarities in Novalis’ comments on economy, money, and 
signs and Marx’s analysis of the process of circulation in his Grundrisse, likening Novalis’ 
description of a “schöner Prozess” as the inversion of the means-ends relationship (Novalis: “wo 
das Mittel die Hauptsache und das Resultat die Nebensache wird”) to Marx’s rather – in this 
regard – Romantic emphasis on how any point in the process of monetary circulation can 
function as both, in Marx’s words, “Anfangs- und Endpunkt,”38 the overlap between these two 
thinkers of economy lies perhaps more properly in their similar description of the valorization 
process. What Marx calls the “okkulte Qualität” of value to self-valorize, “sich als Mehrwert von 
sich selbst als ursprünglichem Wert abstößt, sich selbst verwertet” and names “prozessierender 
Wert” or “automatisches Subjekt” in a “maßlos[e] Bewegung,” is in fact what Novalis has in 
mind when he defines romanticization in self-reflexive terms as “nichts als eine qualitative 
Potenzierung” that gives “dem Endlichen einen unendlichen Schein” (Novalis, Schriften 2, 545). 
The ultimate economic art of Goethe’s novel would be to turn the prosaic bourgeois 
world poetic: “Schöne, liberale Oeconomie: Bildung einer poetischen Welt um sich her. Dichten 
mit lebendigen Figuren.”39 Thus, it is less because Wilhelm Meister preaches an economic gospel 
                                                
38 Novalis and Marx quoted in Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 269. 
39 Novalis, Das Allgemeine Brouillon: Materialien zur Enzyklopädistik 1798/99 in Schriften 3:469. In a 
letter to Caroline Schlegel, Novalis uses this same formulation: “Die Poësie mit lebendigen Kräften, mit 
Menschen, und sonst gefällt mir immer mehr. Man muß eine poëtische Welt um sich her bilden und in der 
Poësie leben. Hieher gehört mein mercantilischer Plan. Diesem ordne ich die Schriftstellery unter. Ich 
lobe W[ilhelm] wegen seines lebhaften Treibens der Professorey. Auch dies gehört zur schönen, liberalen 
Oeconomie, dem eigenlichen Element der gebildeten Menschen.” Novalis to Caroline Schlegel in Jena, 
Freyberg 20 Jan 1799 274-276. Schriften 4:275. In his study of economy in early Romanticism, which 
makes Novalis’ phrase its title, Reinhard Saller suggests that Novalis’ note here marks a shift from an 
older application of the word economy to aesthetics in terms of a rationalist demand for 
 
  53 
that poetry destroys itself in Goethe’s novel than because Goethe fails to make this gospel poetic 
enough, that is, fails to poetically capitalize upon the world of prose in his novel. Novalis does 
not outright reject the economy of prose in a simple dichotomy of “Dichtung und Wirtschaft” 
(Vogl,) but aims to develop an economic gospel of his own that would poetically trump 
Goethe’s.40 This gospel would be his own Bildungsroman Heinrich von Ofterdingen, which, as 
he writes in his letter to Tieck aims to be an “Apotheose der Poësie.”41 
By outlining the economic dilemma of Goethe’s prose novel, Novalis stumbles upon a 
central literary problem around and especially after 1800: what value, poetic or otherwise, does 
prose add to the world? Pace Vogl, for instance, who reads Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen 
as a “poetische wie ökonomische Programmschrift” and Novalis’ work more largely as signaling 
an epistemic shift in economic orders of knowledge around 1800 away from older paradigms of 
circulation and equilibrium towards “operationalisierten Selbstreferenz,” I suggest that Novalis 
comments on Goethe’s Bildungsroman address a particularly literary question that cannot be 
neatly subsumed under a discursive affinity between economic knowledge and literary text. 
Beyond such convergences between political economy and narrative literature in questions of 
(auto)regulation, governance, or “Steuerung,” (i.e. of literary protagonists and economic actors 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Zweckmäßigkeit” and order to the demand for a “unkontrolliert (‘lebendig’) verlaufende Ordnung der 
Welt, die sich nach Kategorien der Ästhetik vollzieht und in deren Zentrum Poesie steht.” Saller thus 
reads the economic in Novalis as the driving force between a Romantic synthesis of art and life. Reinhard 
Saller, Schöne Ökonomie, 50. It is worth noting overlaps between Novalis’ and Schlegel’s review of 
Wilhelm Meister. Much of what Schlegel comments on in Goethe’s novel (the “retardirende Natur,” the 
irony that allows persons and events to become ends in themselves, the ‘accents’, the way in which minor 
events take on great meaning, etc.) Novalis translates into an economic idiom. See Friedrich Schlegel, 
“Über Wilhelm Meister” in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, vol. 2, ed. Ernst Behler (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1967) 126-147. 
40 See Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 268. 
41 Novalis, Schriften 4, 322. 
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alike);42 beyond converging semiologies of language and money around 1800, Novalis’ 
comments on the intrusion of an ‘economic gospel’ in Goethe’s prose address a concern about 
literary value irreducible to discursive entanglements between literature and economics as they 
sketch out the rules, techniques, or laws of an order of knowledge about regulation and order. 
Notwithstanding Novalis’ encyclopedic ambitions to form a second-order “Wissen des Wissens,” 
his reading of an economic gospel in Wilhelm Meister concerns less knowledge tout court than 
the very aesthetic question of how poetic literature can valorize the prosaic relations of everyday 
life, a question that will resonate throughout the nineteenth century.43 In this regard the economy 
of prose, while it belongs to a larger encyclopedic network of economic knowledge in Novalis’ 
oeuvre, addresses a different dimension of the economic than, say, his writings on political 
economy as a “Lebensordnugnslehre.” For Novalis what ultimately makes Goethe’s novel a fatal 
book and a self-destruction of poetry is not its prosaic encounter with the economy but the fact 
that this encounter fails to become something more, that is, fails to generate the surplus-value of 
                                                
42 This is one of the main points of contact between political economy as an order of knowledge and the 
novel as a literary genre concerned with contingency in Vogl’s account. See especially Vogl’s analogy 
between the Turmgesellschaft in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Adam Smith’s famous trope of the 
invisible hand. Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 35-38. In his discussion of Novalis’ economy, Vogl comes to the 
conclusion that “Das Romantische [. . . ] ebenso wie eine ‘schöne liberale Ökonomie’” in Novalis 
becomes a “Kritierium und Test für die autoregulative Kraft von Funtionssystemen überhaupt: das gilt für 
ein Wissen von der Regierung ebenso wie für die Ordnung des Romans.” Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 
270. See also Vogl’s chapter “Ökonomie und Regierung” in his recent Der Souveränitätseffekt for a more 
general account of economy as a question of order and governance. This account is, of course, heavily 
influenced by Agamben’s recent reading of economy as the question of theological governance in The 
Kingdom and the Glory. 
43 Richard Gray has argued that an anti-physiocratic rhetoric of economics emerges in German thought 
towards the end of the 18th century to displace a concept of value that locates the source of value in nature 
with a concept of value in terms of human labor (Marx, of course, marks the tail end of this shift for 
Gray). Gray argues that this discursive shift coheres with a transformation in aesthetic thought from a 
notion of artistic creativity premised on imitation to one premised on imagination. Imagination, like 
human labor, can become the source of surplus value and human productivity. Thus, for instance, in 
Kant’s aesthetics of artistic genius as in the anti-physiocratic writings of Goethe’s brother-in-law Johann 
Georg Schlosser, “imagination is conceived as a fundamentally creative, indeed value-creative force.” 
Richard T. Gray, Money Matters, (157). 
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poetry necessary to turn the prosaic world into art.  
Behind the backs of the Bourgeoisie: The Wirtschaftswunder of the Novella 
In the early 19th century, what is hitherto an almost unheard-of genre in German letters 
enters the German literary scene and becomes a dominant genre of the century at the moment 
that the economy of prose becomes a problem: the novella.44 The novella becomes a privileged 
site for an investigation into the economy of prose precisely because of its extreme economy 
both structurally and formally: the novella essentially launches widespread popular literature, 
bolstering the literary market in the early nineteenth century. Moreover, the novella is 
characterized by an extreme economy of narration and by an almost obsession with economic 
matters. The 19th-century German novella displays a surprising interest in economic matters: the 
reflections on the substantiality of money in Chamisso’s Peter Schlemihl; in addition to the 
problem of ignorance, Tieck’s Der blonde Eckbert (1797) is also concerned with material wealth 
(Bertha’s story); even Stifter’s Kalkstein (1853) is about a priest’s poverty and ends with an 
economic problem, Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten (1795), as the inaugural 
novella of modern German literature, reflects on movable and immovable property, proprietary 
and improprietary wealth, and all sorts of material and cultural “Güter;” Eichendorff’s Aus dem 
Leben eines Tagenichts (1826) is about “Broterwerb;” Grillparzer’s Der arme Spielmann (1847) 
                                                
44 See also Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books: “The genre of the novella collection experienced a 
tremendous rise in popularity in the first half of the nineteenth century across Europe and the Atlantic, a 
fact that offers an important counterweight to the importance that scholars have accorded the novel in 
thinking about literary form around 1800. Where the novel functioned as a key genre at the turn of the 
nineteenth century to explore the possibility of networking—of bibliographic everywhereness—it was the 
novella collection that emerged to address the problem of literary repetition and the bibliographic copy” 
(65). As Piper argues, despite its name the novella is a genre less concerned with literary novelty than 
with secondarity and reproduction. Highlighting specific literary and publishing practices in the 
nineteenth century, with a focus on E.T.A. Hoffmann, Piper shows how the novella was less about 
Innerlichkeit and more about Äußerung. 
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about a poor musician.45 
Moreover, the novella relies on its extreme narrative economy – its precision, 
construction, and concatenation – for its surplus of meaning; the stricter its economy the greater 
its surplus value. Less focused on processes of forming subjective identity like the 
Bildungsroman and less tied to the latter’s teleological structure,46 the novella often becomes a 
site for negotiations about what is worth writing down at all and how (i.e. in what order). In other 
words, in the 19th century the novella is the privileged genre for prose literature’s reflections of 
its own value.  
As what Lukács calls “die am reinsten artistische Form,” the novella is hardly a stable 
genre.47 For Lukács, the artistry of the novella is measured in its ability to negotiate between 
form and chance,48 the careful, tacit work of the lyrical subject who conceals herself behind “die 
harten Linien der vereinzelt herausgemeißelten Begebenheit” and through a principle of selection 
(which guarantees epic unity) balances the “schreiende Willkür des beglückenden und 
vernichtenden, aber immer grundlos darniederfahrenen Zufalls” with “sein klares, 
kommentarloses, rein gegenständliches Erfassen” (38). The problem of the genre for Lukács, 
                                                
45 For an American context, see Marc Shell’s excellent and inimitable study of Edgar Allen Poe in “The 
Gold Bug: Introduction to ‘The Industry of Letters’ in America” which reads Poe’s novella The Gold Bug 
(1843) as a text that provides an aesthetic reflection upon monetary symbolization against debates about 
paper money in mid-19th-century America. Shell, Money, Language, Thought, 5-23. Shell’s text is 
groundbreaking for the field of literature and economics in part for how it establishes relations between 
economic and linguistic symbolization. As Shell points out in his chapter on Poe, literature is haunted, 
like money, by a fear that it might be nothing at all (a cipher) or have no value, and as Shell points out, 
literature, like money, is animated by credit or belief, which “involves the very ground of aesthetic 
experience.” Both money and literature are therefore backed by the same medium: writing. Shell, 7. 
46 See the differences that Gailus highlights as well: the psychic blind spot, the Romantic deconstruction 
of the Bildungsroman’s fantasy of self-transparency. Gailus links the novella to the case study: both 
“limit the scope of representation to events marked explicitly as deviations” and contexualizes the genre 
within 19th-century historicism/notions of progress: the novella offers upsets “teleological schemata of 
meaning” at stake in historicist notions of progress and the Bildungsroman (750). 
47 Georg Lukács, Theorie des Romans, 38. 
48 This is the title of Andreas Gailus’ essay, “Form and Chance.” 
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similar to that of the novel, is a formal one: it pivots on the issue of combatting contingency with 
literary form and for this reason requires a precise economy of form. But the novella, unlike the 
novel, has no chance at totality: the subjectivity of its selective forming, which approaches that 
of lyric poetry, can give a kind of unity or balance but is “ohne Totalität.” Instead, the novella 
confronts the problem of “Sinnlosigkeit” by turning it into form and this requires the economy of 
balance between contingency or chance and form.  
Since Goethe’s famous definition of the novella as “eine sich ereignete unerhörte 
Begebenheit,”49 the genre’s most salient feature in German-language literary history has been the 
integration of novelty, of the unheard-of event, in the narrative fabric of a story. As such, the 
genre has cognitive and discursive significance: as David Wellbery notes, the novella is directed 
toward the “case (casus) without precedent which is therefore not yet subsumed by law or 
canonical narrative.”50 Its orientation toward the new means that the novella involves the 
narrative integration and contextualiztion of some not-yet known, disciplined, ordered or 
domesticated event, the working of raw material into a contextual order that the novella first 
provides.51 Yet, this integration, as well as the artistic balancing act that Lukács attributes to the 
novella, does not always occur as a smooth process. Indeed, traces of the event’s newness, or its 
traumatic “schreiende Willkür,” persist in the texture of the novella’s narrative poetics. In this 
way, the novella opens a site for negotiating contingency and order, exception and norm, history 
and event, a well as for reflection on the boundaries of a given system. As Andreas Gailus 
argues, the German-language novella of the long nineteenth century is “a genre of crisis,” one 
that “dramatizes states of exception, moments in which the world- and identity-constitutive 
                                                
49 Goethe in Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens, 280. 
50 David Wellbery, afterword to Goethe’s Collected Works, 11:294. 
51 See Fritz Breithaupt’s model of the novella’s excusability in Kultur der Ausrede. 
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function inherent in traditional patterns of ordering and interpreting has become unstable.”52 For 
Gailus novellas “thematize the limits of (social, psychic and narrative) systems” (740). The 
novella, as a genre of crisis, highlights instabilities, eccentricities, and risks for social, psychic, 
and narrative systems. 
At the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, August Wilhelm Schlegel 
comments on the historico-philosophical status of the novella in his 1801-1802 Berlin lectures on 
literature and art. Drawing on the querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, Schlegel distinguishes 
between the ancient’s mode of writing history, which relies on techniques borrowed from the 
realm of poetry, i.e. the epic, and modern poetry, which inherits the task of writing history. If the 
historian Herodotus had to borrow from Homerian poetics to write history, Shakespeare the poet 
has become historian. In the context of history’s drifting into the realm of poetry, the novella 
becomes for A.W. Schlegel the historical genre amongst modern poetry which faces the task of 
narrating what “in der eigentlichen Historie keinen Platz findet, und dennoch allgemein 
interessant ist.”53 The distinction then between ‘actual’ history and the novella pertains to their 
object of depiction: while the object of history is “das fortschreitende Wirken des 
Menschengeschlechts,” that of the novella is “was immerfort geschieht, der tägliche Weltlauf” 
insofar as this deserves being chronicled [aufgezeichnet]. At the risk of rendering the distinction 
overly schematic one might say that while history is concerned with mankind’s progress, with a 
development over time, the novella concerns itself with the continual or regular rhythm of the 
world. While Schlegel’s distinction seems to cleanly consign diachronic time to ‘actual’ 
historiography and synchronic time to the novella, the latter genre does not simply inherit the 
task of documenting the regular, but, as Schlegel elaborates, must be characterized by both 
                                                
52 Andreas Gailus, “Form and Chance: The German Novella,” 740. 
53 August Wilhelm Schlegel, Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst, 242. 
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extraordinary or unusual singularity and general validity: “um ächt zu seyn [. . .] [muß die 
Novelle] von der einen Seite durch seltsame Einzigkeit auffallen, von der andern Seite eine 
gewisse allgemeine Gültigkeit haben” (242). With this, the novella becomes a deeply ambiguous 
genre, one charged with the literary representation of particularity and generality, of chronicling 
the continual, regular occurrences in the course of the world and those moments that punctuate 
this course, what occurs both immerfort and einmal.  
This ambiguity is not solved by Schlegel but persists throughout his discussion of the 
novella: 
Um eine Novelle gut zu erzählen, muß man das alltägliche, was in die Geschichte mit 
eintritt, so kurz als möglich abfertigen, und nicht unternehmen es auf ungehörige Art 
aufstützen zu wollen, nur bey dem Außerordentlichen und Einzigen verweilen, aber auch 
dieses nicht motivirend zergliedern, sondern es eben positiv hinstellen, und Glauben 
dafür fordern. Das Unwahrscheinlichste darf dabey nicht vermieden werden, vielmehr ist 
es oft gerade das Wahrste, und also ganz an seiner Stelle. An die materielle 
Wahrscheinlichkeit d.h. die Bedingungen der Wirklichkeit eines Vorfalls, muß sich der 
Erzähler durchaus binden, hier erfordert sein Zweck die größte Genauigkeit (247).  
While the novella would appear upon first glance decidedly unromantic, oriented, as it were, 
towards the quotidian, the criterion Schlegel introduces by demanding “Glauben” qualifies this 
everydayness. Thus while Schlegel makes clear a few sentences later that regardless of the tone 
the novella strikes (whether tragic, catastrophic or even burlesque), it must always be at home 
“in der wirklichen Welt” and from this position should depict the Weltlauf “wie er ist,” the 
novella’s orientation towards the everyday must ultimately be kept to a minimum; the novella 
may be quotidian, but it should not celebrate this. Rather, the novella dwells on the extraordinary 
and singular, not with analytical intent that would attribute a motivational causality to the 
extraordinary but by invoking the force of “Glauben.” Truth in the novella is often aligned with 
the improbable. Yet, as if such a contention were in danger of freeing the novella from its 
imperative to stick to the regularity of the Weltlauf or open it up to the more properly Romantic 
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program of self-reflexivity, the work’s production of its own criterion, A.W. Schlegel abruptly 
limits the narrative scope of the novella to the non-fantastic and empirical, to the strictures of the 
real. This limiting occurs, however, always only halfway: the novella retains its embeddedness in 
the empirical world, which it is allowed to “veredeln” but not, we are told, “über Gebühr” (248). 
If the world proves to be “anstoßig,” for the writer that seeks an immediate model for emulation 
in its events, the author of the novella, counteracts the world; he serves as a “Gegenmittel” with 
his “verständige Blick” and “überlegne Ansicht.”  
 The tensions that Schlegel identifies in the novella’s poetics of singularity and generality, 
of regularity and surprise, result, one might say, from the object of its narration: as a genre the 
novella’s central concern is what Goethe famously calls “eine sich ereignete unerhörte 
Begebenheit.”54 Since this “unheard-of event” will not always lend itself easily to narrative 
convention, the novella will face the difficult task of negotiating a relationship between the event 
(Begebenheit) and an order of narrative or social convention given by history (Gegenbenheit) if it 
is to do justice to the singularity or “unheard-of” quality of its event. This is how one might 
understand Schlegel’s unusual formulation the novella constitutes “eine Geschichte außer der 
Geschichte” (248), a story outside of history which “erzählt folglich merkwürdige 
Begebenheiten, die gleichsam hinter dem Rücken der bürgerlichen Verfassungen und 
Anordnungen vorgefallen sind.” The novella thus constitutes a curious epistemic and discursive 
terrain in which a narrative poetics is linked to a project of critical exhibition; of bringing to light 
an event—or as Tieck understands it, of placing it “in’s hellste Licht”—which stands perforce in 
conflict with bourgeois moral, legal, social or economic order.55 
                                                
54 Goethe, conversation with Johann Peter Eckermann, January 29, 1827, in Sämtliche Werke nach 
Epochen seines Schaffens, 19:203. 
55 Tieck, quoted in Helmut Bachmaier, afterword to Des Lebens Überfluß (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), 68. 
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Superfluous Marvel (Des Lebens Überfluss) 
As one of Ludwig Tieck’s last novellas, Des Lebens Überfluß (1839) might easily have 
fulfilled Novalis’ criteria for a farce of poetic art. In many respects, the novella offers a barely 
disguised allegory of Romanticism’s self-destruction, an ironized last-ditch Romantic effort to 
poeticize the world by holding the prose of the world at bay. But in its attempt to create an 
autarkic poetic realm the gesture of withdrawal from the prosaic world which Tieck’s novella 
dramatizes drives, in fact, the Romantic ambition of a (poetic) amalgamation of prose and poetry 
ad absurdum:56 the poetic cosmos created in Tieck’s novella turns out to be entrenched in prose 
all the way through – from its intertextual reliance on works of prose literature by authors such 
as Jean Paul, Cervantes, Chaucer to its fully prosaic plotline (banished lovers in poverty).  
The plot of Des Lebens Überfluss – a kind of ironic and self-aware riff on the clichéd plot 
of a romance forbidden for class differences – is quickly told: two banished lovers, the 
aristocratic Clara and the bourgeois Heinrich, are forced into exile and withdraw entirely into the 
confines of their meager domestic space and compensate for their economic deprivation and 
isolation in a gruelingly cold winter by turning their surroundings into a refuge for poetic living 
and doubling down on their romantic commitment. When their supply of firewood and money 
dwindles – and the couple is forced to wonder whether their “heiße Liebe” might not be enough 
to survive the brutally cold winter or put food on their table, the male protagonist, in a final 
inspired gesture, both solves and exacerbates the situation in another way, fully severing ties to 
                                                
56 Amalgamation or Verschmelzung is Schlegel’s ideal for the relation between prose and poetry, 
something he claims that Tieck’s mere ‘mixing’ of the ‘metric’ and the ‘proasic’ does not achieve. 
Tieck’s prose thus can only hint at the Romantic for Schlegel but never fully achieve it. As Hamacher 
describes it: “Die von Schlegel bei Shakespeare, bei Goethe und Tieck beobachteten Formen der 
Vermischung metrischer und prosaischer Diktion deuten zwar, wie er notiert, auf absolut Romantisches 
hin (LN 688, 827, 1233), realisieren allerdings noch nicht den Imperativ der Poetisierung, deren Ergebnis 
Verschmelzung wäre” (italics in original). Hamacher, “Der Satz der Gattung,” 1175. 
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the outside ‘prosaic’ world, as he calls it, by sawing and burning the staircase that leads out of 
the lover’s apartment. If this would seem to be the absolute romantic gesture – intensively 
enacting the trope of the Romantic hermit  – it finally becomes very prosaic when the landlord 
shows up with the police at the end of the novella seeking restitution for the violation of a 
property code.57 The ruse and turning point of the novella consists in the fact that, despite all 
concerted efforts to practice what the protagonist calls a philosophy of poverty, what was cast off 
by the lovers as superfluously prosaic, what was expended or left-behind in order to more fully 
embrace lack, returns unwittingly: this includes actual prose, the prized first-edition of Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales that, once “das teuerste Eigentum” of the male protagonist, is sold off in a 
moment of desperation; but also the good graces of the wife’s aristocratic father who had been 
the instigator of their exile by condemning the relationship; Heinrich’s long-lost wealthy friend 
who finds the lovers in hiding only because he recovers the Chaucer edition, which he had 
previously given as a gift to Heinrich, and in which Heinrich noted both the story of this gift and 
the story of his impoverished existence in a foreign apartment. And, finally, the lovers receive a 
hefty return on invested capital, brokered by the old friend, which is described in a word that 
succinctly cites nearly all theological, moralist, physio- or bio-logical discourses on 
                                                
57 This incredibly prosaic and bourgeois incident – the irruption of a petty quarrel about private property 
and renter’s rights in the work of a figure who Friedrich Hebbel dubbed the “König der Romantik” – 
belongs to a larger context of literary property violations with decisive consequence for plots, forms, etc., 
including the quarrel about property rights in Gottfried Keller’s Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe, which 
Benjamin compares to the bourgeois ethics of Goethe’s Wahlverwandschaften: “Nicht anders als in den 
Wahlverwandtschaften aus dem erschütterten Ehebund geht in der unvergänglichen Novelle Romeo und 
Julia auf dem Dorfe aus dem gebrochenen Eigentumsrechte an einem Acker ein vernichtendes Schicksal 
hervor.” Walter Benjamin, “Gottfried Keller: Zu Ehren einer kritishen Gesamtausgabe seiner Werke” in 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, bk. 1, 287. On the issue of property rights in Keller’s story see Eva Geulen, 
“Habe und Bleibe in Kellers Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe” in Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 129 
(2010): 253-264. 
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superabundance and luxury up till the enlightenment: “wucherndes Kapital.”58  
Moreover, Tieck’s novella quite literally makes the project of poeticization a matter of 
the economy of prose in what one could call the last Romantic gesture and the undoing of 
Romanticism at the same time. Whereas Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterding was Romantic in its 
attempt to outdo the ‘economic gospel’ of Goethe’s Meister by inverting the novel’s economic 
teleology (the means-ends logic of Goethe’s text) into a logic of pure means and infinite 
processuality, “wo das Mittel die Hauptsache und das Resultat die Nebensache wird,” mimicking 
the teleology of the general equivalent money as Joseph Vogl has argued, Tieck’s novella is an 
attempt to Romantically turn prosaic reality’s lack of poetry into surplus, an attempt at poetic 
valorization that runs up against value’s sine qua non: finitude.59 Transfiguring the world (from 
what one eats to what one is) in Des Lebens Überfluss runs up, in other words, against the need it 
hopes to dispel, or, in the words of the narrator of Tieck’s prior novella Der junge 
Tischlermeister (1836), against “die Bedürfnisse, die prosaische Grundbasis des Lebens.”60 Des 
Lebens Überfluss thereby subjects the poetic (represented in Tieck’s novella in Romantic love, 
the literary text, reading, and conversation) to the most prosaic of circumstances – absolute 
deprivation – in the hopes of reaching a state that lacks lack, a way of retaining prose without the 
prosaic. “Die dürftigste Nahrung fristete ihr [the lovers] Leben, aber im Bewusstsein ihrer Liebe 
war keine Entbehrung, auch der drückendste Mangel nicht fähig, ihre Zufriedenheit zu stören” 
                                                
58 “Dein Kapital [. . .] hat in Indien so gewuchert, daß Du Dich jetzt einen reichen Mann nennen kannst.” 
Tieck, Schriften, 12:246. 
59 On how finitude – through the figure of scarcity – comes to shape value see Foucault’s discussion of 
Ricardo in Order of Things, 275-286. 
60 Tieck, Schriften, 11:57. A more detailed discussion would have to situate this prosaic need in the 
context of Hegel’s thoughts on prose in his aesthetic lectures and the “System der Bedürfnisse” in his 
philosophy of right. On the latter in relation to the problem of poverty and luxury, see Frank Ruda, Hegels 
Pöbel: Eine Untersuchung der “Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts.” See also Birger Priddat, Hegel 
Als Ökonom. 
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(Tieck, Schriften, 12: 230). “Entbehrung,” together with insolvency – the exhaustion of all 
means, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter – ironically becomes the (prosaic) trope 
through which the lover’s attempt to create a poetic cosmos inside their apartment. If Ofterding 
preaches its own economic gospel (i.e. not that of Wilhelm Meister) of Romantic poetry that 
exceeds a prosaic logic of exchange, and thus, imagines itself as a surplus, indeed as überflussig 
to the world of prose, Tieck’s novella spins this Romantic gospel precisely in the other direction, 
namely towards lack. The economic gospel in Tieck’s novella becomes, only a decade before 
Proudhon’s similarly titled work, a “Philosophie der Armut” – in this way, I note, the novella 
runs the entire spectrum of poverty’s philosophical heritage, from the medieval valorization of 
poverty in monastic forms of life to poverty’s condemnation as a source of vice and inhumanity 
in the moral philosophies of the Enlightenment,61 to its emergence as the central ‘social question’ 
of the nineteenth century, as Hannah Arendt will call it, in Hegel, Marx, and early Socialism. 
This philosophy of poverty, in a direct inversion of Novalis, makes not poetry but the prosaic 
world/world of prose the source of Überfluss, of extravagant waste. But – and herein lies the 
ironic refraction of the story – insofar as this philosophy of poverty attempts to dispel the prosaic 
world altogether, casting it off as superfluous, it reveals itself to be überflussig in another sense, 
namely frivolous, premised as this philosophy of poverty is on the disavowal of any urgent need 
or lack.62 “Um in diesem Zustande fortzuleben, war aber der sonderbare Leichtsinn dieser beiden 
                                                
61 On monastic poverty as a form of life see Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and 
Form-of-Life, esp. 123-143. 
62 In this regard the lover’s philosophy of poverty could be read to do what Novalis writes of Wilhelm 
Meister: retard the economic gospel. “Retardieren,” or retardation is a term Novalis, borrowing from 
Wilhelm Meister, uses to describe the poetic movement of the novel. In Tieck’s novella the retardation of 
economic exigency or need goes by the name of a different poetic term from Goethe, namely 
“Schonung,” which Tieck takes from Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. On Tieck’s 
use of Goethe’s word Schonung see Oesterle, who writes: Die ‘gesellige Schonung’ ist bei Goethe ein 
Sozialverhalten nach einem Verlust; sie ist ein lebenspraktischer Vermeidungs-, Linderungs- und 
Heilungsversuch” (251). Ingrid Oesterle, “Ludwig Tieck: Des lebens Überfluss.” As Oesterle argues, 
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Menschen notwendig, die alles über der Gegenwart und dem Augenblick vergessen konnten” 
(Schriften 12:230, italics mine). Need and superfluousness, or lack and plenty, become terms 
through which Tieck can probe the possibility of poetry in prosaic circumstances and the extent 
to which poetic valorization is possible before it lapses into frivolity. For an author who sees the 
genre of the novella as the privileged locus for staging the struggle of prose and poetry, the 
ordinary and the marvelous, the extravagant expenditure of poetry and the prudent economy of 
prose, the poetic valorization of prose operates in Des Lebens Überfluss as a kind of inverted 
reality check: can art instantiate a reality that is both entirely within prosaic life and at once 
above it? The value problem, in this context, is the paradox of needing art to be something more 
without it becoming merely superfluous.  
Tieck’s novella addresses the problem of value across multiple registers (the value of life, 
the value of literature, the values of society) at the end of a Romantic project of potentiation. Set 
in Restoration Germany, against a backdrop of political, social, and aesthetic unrest, the 
novella’s value problem is inseparable from the collapse of the value paradigm of the 
Ständegesellschaft, a contextual fact that becomes clear in the novella’s subtext: a relationship 
condemned on the basis of a value difference (aristocratic/bourgeois). The flight into a 
“notgedrungene Philosophie der Armut” (248) – and away from the world of prose – is 
articulated explicitly as a problem of value: as the protagonist exclaims, “die Welt hat mich und 
ich habe die Welt in dem Grade verlassen, daß kein Mensch meinen Wert mit irgendeiner 
namhaften Summe würde taxieren wollen” (227). In this regard, the novella must be read, as one 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tieck sheds the ‘social’ character of Schonung since, in his novel, the social setting of the novelistic 
community that exchanges stories is no longer possible.  
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critic calls it, as the most subtle political novella of its time.63  The decisive ruse of Tieck’s 
novella, however, is to, on the one hand reveal poetry to be überflussig in the sense of frivolous, 
and, on the other hand, to point to its necessity in a lacking world of prose. 
The irony of Tieck’s reflection on the value of literature in a prosaic world, and with it 
the fate of the poetic, depends on turning an austerity program into a “philosophy of poverty” 
that would claim a special status for poetic existence and the existence of the poetic in a prosaic 
and bourgeois realm of value relations. This philosophy of poverty thus counterintuitively relies 
on a term that would seem far removed from deprivation: overabundance or superfluity. As its 
title already announces, Tieck’ novella grapples in the literary text with what in cameralist and 
physiocratic discourses, but also in semiotic and linguistic discourses, around 1800 becomes a if 
not the pivotal problem regarding value (of commodities, of money, of words): the separation of 
the necessary from the superfluous. The debates on luxury that preoccupy late 18th-century 
semioticians, moral philosophers, statesmen, physicians, and literary authors alike pivot around 
the question of how to manage and bring order to what is superfluous, excessive, extravagant, or 
sumptuous in a citizen’s consumptive behavior (whether the commodity is books or pearls),64 in 
a craftsman’s production, for the wealth of the nation, or for the health of the individual and 
                                                
63 In this regard, this chapter also contributes to a growing trend in Tieck scholarship to read the author’s 
work against longstanding accusations of his political backwardness and retroactive conservative views – 
accusations inaugurated perhaps by Heine’s damning account of the early Romantics, repeated in Carl 
Schmitt’s critique of political Romanticism, exacerbated by the National Socialist instrumentalization of 
Romanticism’s nationalistic-pastoral undertones and the conservative literary criticism of the likes of 
Benno von Wiese. One of the most recent and forceful of such attempts to reread Tieck is Patrick Eiden-
Offe’s Poesie der Klasse. Agamben’s rather surprising reference to Tieck in his early Infancy and History 
might also be seen as the beginning of a new take on the political stakes of Tieck’s work amongst the 
Left. See Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience. 
64 On the influence of these questions, as they arose in debates on physiocratic economic thought in 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, on aesthetic matters see Richard Gray’s extensive chapter 
“Economics and the Imagination” in Money Matters, 109-169. The chapter also includes a brief 
discussion of Tieck’s Künstlerroman, Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen. See also Matt Erlin, Necessary 
Luxuries.   
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collective body. This task is moreover central to that biopolitical apparatus that goes by the name 
of Police or Polizei in cameralism around this time.65 The issue of the superfluous, doubly coded 
at the time as the extravagant and luxurious and simply waste or unnecessary excess, raises, in 
the context of these debates, questions about whether the value of a good is indexed to need (the 
problem of relation between a diamond worth much and water worth little – the central value 
paradox of enlightenment economics, as Joseph Vogl has suggested) or whether need can only 
be met through a surplus that assuages lack and motivates trade but also threatens to overshoot 
the necessary and go unused; in short, the question becomes: does superfluousness indicate the 
high value of a thing or word, or its frivolity? And is it necessary for the well-tuned functioning 
of a market or semiotic economy? In a reading of one of the major figures who pursues this 
question in linguistics and economics at the time – the French philosopher of language Condillac 
– Derrida outlines the problem of lack and plenty, need and surplus as such:  
“The effect of overabundance produced by what supplies the lack gives rise to commerce, 
both economic and linguistic, as well as to trade and to the frivolity of chitchat. This 
effect produces in both fields the same objects: merchandise, money, the token or idea, 
the full sign, the empty sign. But founded upon need alone, this economy can 
nevertheless function, or at least trade, only insofar as it produces a useless supplement, 
an overabundance.”66  
                                                
65 See for instance Klaus Mladek (ed.), Police Forces: A Cultural History of an Institution (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), especially therein Joseph Vogl, “State Desire: On the Epoch of the Police,” 
47-76. See also Caygill’s history of the structural relationship between aesthetics and the police state 
advocated by Polizewissenschaft. Caygill posits similarities in the role played by taste and the police in 
preventing sumptuousness. Howard Caygill, Art of Judgement. 
66 Jacques Derrida, The Archeology of the Frivolous, 103. Condillac would later become a target of 
Marx’s critique of political economy for this concept of an unnecessary surplus. For Marx Condillac is, in 
fact, guilty of the central confusion of exchange and use value that reproduces itself in bourgeois political 
economy again and again, and which, Marx argues, leads to the fallacious idea that surplus value derives 
from exchange. While Condillac, anticipating theories of marginal utility – as Foucault points out in The 
Order of Things – suggests that exchange is premised on trading something superfluous for something 
necessary and that the circulation of commerce is therefore the source of increases in value, Marx 
adamantly insists on the exchange of equal goods and since “man zahlt die Waren nicht doppelt, das eine 
mal ihren Gebrauchwert, das andre Mal ihren Wert,” and since “keiner mehr Wert aus der Zirkulation 
heraus[zieht], als er in sie hineinwirft” “findet keine Bildung von Mehrwert statt.” Das Kapital, 173-175. 
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What Derrida refers to here is a common idea in eighteenth-century political economy that trade 
only happens when there is a surplus, a quantity of a thing produced that is not exhausted by the 
needs of its producers. This founding myth of trade becomes, in Derrida’s hands, a cipher for 
supplementarity as such: the supplement of production – the unit to be traded – implies that need 
can never be satisfied, that lack will always persist. The necessity of the superfluous is, in other 
words, what animates an economy designed to fill a lack, indeed what generates this economy in 
the first place. This means, moreover, that lack is the source of a non-lack.67 
When Tieck titles his novella Des Lebens Überfluss, and thereby juxtaposes what in these 
debates passed as a codeword for need, “Leben”, to its opposite, “Überfluss”, he writes a story 
that wonders about, as the last line of the story suggests, “den Inhalt des menschlichen Lebens, 
dessen Bedürfnis, Überfluss und Geheimnis” (249). Indeed the attempt in Tieck’s novella to 
carve out a space for poetic existence in which need and scarcity lose their meaning can be read 
as a response to discourses on luxury and frivolity in eighteenth-century moral philosophy which 
addressed, as in Condillac, the high value of useless objects such as the diamond. But Tieck has 
left the terrain of the discourse network around 1800. His story asks instead whether need itself – 
and by extension life – could be made superfluous, and paradoxically this will involve not the 
production of an overabundance, out of ‘supplying a lack’, but producing lack out of a perceived 
overabundance, the name of which, in Romantic fashion, is love. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
On the notion of a necessary surplus in Condillac and more generally for a discussion of the figure of an 
excess or overabundance in paradigms of (bodily and financial) circulation in the eighteenth century see 
Albrecht Korschorke, Körperströme und Schriftverkehr, especially “Ökonomie des Überschusses,” 66-76. 
67 On this problem see, too, Foucault, Order of Things, 211. 
  69 
The Love-Child of Lack and Plenty: Eros 
The irony of Tieck’s novella depends on the lovers’ efforts to cope with their 
circumstances by imagining them or misrecognizing them as better than they are, and by 
supplementing their material lack with the immaterial, but infinitely substantial bond of love that 
turns their lack into plenty: “Wir entbehren fast alles . . .nur uns selbst nicht” or “So ist die 
Armut mit unsrer Liebe eins geworden” (195). In their state of lack, their Romantic love “muß . . 
. alles ersetzen” (204) and as a supplement or substitute for “alles,” love becomes the principle 
by which they can expend with everything else, indeed cut themselves off from the outside 
world. They imagine love as the absolute substitute. Precisely this logic is what will be tested in 
Tieck’s novella when the ‘philosophy of poverty’ proves to be not a cancellation of need but 
itself, in fact, “notgedrungen” (248). 
While the politics of this philosophy of poverty lies in the attempt to renounce need as 
itself superfluous against the absolute erotic minimum, this is not the ‘irresistable’ politics of the 
poor that, as Hannah Arendt has suggested, aims at ‘liberation from life’s necessities.’68 It rests 
instead on a poeticizing dimension that is less about abolishing deprivation or insolvency, 
compensating for this prosaic lack, than it is about the procedure by which this material lack is 
stripped of meaning, rendered insignificant in comparison to the immaterial ‘satisfaction’ of 
what the novella names ‘heiße Liebe.’ Of course in the next move, this lack proves itself to be 
the (necessary) foil against which this poetic valorization of poverty can occur: “Wir entbehren 
fast alles, nur uns selbst nicht” – the key word here is “fast”- a lack that is almost a lack is, as it 
were, not a lack but a deficiency that requires supplementation. In the logic of the lovers, the fact 
that they have each other is a fact that erases “Entbehrung” altogether: “im Bewusstsein ihrer 
                                                
68 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 114. 
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Liebe war keine Entbehrung, auch der drückendste Mangel nicht fähig, ihre Zufriedenheit zu 
stören” (230). Through this logic of love as substitution, Tieck’s novella offers a critique of the 
Romantic absolute, transposing it into the context of economic need. If the Romantic absolute is 
a logic of being unconditionally set free, or, like the fragment, of breaking off from the whole,69 
Tieck’s novella suggests that in the economy of this absolution, the richness of the Romantic 
trope (i.e love) gains its contours only against the misère of limitation. In other words the 
absolute, Tieck’s novella suggests, is meaningful only in its conditioning by a finite world.70   
Indeed what makes having each other possible in the way the lovers imagine it is the very 
fact of “Entbehrung” – “So ist die Armut mit unserer Liebe eins geworden.” In this logic of a hot 
love that renders death by cold impossible, the double sense of “Entbehrung” becomes clear: 
what one lacks or is deprived of (money, food, etc.) is what one can, in a second move, afford to 
dispense with.71 Through Romantic love material need is rendered both necessary and 
                                                
69 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, 56.  
70 This point would have to connected to Jean Paul’s definition of the idyll, particularly since Jean Paul is 
one of the major referents of Tieck’s novella. The idyll belongs within this economy as the expression of 
inner freedom under circumstances of external limitation. In a certain German literary tradition 
exemplified by Jean Paul, the idyll is the literary genre par excellence of a prosaic economy: Jean Paul’s 
Quintus Fixlein is a paradigm of the idyll not as a world devoid of need, longing, destitution or conflict 
but of the idyll against the horizon of absolute restriction. Indeed in Jean Paul the idyll is defined as “die 
epische Darstellung des Vollgücks in der Beschränkung” (Werke, 5:257). If what an economy is depends, 
as Blumenberg writes, on what is considered to be scarce or limited, one could say Jean Paul’s idylls offer 
a kind of absolute economy of life in miniature; for what is scarce or limited varies: “Die Beschränkung 
in der Idylle kann sich bald auf die der Güter, bald der Einsichten, bald des Standes, bald aller zugleich 
bezeichnen” (Werke, 5:257). What is, however, not limited is happiness itself. Similar then to Jean Paul’s 
idylls, Tieck’s story depicts the protagonist's complete happiness in absolute destitution: “Wer in ganz 
Europa ist wohl so glücklich, als ich mich mit vollem Recht und aus der ganzen Kraft meines 
Gefühles neben darf” (Tieck, Schriften, 12:195). The ruse of the idyllic transformation in Tieck’s novella 
lies in turning destitution into a relative problem, more a matter of perception than reality. Unlike Jean 
Paul’s idylls, in which characters paradoxically and humoristically downgrade their expectations 
of happiness by exaggerating their misery, Tieck’s characters disavow theirs. As Paul Fleming suggests, 
in Jean Paul “the essence of the microscopic amusement is to ask for so little and get so much from it.” 
Fleming, The Pleasures of Abandonment.  
71 Tieck’s novella knows both senses: “Entbehrung” as lack/deprivation and “Entbehrung” as dispensible 
goods. The latter sense can be seen in the maid who sacrifices for the lovers “alles nur irgend 
Entbehrliche,” i.e. anything she can do without/anything dispensable.  The former sense is marked by 
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insignificant at once, finitude usurped by the infinite, such that the lovers can later reflect on 
their “vormalige Elend” as “zugleich unendliches Glück” (249). This is, moreover, precisely how 
Novalis defined romanticization: giving the finite the semblance of the infinite. What Tieck’s 
novella will do, however, is expose the infinite as itself finite. Deprivation isn’t a lack that is 
assuaged by the overabundance of love – the lack persists forcefully - but love is that surplus that 
makes need a matter of complete indifference, or, more radically and paradoxically, love needs 
need in order to distinguish itself as not simply superfluous.  
This is quite obviously a dubious political program but not one that is meant to be taken 
seriously – in fact, the novella might be read as a critique of the kind of aesthetic ideology 
propagated by this philosophy of poverty. The ironic refraction of the text exposes what lies 
behind the frivolous poeticization of poverty: a desperation (which itself is refracted by laughter) 
and a subjective basis for evaluating the economic situation. What Tieck’s novella is doing when 
it turns love – famously in Plato the child of lack and plenty – into the basis for an embrace of 
poverty’s richness and for a renunciation of everything prosaic, including need, as superfluous, 
is questioning the value of an earlier literary program in Romanticism and attempting to develop 
a hermeneutics of life that would situate the poetic not in opposition to the prosaic but within it.  
 
Cynicism and Asceticism 
Tieck’s novella, in the mid-19th century, uses the poverty or insolvency of the cynic and 
ascetic to raise questions about the value and politics of prose and in doing so will develop a 
                                                                                                                                                       
everything the lovers lack: the items that the lovers pawn off to survive before running out completely of 
anything to pawn are referred to as the “die vielfachen Bequemlichkeiten, die wir gewohnt waren und die 
wir nun entbehren mußten”. Paradoxically, it is the maid who has dispensible goods whereas what the 
lovers dispense of is called lack. On the category of dispensible goods and other “Bequemlichkeiten” see 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Das Paradies, der Geschmack und die Vernunft: Eine Geschichte Der 
Genussmittel. 
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hermeneutics of life that assigns these question of value a central place. 
In his monumental Philosophie des Geldes, published in 1900, Georg Simmel offers a 
kind of psychic typology of what he calls “Geldkultur.”72 Following his arguments about money 
as the most extreme example of the “Auswachsen der Mittel zu Zwecken” (229), Simmel charts 
the emergence of a motley crew of economic types that catalogue the various ways in which in a 
‘money culture’ money can switch from an absolute means, the “reinste Beispiel des 
Werkzeugs” (197), to an end: these types include the miser, the spendthrift, the ascetic, the cynic, 
and the blasé. While they differ dramatically in their specific handlings with money – the miser 
hoards it, the spendthrift lavishes it, the ascetic renounces it, the cynic embraces its leveling 
capacity, and the blasé doesn’t care about it. What unites them is the way in which they make 
money’s specific teleology their own or negate this teleology altogether; in the case of the 
cynicism: the cynic finds in money’s indifference, its capacity to reduce a plurality of values to 
one register and level all hierarchies of values, the grounds for a destruction of value tout court. 
Simmel’s types are remarkable for how they embody the combination of a psychological 
economic comportment with what Simmel will call a ‘style of life’ and aim at a transvaluation of 
monetary value. In the case the ascetic: if monetary value is a final purpose in a money culture, 
the rejection of money turns it into an absolute value, Simmel argues: rejecting money becomes a 
means to reject the world: “die Armut [ist] zu einem eifersüchtig gehüteten Besitz, zu einem 
kostbaren Stück in dem Wertinventar dieses, aller Mannigfaltigkeit und Interessiertheit der Welt 
abgewandten Daseins geworden. Im Gelde war der einheitliche Wert gegeben, mit dessen 
Ablehnung gerade alle Vielheit der Welt abgelehnt war ” (331). As Simmel will go on to say, the 
Franciscans who are characterized as nihil habentes, omnia possidentes (having nothing and 
                                                
72 Georg Simmel, Die Philosophie des Geldes, 263. 
  73 
possessing everything) – a citation of Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians – mark the moment 
when poverty loses its ascetic character: “die inneren Güter, zu deren Gewinn [die Armut] die 
negative Bedingung bildete, sind zu ihr selbst [die Franziskaner] herabgestiegen, der Verzicht 
auf das Mittel, das der Welt sonst als der volle Repräsentant ihrer Endzwecke gilt, hat die 
gleiche Steigerung zu einem definitiven Werte erfahren” (332). In this way, Simmel can, 
paradoxically and analogically, read in the ascetic’s form of life, a more general socio-
psychological process: “Die ungeheure und ausgreifende Macht des Prozesses, durch den das 
Geld aus seiner Mittlerstellung zu der Bedeutung eines Absoluten aufsteigt, kann durch nichts 
ein schärferes Licht erhalten als dadurch, daß die Verneinung seines Sinnes sich zu der gleichen 
Form steigert.” Having nothing becomes possessing everything when the ascetic’s disavowal of 
a paradigmatic means, money, is made into another means to a higher, or the highest, value. In 
both cases, the cynic and ascetic, Simmel is describing a kind of negative symbiosis – though 
one that he doesn’t exactly ground historically: both figures in their poverty and distance to 
money bring about a transvaluation of values that in fact depends on or mirrors money’s own 
value-form. The cynic and the ascetic that Simmel describe have, of course, in particular become 
in a more radical way important paradigms of late for how an impoverished form-of-life might 
signal political alternatives to the sovereign rule of law that characterizes modern biopolitics. 
Foucault will make the cynic, in his destitution, the basis for a type of truth-speaking, parrhesia, 
that as a certain political exercise of freedom entails a challenge to the rule of law (in the polis, in 
the agora, in the public); Agamben will see in Franciscan poverty the basis for a form-of-life that 
in its practice, a kind of use, could escape the sovereign appropriation of life. While Simmel 
extracts the cynic and the ascetic from the development of a modern money culture, viewing 
them as living expressions of – and not exactly challenges to – a dominant regime of value; 
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Foucault and Agamben embrace these figures for their political potential to challenge prevailing 
regimes of power.  
In its emphasis on overabundance and by ending the story with rampant capital, Tieck’s 
novella both cites and modifies the practice of the cynic and the ascetic, condensing this practice 
into the single dramatic gesture of burning the staircase that connects the protagonist lovers to 
the outside world. In their pursuit of a higher value, their love, they remove themselves from a 
world that condemns their union on the basis of a value difference: one is bourgeois, the other 
aristocratic. Removal from the world is then tied to a project not so much of leveling that 
difference as sublating it in a higher spiritual realm of the marital bond (and Tieck’s text cites 
here the master text that crowns marriage as Romantic love, Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde). In 
contrast to the ascetic, however, the two live in poverty not as an expression of world-removal 
but as its banal result: unable to earn a living in the outside world, they live in near deprivation, 
subsisting on the income that comes from pawning their possessions or on the food delivered to 
them from a kind of subaltern third-figure: the wife’s former maid. In this way, as the wife 
remarks, “So ist die Armut mit unsrer Liebe eins geworden” (195). Indeed, this conflation of 
love and poverty becomes the basis for their philosophy of poverty, which they adopt as a life 
mantra. Notably, their love leads not to a retreat into a transcendent sphere beyond life (as for 
instance in Romeo and Juliet’s case), into the otherworldly, but involves a turning inward to life. 
As the husband proclaims, the moment when they fled together marks the point at which their 
“Schicksal [ist] auf unsre Lebenszeit bestimmt. Lieben und leben hieß nun unsre Losung; wie 
wir leben würden, durfte uns ganz gleichgültig sein” (194).  
Heinrich, the husband, ironically articulates this philosophy of poverty as a reappraisal 
and critique of what he sees to be the prevailing value relations in the society from which they 
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are removed, a society that in Tieck’s novella bears all the traces of Biedermeier Germany:  
 “Man kann auch ohne Servietten leben. Wenn ich bedenke, wie unsere Lebensweise 
immer mehr und mehr in Surrogat, Stellvertretung und Lückenbüßerei übergegangen ist, 
so bekomme ich einen rechten Haß auf unser geiziges und knickerndes Jahrhundert und 
fasse, da ich es ja haben kann, den Entschluß, in der Weise unsrer viel freigebigern 
Altvordern zu leben. Diese elenden Servietten sind ja, was selbst die heutigen Engländer 
noch wissen und verachten, offenbar nur erfunden, um das Tischtuch zu schonen. Ist es 
also Großmut, das Tischtuch nicht zu achten, so gehe ic darin noch weiter, das Tafeltuch 
zusamt den Serviette für überflüssig zu erklären. Beides wird verkauft, um vom saubern 
Tische selbst zu essen, nach Weise der Patriarchen, nach Art der – nun? welcher Vökler? 
Gleichviel! Essen doch viele Menschen selbst ohne Tisch. Und, wie gesagt, ich treibe 
dergleichen nicht aus zynischer Sparsamkeit, nach Art des Diogenes, aus dem Hause, 
sondern im Gegenteil im Gefühl meines Wohlstandes, um nur nicht,w ie die jetzige Zeit, 
aus törichtem Sparen zum Verschwender zu werden” (197). 
The lover’s philosophy of poverty, the results or their asceticism, is here combined with an 
inverted riff on Greek cynicism; on the level of language, in the twists and turns of the passage 
(from makeshifting to greed to generosity to superfluity to frugality to squandering), one sees 
how the text moves towards a point at which the very difference between superfluity and dearth, 
plenty and lack, wealth and deprivation, might collapse. The attempt to declare less as more is 
always fraught with contradictions. If this philosophy of poverty in its ‘feeling of wealth’ dreams 
of exiting the economy of overabundance altogether, it constantly runs up against material limits; 
the ascetic act of burning the staircase, meant too to be a declaration against the 
“Überflüssigkeiten des Lebens,” against “leeren Luxus” and “unnützen Erfindungen” (240) – 
indeed the staircase figures as a symbol of the “armseligen, prosaischen Approximation einer so 
gemeinen Stufenleiter der Begriffe” (237) that only the rational empiricist needs, a kind of 
declaration of the poverty of experience as Agamben says of Tieck’s story in Infancy and 
History73 – lasts only until the true adjudicators of need and luxury arrive – the police. And 
indeed the attempt to not need anything – the complete autarky of love – cannot get rid of 
                                                
73 Agamben, Infancy and History, 15-16. 
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necessity altogether, when the protagonist declares the staircase as superfluous as a justification 
of his ‘consumption’ of it to the police and landlord, he is forced to concede: “ Ich brauchte 
indeß das Holz höchst nötig” (240). It is, in fact, the landlord who exposes this philosophy of 
poverty as ridiculous and frivolous when the protagonist for the second time draws a connection 
between his form-of-life and that of Diogenes. The protagonist remarks: “ Ist es, wie so viele 
Weltweise behaupten, edel, seine Bedürfnisse einzuschränken, sich selbst zu genügen, so hat 
dieser für mich völlig unnütze Anbau mich vor dem Erfrieren gerettet. Haben Sie niemals 
gelesen, wie Diogenes seinen hölzernen Becher wegwarf, als er gesehen, wie ein Bauer Wasser 
mit der hohlen Hand schöpfte und so trank” (240-241)? The landlord replies: “Sie führen 
aberwitzige Reden [. . .] ich sah einen Kerl, der hielt die Schnauze gleich an das Rohr und trank 
so Wasser; somit hätte sich Ihr Mosje Diogenes auch noch die Hand abhauen können 
” (241). What is the limit to this vicious circle? At what point does this philosophy of poverty 
become simply impoverished? 
Tieck’s novella demonstrates how a poetic irony can lapse into a kind of aesthetic 
ideology by exposing how the move towards absolute renunciation threatens to renounce even 
the surplus value of austerity and to commit that kind of thinking in resemblances for which, in 
Foucault’s account, Don Quixote stands.74 Given that the novella’s philosophy of poverty is tied 
to a whole network of literary references that constitute something like the canon of a Romantic 
literary corpus (Jean Paul, Goethe, Shakespeare, Chaucer, Cervantes), the novella poses the 
question: to what degree is this philosophy of poverty, in its attempt to be poetry in the prosaic, a 
revival of an older form from these texts (one that would make prosaic reality into poetic 
literature)? Or is the contemporary novella, in being unable to truly accomplish what those 
                                                
74 See Foucault, Order of Things, 46-50. 
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master-texts that precede it could, simply worthless literature, as devalued as the protagonist is in 
a dream in which he is auctioned off together with “Tagesschriftstellern” as a “Lump, [der] 
nichts wert [ist]” (223, 222)?  
The height of a conflation of a literature and reality that seeks to paper over lack comes in 
a scene where the lovers read the ice crystals that form on their apartment window in the cold as 
a “Hauch,” a “süßer Atem” of love, describing them at the same time with recourse to simile as 
“Gespenster” written “wie mit Leichenschrift” (199). In this scene, the ice crystals formed by 
frost on their window – signs of their impending destitution – become, in what one could call the 
last ‘gasp’ of Romantcism, signs of the richness of their Romantic bond of love and of the 
“Geisterdialog” that forms the basis for marriage as the union of two souls. This transfiguration 
of a sign of material lack (no wood) into a sign of immaterial plenty (hot love – “es ist 
undenkbar, dass wir erfrieren sollten bei so heißer liebe”) is accompanied by the self-reflexive 
transfiguration of reality into a poetic text that can be read. As Detlev Kremer reads the scene 
under the rubric of “Romantik als Re-Lektüre”, the iced-over window not only suppresses the 
‘real capacity’ of a window to offer a view of the outside but in Heinrich’s act of reading draws 
the gaze back inward into the imaginative and literary space of the attic apartment: “Nicht nur, 
dass das Fenster entgegen seiner sonstigen Funktion, keinen Blick nach außen ermöglicht: Es 
wird zur weißen Fläche, in die sich die Schrift einschreibt. In einem präzisen Wortsinn erscheint 
in Tiecks Reversion der Frühromantik der literarische Text als diejenige Grenze, die kein Außen 
hat.”75  
The recoding of reality as literature, of the prosaic as poetic, is a gesture that repeats itself 
in many forms in the novel and one that cites the original ideological confusion of reality and 
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literature in Don Quixote, which Foucault in quasi-Romantic fashion will make the very basis of 
capital-L literature through Quixote’s ‘quest for similitudes’ after the breakdown of an episteme 
premised on resemblances between signs. In other words, the question becomes: is poverty in 
prose not the source of a kind of surplus but simply a frivolous romantic gesture. Is the entire 
program just Romantic chit-chat, as Derrida would call it. How else is a sentence to be 
interpreted such as: “es ist undenkbar, daß wir erfrieren sollten bei so heißer Liebe, bei so 
warmen Blut! Pur unmöglich!” (195)? Appropriately and as a sign of frivolity, the response here 
is the protagonist’s own laughter- not the laughter of Romantic Witz or wit – but a laughter out 
of ‘purer Bosheit” (195) that is however “darum noch nicht das Lachen der Verzweiflung” (195). 
This laughter seems to make a mockery of the Franciscan motto, nihil habentes, Omnia 
possidentes. As Augustine notes in The City of God, this motto relies on a rhetorical device of 
contrario, achieving in its “graceful display of antithesis” a beauty in words that mirrors God’s 
beautiful oppositions in the universe.76 Directly after citing Paul’s use of the Latin phrase in the 
Second Letter to Corinthians, Augustine writes: “Just as the opposition of contraries bestows 
beauty upon language, then, so is the beauty of this world enhanced by the opposition of 
contraries, composed, as it were, by an eloquence not of words, but of things.” Tieck’s use of 
oppositions also points to a higher realm in which hot love could be set against bitter cold in the 
same way that “Good is set against evil; and life against death”, as Augustine quotes 
Ecclesiasticus, but this higher realm is no longer the beautiful universe under god’s ordinance: 
it’s the wordly, frivolous laughter at dire straits, a laughter situated fully within the prosaic and 
which thus threatens to be nothing more than an ‘eloquence of words’.  
 
                                                
76 Augustine, The City of God, 472. 
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The Hermeneutic Circle of Life  
Tieck’s novella has a figure for how opposites collapse into one another, how nothing 
becomes everything, etc. which it calls the “Fabel des Lebens” (197). Heinrich reads this fable 
aloud from his diary, as the one piece of literature he still left, itself a fable of (his) life that he 
reads backwards: “Man hat ein Märchen, daß ein wütender Verbrecher, zum 
Hungertode verdammt, sich selber nach und nach aufspeiset [. . .] Dort blieb am Ende nur der 
Magen und das Gebiß übrig, bei uns bleibt die Seele wie sie das Unbegreifliche nennen. Ich aber 
habe auch, was das Äußerliche betrifft, in ähnlicher Weise mich abgestreift und abgelebt” (198). 
This figure of a gradual self-consumption describes not only the process of “abstreifen” and 
“ableben” that the lovers make into a cynical philosophy of poverty – one that recalls Diogenes’ 
own stripping down as life praxis. It also connects to another figure of self-consumption in the 
novella, one which is framed as an interpretative exercise, indeed itself a hermeneutics of life 
insofar as Heinrich describes it as the reading practice (of a hermeneutic circle) he employs to 
read his diary:  
Immer muß alles echte Wissen, alles Kunstwerk und gründliche Denken in einen Kreis 
zusammenschlagen und Anfang und Ende innigst vereinigen, wie die Schlange, die sich 
in den Schwanz beißt — ein Sinnbild der Ewigkeit, wie Andre sagen: ein Symbol des 
Verstandes und alles Richtigen, wie ich behaupte (196). 
This remark frames as reading practice what the poetic poverty of the lovers strives for as life 
practice. Through these two connected figures – the fable and hermeneutics, text and 
interpretation of life – Tieck’s novella offers a kind of materialist spin on Schleiermacher’s 
idealist hermeneutics. The ‘nach und nach’ of the hermeneutic process which, in its own 
economy, forges a relation of parts to a whole is grotesquely inverted into a gradual reduction, an 
“ableben” that is also the “Entbehrung” of the lover’s philosophy of poverty: beginning and end 
do not fit together seamlessly but produce something “unbegreiflich” as the surplus to what is 
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consumed. In this light, the attempt to make less more, to turn having nothing into possessing 
everything, and thereby close the circle, uniting opposites (beginning and end), is an attempt to 
leave a remainder, a surplus, that would not be frivolous but substantial. This perverse or abject 
image of a self-consumed body that leaves behind only stomach and jaw – the bodily organs 
necessary for the consumption of food – likens the production of ‘ineffable’ or “unbegreifliches” 
waste or Überfluss to the process of reading. 
This figure of the self-consuming life points, moreover, to a kind of anthropological 
economy that is in the process of being overhauled at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
What the fable of life names the soul or “das Unbegreifliche” – what is left behind after the cycle 
of self-devouring – is what early Romantic philosophical anthropologies would have hoped to 
define. But in Tieck’s undoing of Romanticism, the ineffable soul has turned into the stomach 
and jaw that the move towards the infinite (the snake biting its own tail) leaves behind. Tieck’s 
novella fuses the economic concern about luxury, overabundance, and lack – a central 
preoccupation of moral philosophers, economists, and statesmen at the end of the eighteenth 
century – with a notion of anthropological or biological economy (one could almost say an 
ecology) that is beginning to shape the discourse in the life sciences as Lamarck is working it out 
in his 1809 Philosophie Zoologique and Darwin in his On the Origin of Species in 1859 – 
Malthus provides the link between population economy (biopolitics) and ecological or biological 
economy. Indeed, Malthus will turn this abject image into a law of political economy by 
suggesting that the surplus population (society’s waste) be eaten. At stake in Tieck’s fable of life 
is thus, as Eva Horn has formulated it for Malthus’ project, a critique of the “central tenets of 
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Enlightenment anthropology, mainly the idea of the perfectibility of human society.”77   
More important for this context, however, is how the trope of the self-consuming life, the 
reduction to bare bones that nevertheless leaves behind an Überfluss is, in fact, part and parcel of 
literature’s value problem for Tieck. Notwithstanding Tieck’s rejection of the moniker Romantic, 
opting instead for poetic, his novella combines the project of Romanticism – Novalis’ Romantic 
“Operation” by which one lends “dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein 
geheimnisvolles Ansehn, dem Bekannten die Würde des Unbekannten, dem Endlichen einen 
unendlichen Schein” – with the poetics of the novella – A. W Schegel’s definition of the novella 
as a non-excessive ennobling of the ordinary or prosaic. This is why the novella has to bring 
poverty into prose in a paradoxical task of turning its prose into a necessary surplus: can it be the 
prose of the world that it must be and more (poetic) at the same time? Can it close the circle, 
linking the highest and lowest poverty, and generate a surplus of ‘soul’? Tieck’s novella is 
ultimately, however, not a bad piece of aesthetic ideology, transfiguring the finitude of poverty 
by lending it a semblance of the infinite, to paraphrase Novalis. It is transfiguration exposed: the 
semblance of poetic infinity in the finite is in the philosophy of poverty revealed to be itself 
impoverished. Insolvency involves facing the fact that all means are exhausted, perhaps even 
literary ones.  
Novelistic Chit-Chat – Policing the Frivolous 
While Tieck’s novella cites Chaucer’s Ur-novella, it is in fact another archetypal novella 
that through exile first raises the question of superfluousness and literature but does so, in typical 
fashion for the novella, against the backdrop of a crisis, namely the plague that threatens to decay 
                                                
77 Eva Horn, “The Last Man: The Birth of Modern Apocalypse in Jean Paul, John Martin, and Lord 
Byron.” 
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the moral and social common. The frame of Boccaccio’s Decameron, shot through with the 
rhetoric of dietetics, tells of an arsenal of prophylactic measures against the plague that range 
from the ascetic to the extravagant: “to live temperately and to avoid excesses of all kinds”,78 
avoiding excessive delectation in food and drink and removing oneself from the ill, is one 
solution; the other is “to carouse and make merry and go about singing and frolicking and 
satisfying one’s appetite in every possible way, and laughing and jeering at whatever happened.” 
As frame, the brigata, and with it, the project of storytelling, does not fall under either an austere 
or extravagant measure against the plague but represents an exceptionalized order that organizes 
and manages the distinction between these measures, between austerity or deprivation and excess 
or overabundance more generally; indeed the stories, designed as pastime and edification, 
frequently concern the hand of Fortuna in turning lack into plenty and plenty into lack.  
Tieck’s novella, inheriting this project, is in contrast to the Decameron plagued by the possible 
frivolity of the storytelling project as such. Before it turns to the lover’s rejection of life’s 
superfluousness in an embrace of its abundance, avowing a form-of-life that eschews or 
renounces one kind of plenty for another (a rich lack), the novella is concerned with the 
superfluousness of speculative story-telling and interpretation. Lacking the historical backdrop of 
a novel event – the indispensible component of the novella according to Goethe – such as the 
plague, Tieck’s Biedermeier story creates its own: a “sonderbarer Tumult” that attracts not only 
the attention of the police but also invites the speculative rumors of an onlooking crowd. These 
onlookers gather around the suburban home in which the event takes place and tell their own 
stories about a political dissident or rebel, an atheist intending to abolish Christianity, a stunning 
show-down between police and criminal that ends in canon-fire, bloodshed, and an execution, of 
                                                
78 Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron of Boccaccio, 2. The Italian original uses the word “superfluità.” 
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a brewing revolution that threatens to engulf Europe in flames. Their frivolous, extravagant 
speculations are the result of Romantic chit-chat (to use Derrida’s term) which, as the narrator 
remarks, gives “das Gewöhnliche die Farbe der Fabel”. Locating the wondrous or fable-like in 
the prosaic constitutes the central poetic principle of Tieck’s novellas. Naming this principle as 
the problem the novella will address, Des Lebens Überfluss will have to do what the police of the 
time would be charged with doing, namely separating this frivolous surplus from the kind of 
necessary surplus it wants to find in prose. The economic domain of Überfluss extends to the 
police as the body responsible for preventing a “Tumult” of speech, the inflationary, speculative, 
indeed frivolous account of events that dot the beginning and end of the novella. This is why 
when the protagonist is cornered by the police at the end of the novella, he resorts to inflationary 
narration countering attempts to force him out of the apartment through starvation by exclaiming 
“weit gefehlt! [. . . ] auf Monate sind wir mit getrocnetem Obst, Pflaumen, Birnen, Äpfeln und 
Schiffszwieback versehen [. . .] und sollte es an Holz gebrechen so [ . . .] finden sich alte Türen, 
überflüssige Dielen, selbst vom Dachstuhle kann gewiß manches als entbehrlich losgebrochen 
werden” (244). To this the police reply: “Er ist Demagog und Carbonari [. . .] das hört man nun 
wohl an seinen Reden” (244). The strategy of the police will lie in countering this exaggerative, 
overflow of speech.  
 At the same time the police, with their own inflationary speech, generate the novella in 
the first place: when the police chief describes Heinrich’s poetic act (destroying the staircase, a 
destruction of property) as “über die Beispiele” (244), he gives the event its poetic splendor as an 
‘unheard-of’ violation of order, something truly extravagant. It is, in fact, the novella’s narrator 
who at the story’s beginning takes a different route and reduces the frivolous chit-chat to the 
necessary ‘facts:’ “So viel war ausgemacht, in einem kleinen Hause hatte es Tumult gegeben [ . . 
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.]” or “So viel ist gewiß, dieser unbekannte Mann lebte sehr still [. . . ]” (194). Thus begins the 
story, which immediately turns this poetic regulation of extravagance (rumor) into a reduction of 
the material kind: sheer poverty: “[. . .] jetzt sind, so scheint es, alle Mittel erschöpft? Gewiß, 
Heinrich [. . .].” What is certain is the exhaustion of means. 
Tieck’s plot takes two of the central tropes of the novella, as he sees it, namely the 
marvelous or “Wunderbare” and the inversion or turn, the “Wendepunkt” – in the dramatic sense 
of peripeteia – and injects them into the economy of prose.  
Eine Begebenheit sollte anders vorgetragen werden, als eine Erzählung; diese sich von 
Geschichte unterscheiden, und die Novelle nach jenen Mustern sich dadurch aus allen 
andern Aufgaben hervorheben, daß sie einen großen oder kleinern Vorfall in's hellste 
Licht stelle, der, so leicht er sich ereignen kann, doch wunderbar, vielleicht einzig ist. 
Diese Wendung der Geschichte, dieser Punkt, von welchem aus sie sich unerwartet völlig 
umkehrt, und doch natürlich, dem Charakter und den Umständen angemessen, die Folge 
entwickelt, wird sich der Phantasie des Lesers um so fester einprägen, als die Sache, 
selbst im Wunderbaren, unter andern Umständen wieder alltäglich sein könnte.79 
 
Des Lebens Überfluss offers a specific transposition of this theory of the novella into the 
economy of prose. The wondrous is now the Wirtschaftswunder of the surprising, prolific capital, 
the return on investment, that ends Des Lebens Überfluss; the turn, in similar fashion, is this turn 
from lack to plenty. Indeed, one could say that in Des Lebens Überfluss the Romantic trope of 
the inverted world, a trope Tieck worked with extensively, is transposed onto the “Verkehr” of 
the social, which the lovers had hoped to separate themselves from (“völlig von allem Verkehr 
mit den Menschen abgeschnitten” [217]). In other words, the inverted order of the novella’s 
ending (in the turn from lack to plenty after lack wasn’t plentiful enough) – the verkehrte Welt or 
ordo inversus it announces – describes a social logic that, in many ways, lies at the heart of the 
‘prose of relations’ in the bourgeois civil society of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, 
namely the turn from insolvency to solvency. 
                                                
79 Tieck, Schriften, vol. 11 (Berlin: Reimer, 1829), lxxxvi. 
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This inverted world, a comedy of errors with an earnest economic subtext, that describes 
the intersection of a value problem of life and literature will become in the hands of Gottfried 
Keller a kind of conjuncture of fortune, a story of luck or Glück that will also operate according 
to an Umschlag from lack to plenty. But Keller will leave Tieck’s anthropological Romanticism 
behind, Überfluss and Mangel will become credit and debt, the remainder will be a ledger that 
can’t be balanced. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 Schuldenverkehr:  
Conjunctures of Fortune in Keller 
 
 
 
Transfiguration and Transvaluation 
In few literary texts of the 19th century is the economy of prose and the problems it poses 
for Poesie (in the sense described in the previous chapter) as prominent as in Gottfried Keller’s 
novella cycle Die Leute von Seldwyla (1853-1874).1 Like Tieck who relinquishes the Romantic 
attempt to create an autarkic poetic world opposed to prose, searching instead for the poetic 
within the prosaic (for instance in the guise of a Wirtschaftswunder), Keller locates the poetic 
this side of the prosaic world. Whereas Tieck’s Des Lebens Überfluß only gestures in this 
direction (for instance with the return on capital from India), Keller’s prosaic world has fully 
arrived in the nexus of global capitalist trade. Where to locate the value of literature in this world 
will be one of the central questions Keller addresses in Seldwyla, turning it into a literary 
question. Scenes like the following demonstrate how this “Handelswelt” irrupts at the center of 
his narratives, a scene that with its complex concatenations and metonymic chains deserves full 
citation. 
[…] es brach eine jener grimmigen Krisen von jenseits des Ozeanes über die ganze 
Handelswelt herein und erschütterte auch das Glorsche Haus, welches so fest zu stehen 
schien, mit so plötzlicher Wut, daß es beinahe vernichtet wurde und nur mit großer Not 
stehen blieb. Schlag auf Schlag fielen die Unglücksberichte innerhalb weniger Wochen 
und machten den stolzen Menschen und die Nächte schlaflos, den Morgen zum 
Schrecken und die langen Tage zur unausgesetzten Prüfung. Große Warenmassen lagen 
jenseits der Meere entwertet, alle Forderungen waren so gut wie verloren und das 
angesammelte Vermögen schwand von Stunde zu Stunde mit den hochprozentigen 
Papieren, in welchen es angelegt war, so daß zuletzt nur noch der Grundbesitz und 
                                                
1 The exception may be Keller’s own Der Grüne Heinrich (1854), written at the same time as Seldwyla. 
On the economy of Der grüne Heinrich see Jochen Hörisch. Kopf oder Zahl.  
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einiges in alten Landestiteln bestehendes Stammvermöge vorhanden war. Aber auch 
dieses sollte dahingeopfert werden, um die eigenen Verbindlichkeiten zu erfüllen, welche 
im Augenblicke de Sturmes bei dem großen Verkehre gerade bestanden.  
Die Männer rechneten und sprachen miteinander bleich und still Tage und Nächte 
lang, und die Hausordnung schien erstarrt zu sein. Die Dienstboten arbeiteten ohne 
Befehl und bereiteten das Essen, aber niemand aß oder wußte, was er aß. Die Uhren 
liefen ab und wurden kummervoll aufgezogen, nachdem sie tagelang still gestanden. Die 
Zeit mußte dann zusammengesucht werden, wie man in der Finsterniß ein Lichtlein am 
andern anzündet, um sehen zu können. Einige junge Kätzchen, welche bis zum Tage des 
Unglücks der Zeitvertreib und das Spiel von alt und jung gewesen waren, wurden 
plötzlich gar nicht mehr gesehen und zogen sich mit ihren kleinen Sprüngen in einen 
Winkel zurück, und als nach geraumer Zeit einige Seelenruhe wieder in das Haus 
gekommen war, wunderten sich alle, daß die Katzen unter ihren Augen auf einmal groß 
geworden seien. 
Als es hieß, daß, wenn die Ehre des Hauses gerettet und alle Schulden bezahlt 
sein werden, nicht eines Talers Wert mehr im Besitze der Familie bleibe und sie, gänzlich 
verarmt, von neuem anfangen müßten, stand die Frau Gertrud, die Stauffacherin, und 
schlotterte an ihrem ganzen Leibe; sie müßte niedersitzen.2 
 
While nearly all of Keller’s Seldwyla stories thematize the encroachment of a burgeoning global 
capitalist economy on the ‘traditional’ economic order of the family household, this scene is 
particular in its detailed unfurling of a “Hausordnung” upset by global crisis.3 Invoking the 
metaphorics of a natural disaster, this passage documents a spectacle of financial deflation, of 
Entwertung, that knows no bounds: metonymically unrolling its force from the macro (“die 
ganze Handelswelt”) to the micro scale (“das Glorsche Haus”), the “Handelskrise” not only 
eviscerates the family fortune in its wake but upsets all indices of normality, from the family pet 
to the course of time; a phenomenology of crisis in nuce. Yet Keller’s description of economic 
crisis thwarts the anormality and suddenness of the event (its “plötzliche Wut”), its status as a 
singular incident, in the very moment of its positing. Like A.W. Schlegel’s suggestion that the 
                                                
2 Gottfried Keller, Die Leute von Seldwyla (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1987), 589-590. All citations from 
this edition. 
3 In many ways, Keller’s Seldwyla offers a fictional account of what Max Weber will describe in chapter 
2 of Die Protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus as the rationalization of the traditionalist 
ethos of the “Verleger” (52). Not incidentally, Weber’s example is, like in Keller’s Kleider machen Leute, 
the textile industry. 
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novella negotiate between the immerfort and the einmal of world events, or Lukács’ call to 
counter ‘screaming contingency’ in the novella with objective commentary, Keller’s crisis 
dramatizes an event that violently upsets the everyday at the same time as it integrates it into the 
everyday: time, brought to a standstill, is restored; the cats, whose disappearance was first 
portending now return to reassert a natural and uninterrupted temporality of growth; and, in the 
very moment of naming the event, the crisis is subsumed in a series of recurring events, as one of 
many, “eine jener.” What Walter Benjamin, in an essay on Keller,4 describes as Keller’s epic 
heritage is at work in this move from global economic crisis to a cat, a condensation of world-
historical event with the Romantic Volksmärchen trope par excellence, and in the shudder that 
moves from the family “Haus” to Frau Gertrud.5 Such poetic moves, as part of what Benjamin 
calls Keller’s “Gesetzt der Schrümpfung,” would, in this context, hardly seem to be 
transfigurative in the sense typically associated with poetic realism, which, in Fontane’s words 
neither consists in “das nackte Wiedergeben des alltäglichen Lebens, am wenigstens seines 
Elends [. . . ]” nor should be confused with “Misere,”6 and which aims, as Keller writes, “in der 
gemeinen Wirklichkeit eine schönere Welt wiederherzustellen.”7 In this context, the charge 
against Keller as guilty of a naïve transfiguration of social reality deserves revisiting. 
Transfiguration in Keller, this chapter argues, is not an aestheticizing compensation for but a 
skeptical encounter with economic misère, one that pivots on an understanding of transfiguration 
as transvaluation, which names, in its broadest sense, a reappraisal of a dominant value system 
(in Keller’s case, economically, credit and debt) and an account of the reality of a given value 
                                                
4 Walter Benjamin, “Gottfried Keller” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, bk. 1, 283-294. 
5 See Spiegel, das Kätzchen as Keller’s reply to Romanticism’s cats, including Tieck’s Gestiefelter Kater. 
6 Theodore Fontane, “Unsere lyrische und epische Poesie seit 1848” in Die deutsche Literatur in Text und 
Darstellung: Bürgerlicher Realismus, 56. 
7 Keller, Historisch-Kritische Gottfried-Keller-Ausgabe, 15:83. 
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system as the result of technical, material, and social procedures.     
Unlike in Tieck, the poetic in Keller is no longer to be had as a violation of bourgeois 
prosaic order – in the form of the Eigentumsdelikt.8 Rather Keller insists on it, this side of the 
law, as a “right.” As he famously writes to Paul Heyse in 1881, what Keller, in the bureaucratic 
language of the Stadtschreiber, calls the “Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Poesie” consists in “das 
Recht, zu jeder Zeit, auch im Zeitalter des Fracks und der Eisenbahnen, an das Parabelhafte, das 
Fabelmäßige ohne weiteres anzuknüpfen, ein Recht, das man sich nach meiner Meinung durch 
keine Culturwandlung nehmen lassen soll.”9 Keller’s right to the poetic is typically read as one 
of the central programmatic statements of poetic realism, an insistence on the transfigurative 
force of a realist literature in a post-idealist context. The right to the fable-like in the era of the 
locomotive opens up, however, a kind of discrepancy or gap in the contemporary Alltag of an 
epoch and the poetic representation of this Alltag that is more than simply the gap of the poetic 
as transfigurative.10 What Keller claims “without qualification [ohne weiteres]” is the right to an 
immediate connection, or literally a ‘tying to’ something, that in its very articulation establishes 
the non-immediacy of the fable-like or poetic and the contemporary “Zeitalter.” The right to an 
immediate connection to the poetic in an age in which this connection is no longer given de facto 
prompts Keller’s attempt to recuperate a loss de jure as it were, a recuperation that cannot help 
                                                
8 As this chapter’s analysis of Keller’s novella Kleider machen Leute will show, violation of the law is 
structurally impossible or always already rectified in a Kellerian “Rechtsordnung” in which, as Benjamin 
suggests, verdict and clemency converge. This isn’t to say, however, that the scales of justice are 
balanced, the quid-pro-quo order of right in Keller’s non-bourgeois ‘Rechtsordnung’ of payback/revenge 
always leaves a remainder.    
9 Gottfried Keller to Paul Heyse, July 27, 1881, in Gesammelte Briefe, vol. 3, bk. 1, 57. 
10 See Preisendanz: “Verklärung meint [. . .] eine Schreibweise, die den Unterschied zwischen dem vom 
Leben gestellten Bilde und dem dichterischen Gebilde nicht verwischt, sondern verbürgt, eine 
Schreibweise, in der Darstellung mehr als Nachbildung oder Bestandsaufnahme, in der sie Grund und 
Ursprung einer Wirklichkeit ist” (Wege des Realismus, 83). In this regard, Realism’s transfiguration aims 
to valorize the prosaic world in a way that is is not simply an effusive aestheticization of reality but value-
productive and original in its own right. 
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but ex negativo declare the current age – and with it prosaic reality – to be poetically insolvent. 
Perhaps more then transfigurative – indeed Keller’s novellas tend to turn towards rather than 
away from Fontane’s misère – Keller’s claim to a poetic right is a recuperative gesture 
[“wiederherzuherstellen]. In this regard, it depends on a loss or lack it seeks to restore by 
borrowing from the fables of the past; this will be explicit in the second preface to Keller’s 
Seldwyla collection when he describes his narrative project as a “Nachernte” (297). But even 
before then, as I’ll discuss below, Keller’s narration relies on a logic of a ‘fall’ out of paradise, 
and a recuperation of what is excised, expended, banished or wasted that makes the 
“Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Poesie,” more than a poetics of Verklärung, a poetics of Verwertung. 
This chapter examines this Verwertung in particular in its economic inflections in Keller’s 
Seldwyla; its poetics finds expression in the trope of insolvency or bankruptcy and in particular 
in what Keller in the preface to Die Leute von Seldwyla calls Schuldenverkehr. Affixing two 
master terms of nineteenth-century political economy (Schulden and Verkehr), Keller forms a 
compound that can be read as the central concept of his recuperative poetics. Transfiguration, by 
this logic, is not the ideological move par excellence but a realist one: out of the prosaic reality 
of credit/debt relations it excavates the material for a Verwertung. As Adolf Muschg has 
suggested for Keller’s Bildungsroman Der grüne Heinrich (1855) in a study of Keller’s work 
organized entirely around the trope of debt, Keller’s “Kunst-Sprache” stands under the 
“Imperativ ökonomischer Legitimation [. . .] so sehr, daß eher die ästhetische Lösung (das 
‘Gleichggewicht’) mißglückt, als daß der Bund mit jener Grundverpflichtung gelockert würde.”11 
In this regard, this chapter looks specifically at Walser’s version of the story of fortune, the 
Glücksgeschichte in the context of this specific credit/debt logic of transfiguration. Central to this 
                                                
11 Adolf Muschg, Gottfried Keller, 95. 
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discussion will be how the two seminal thinkers of value in Keller’s time address the problem of 
credit and debt: Nietzsche and Marx. 
  
The Fall of the Debtor 
In Die Leute von Seldwyla Keller embeds his stories within complex economies of credit 
and debt, solvency and insolvency, proprietary and non-proprietary wealth, speculation and 
financial risk. Seldwyla’s strange economy as a “Paradies des Kredites” plays a decisive role in 
nearly all of the novellas, asserting more and less pressure on the narrative economies of the 
novellas.12 Signs and motifs of this economy, such as the “Gültbrief von siebenhundert Gulden” 
that belongs to Züs Bünzlin (215), a central love interest of the three comb-makers in Die drei 
gerechten Kammacher, can hardly be read as “scandalous notation” or markers of “narrative 
luxury” like Flaubert’s barometer, and their persistent presence cannot be reduced to the 
production of a reality effect.13 Züs Bünzlin’s Gültbrief, a type of promissory or mortgage note, 
does not fall out of the “order of the notable,” to return as a signifier of the real in a Barthesean 
textual economy,14 but becomes the dominant force of the novella’s narrative and descriptive 
energies, drawing in and condensing a complex network of signifiers in a poetic technique 
Benjamin recognized as Keller’s “Gesetz der Schrümpfung”15 at the same time that it instigates a 
proliferating chain of enumerations.16 In this novella as in the other Seldwyla novellas, 
                                                
12 Keller, Die Leute von Seldwyla, 10. 
13 Roland Barthes, “The Reality Effect,” 141. 
14 Barthes’ reality effect depends upon the economic metaphor since it results from “notations [ . . . ] 
[that] seem to correspond to a kind of narrative luxury, lavish to the point of offering many ‘futile’ details 
and thereby increasing the cost of narrative information.” Barthes, 141. 
15 Benjamin, “Gottfried Keller,” 289. 
16 Rainer Nägele has elucidated this aspect of Keller’s prose. Nägele refers to a “knotting of signifiers” in 
Keller’s baroquish and “conspicuously regular catalog-like enumerations,” including a list of toiletry and 
other items given to the tailor of Kleider machen Leute. Nägele describes the strange amalgamation of 
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instruments of value and other economic motifs become nodal points of organization for the 
larger narrative economy of the novella. As part of what Benjamin calls the “Durchdringung des 
Erzählerlischen und Dichterischen” in Keller, these signs of value become poetological 
principles for the order of narration in Keller’s novellas: beyond their poetic-semiotic function, 
they generate narrative threads, possible events, and logics of concatenation of their own.17  
Economic assets, figures of value, and relations of value thus circulate in Keller’s 
novellas on and below the surface of the text and operate on more than simply a thematic level. 
They become, furthermore, ordering principles of the text that yoke together various narrative 
threads in a way that exceeds their status as referents to Keller’s contemporary epoch.18 Züs 
Bünzlin’s Gültbrief is an instrument of value that has a specific economic-juridical history: 
Gültbriefe function in rural economies of Germany in Switzerland up to the 19th century as 
bonds, formalized instruments of value used in informal credit economies to note an outstanding 
debt or obligation, and often used as mortgages on property.19 But in the unusual economy of Die 
drei gerechten Kammacher, Züs Bünzlin’s Gültbrief writes its own history, generating 
                                                                                                                                                       
baroque- and nineteenth-century poetic realism in Keller as a non-psychologizing and radically 
exogenous version of “eccentric realism,” one that frustrates a topography of surface and depth. “If on the 
one hand Keller’s stories are overarched by adages and sayings from the realm of old experiences, they 
are also undermined and enclosed by strange, not easily describable celler valuts [. . .] which allow 
Keller’s language and style to resonate.” Rainer Nägele, “Keller’s Cellar Vaults: Intrusions of the Real in 
Gottfried Keller’s Realism,” 191-192.  
17 This relation between detail and the whole of the text has often been noted in Keller and is central to his 
narrative economy. Menninghaus, for this reason, calls Keller a guardian of the “kanonischen Eigenwert 
der Sinnlichkeit” and an artist “dessen Schrift noch das winzigste Detail aus einer sich selbst genügenden 
Realie in die Funktion einer streng durchbildeten Textualität verwandelt.” See Winfried Menninghaus, 
Artistische Schrift, 9.   
18 This, too, is therefore one of the ways in which Keller’s prose is both ancient and modern at once, as 
Benjamin suggests: “[Keller] glaubte seine Zeit zu geben und in ihr gab er Antike” (Benjamin, 289). 
Many of Keller’s imports from his contemporary economic world tend, like Odysseus’ scar in Homer, to 
take on epic dimensions. A more detailed analysis of Keller’s realism and what Auerbach sees as the 
‘realism’ of Homer’s Odyssey could pursue this ‘ancient’ quality of Keller’s writing from a different 
angle. See chapter one of Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature. 
19 See Sheilagh Ogilvie, Markus Küpker, and Jennie Maegraith, “Household Debt in Early Modern 
Germany: Evidence from Personal Inventories.”  
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“schlimme Geschichten” as it becomes the “Perpetuum mobile” of the story and the primary 
source of narrative conflict for the three righteous combmakers who struggle against each other 
to woo the bearer of the bond. If the “Gültbrief von siebenhundert Gulden” performs, as Nägele 
suggests, a semantic condensation of terms related to validity and currency (gelten, gültig, Gold, 
Geld, etc.), it also becomes a literal bond for the novella’s characters: both in the form of an 
oppressive “eheliche Verbindung” for the Schwabian combmaker that ultimately marries Züs 
Bünzlin to procure the funds necessary to buy out his master’s workshop, and in the form of the 
caustic constellation of the three combmakers; the mortgage bond ties their fates together and 
ultimately leads to the demise of all three (one hangs himself from a tree, the other goes mad and 
becomes an antisocial hermit, and the third enters an ‘oppressive’ marriage).20  
In the fictional world of Keller’s Seldwyla, poetic signs are embedded in an economy of 
prose in which anything can become a bond, an instrument of value, can be capitalized upon, fall 
into bankruptcy, or proliferate endlessly, like the promissory note of Die drei gerechten 
Kammacher or the stones from a quarry that become the basis for a “Schuldenwesen” in Frau 
Regel Amrain und ihr Jüngster. The prefaces to the two parts of Die Leute von Seldwyla, which 
introduce an entire repertoire of economic motifs that will circulate in the novellas that follow, 
rewrite a tradition of the literary idyll to present a fictional Swiss village that is hardly a locus 
amoenus – as the etymology of its name might suggest – but which is mired in precarious and 
paradoxical relations of value, a town in which “die Gemeinde reich ist und die Bürgerschaft 
arm” and “kein Mensch . . . etwas [hat] und niemand weiß, wovon sie seit Jahrhunderten 
eigentlich leben” (9). The good life in Seldwyla (“sie [the Seldwyler residents] leben sehr lustig 
                                                
20 Keller’s novella partakes in a literary history of tragic outcomes instigated by a bond or mortgage note. 
See, for instance, Marc Shell’s reading of the mortgage in Faust II in chapter 4 of Money, Language, 
Thought.  
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und guter Dinge”) is a sham, which is to say it rests on “zerknitterten Schuldscheinen” (296). 
Seldwyla is a “Paradies des Kredits” that doesn’t last, in which “seltsamen Geschichten und 
Lebensläufen” rise and fall with the fluctuations of its volatile economy of credit and debt and 
wherein the good life lapses into insolvency and exile from the paradise of credit:  
Der Kern und der Glanz des Volkes besteht aus den jungen Leuten von etwa zwanzig bis 
fünf-, sechsunddreißig Jahren, und diese sind es, welche den Ton angeben . . . sie lassen 
solange es geht, fremde Leute für sich arbeiten und benutzen ihre Profession zur 
Betreibung eines trefflichen Schuldenverkehrs, der eben die Grundlage der Macht, 
Herrlichkeit und Gemütlichkeit der Herren von Seldwyla bildet und mit einer 
ausgezeichneten Gegenseitigkeit und Verständnisinnigkeit gewährt wird; aber 
wohlgemerkt, nur unter dieser Aristokratie der Jugend. Denn sowie einer die Grenze der 
besagten blühenden Jahre erreicht . . . so ist er in Seldwyla fertig, er muß fallen lassen” 
(9-10)  
Keller’s Seldwyla intertwines values of Sittlichkeit, moral values, with economic ones in an 
economy of credit and debt that is ‘backed’ by reciprocity and mutuality but that ends in a fall: in 
bankruptcy (“fallen”), and depletion as the debtors are banished from paradise as “Entkräfter” 
that reside “ferner am Orte” or are exiled to various corners of the globe (one might encounter 
Seldwylers in “Australien” “Kalifornien” “Texas” “Paris” or “Konstantinopel”).  
Here as elsewhere Keller’s language opens onto what Benjamin names as a 
“‘bedenkliches’ Grotten und Höhlensystem” in Keller’s work, in which the “Rhythmik des 
bürgerlichen Stimmen- und Meinungslärms” becomes entangled [“verschränkt”]21 with and 
ultimately repressed [“verdrängt”] by the “kosmischen Rhythmen” that accumulate “im Innern 
der Erde.” Like the global economic crisis in Das verlorene Lachen, cited at the opening of this 
chapter, that threatens to upset cycles of time altogether, what belongs squarely within the realm 
                                                
21 In another context, Peter Fenves has addressed the role of Verschränkung in Benjamin’s conception of 
the work of art, unearthing entanglements between Benjamin, Heidegger and Schödinger. Fenves’ work 
has as of yet, as far as I am aware, not been published. Fenves presented these ideas in a talk entitled 
“Temporary Entanglements Around 1935: Benjamin, Heidegger, Schrödinger” at the conference Jetzt: 
Contemporary and Historical Figurations at Cornell University, 31 Mar 2012. 
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of bourgeois prosaic reality (a “Handelskrise” a “Falliment”) quickly takes on cosmic 
dimensions. This move is, however, not without humor in Keller. As Benjamin suggests, the 
depths of the grotto and cave system figure Keller’s humor precisely not as a transfigurative 
‘polishing of the surface’ [“Politur der Oberfläche”] but as a “Rechtsordnung” in its own right. 
The ‘order of right’ that Benjamin identifies in Keller’s humor is, indeed, everywhere in his 
Seldwyla stories;22 one could call it, in a spin on Keller’s right to the poetic, an ‘order of poetic 
justice’ in which Keller not only claims the right to the poetic but in which the poetic brings with 
it its own right: this is a right that cannot be separated from the notion of comeuppance or 
payback that poetic justice implies. This is a world, as Benjamin describes it, of non-sentencing 
enforcement [“urteilslose Vollstreckung”] in which verdict and clemency converge.23 The 
Schuldenverkehr of Seldwyla and the bankruptcies, insolvencies, or falls, it entails – which, as in 
the case of Keller’s protagonist in Kleider machen Leute, often unfold in a humorous manner24 – 
                                                
22 For a different take on the relation between law and literature in Keller’s Die Leute von Seldwyla and a 
different sense of poetic right(s) see Eva Geulen, “Habe und Bleibe in Kellers ‘Romeo und Julia auf dem 
Dorfe.’” 
23 Kleider machen Leute is a prime example of how “Gnade” and “Verdikt” ‘humorously’ converge as a 
kind of poetic justice. After Keller’s protagonist is exposed as an imposter, the moment of judgment 
never occurs – the false count cannot be found guilty since he never actively posed as someone he wasn’t, 
signing all documents with his actual name. Friedrich Theodor Vischer reads the story this way as well: 
“der gute Schneidergeselle Strapinsky [sic!], der für entschuldbare Schuld vom Schicksal, das ihm die 
Falle doch selbst gelegt, so herb gezüchtigt und dann so hoch begnadigt wird.” Friedrich Theodor 
Vischer, Allgemeine Zeitung, July 22, 1874. 
24 If as Preisendanz has shown, Keller’s humor has less to do with a tension between appearance and 
reality, as is often suggested in the scholarship, and rests instead on an “eigenartigen Dualismus von 
absolutem und spezifischem Gewicht des geschilderten Details” that links the “erhabene kosmische 
Ordnung mit der banalsten, prosaischsten Ordnung menschlichen Daseins,” then the humorous valences 
Keller gives to insolvency in the preface – humorous because they stretch from a ‘banal’ law of value in 
the literal sense of falling out of an economy of exchange to a cosmic law of the Fall for which the price 
is expulsion from a paradise of credit into an economy of Schuld – can be understood as part of a 
narrative adjudication of value that aligns the quotidian with the cosmic. This is one way in which 
Keller’s text develop their own economy of humor: when the relation between the day-in, day-out 
attempts to scrape by (the prosaic) turn over into a cosmic deprivation (“Entbehrung”). See Preisendanz’s 
reading of one such scene in Pankraz, der Schmoller, in which punctual signs of economic lack – the 
green bottom of the butter pot – take on cosmic dimensions. In that scene, the bottom of the butter pot 
indicates not only a lack of food that results from a meager “Witwengehalt” that is never paid on time but 
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bring these earthly cosmic depths to bear on and ultimately unravel a prosaic, bourgeois order of 
right as Keller becomes the arbiter, and author, of (narrative) motivation and culpability: in the 
singular, Kellerian Rechtsordnung of Seldwyla’s economy, guilt and debt is attributed and 
forgiven and sometimes struck from the record entirely – as is the case in Die drei gerechten 
Kammacher which envisions an order of right [“blutlose Gerechtigkeit”] in which debt is erased 
from the Lord’s Prayer: the sentence ‘forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors’ is 
“gestrichen” since this righteous order “keine Schulden macht und auch keine ausstehen hat” 
(203). Seldwyla’s Schuldenverkehr paradoxically enforces a verdict that is never given or never 
given rightly: victims and perpetrators switch roles, comeuppance is experienced by the wrong 
people, justice is served and payback is had but neither in the proper terms of bourgeois/civil 
right nor in the terms of divine right, according neither to natural nor positive law but which, as 
an order of poetic justice, can only be realized within the specific narrative economy and 
economic logic of the Seldwyla novellas.25 In affixing a master signifier of the 19th century to a 
term with religious, moral, and economic valences,26 Keller’s Schuldenverkehr transposes the 
                                                                                                                                                       
also a “regelmäßige jährliche Erscheinung, wie irgendeine am Himmel.” Preisendanz, Humor als 
dichterische Einbildungskraft, 153-154.  
25 Elsewhere, Benjamin locates Schuldenverkehr as part of the religious structure of capitalism in its dual 
meaning of debt and guilt: “Der Kapitalismus ist vermutlich der erste Fall eines nicht entsühnenden, 
sondern verschuldeten Kultus” that universalizes guilt/debt until ultimately God himself becomes guilty. 
Benjamin, “Kapitalismus als Religion,” in Gesammelte Schriften, 6:100. Werner Hamacher recognizes in 
Benjamin’s fragment an “etiological structure of time and history” (83) in the sense of aítion as both 
provenance/cause and guilt: “Capitalism is thus essentially etiology, the attribution of provenance and 
guilt [. . .] Capitalism is a system for the attribution of guilt as well as debt” that posits and structures an 
essential lack like Christianity does (86-87). In Benjamin’s words, capitalism like religion responds to 
and attempts to alleviate the same “Sorgen, Qualen, Unruhen” as does religion. For Hamacher, this means 
that as a cult religion, capitalism condemns to guilt by positing guilt/debt as the reason for a lack, the 
“‘worries, torments, and restlessness’ of natural life.” Hamacher, “Guilt History: Benjamin’s Sketch 
‘Capitalism as Religion.’” 
26 Verkehr is central to discourses in political economy in the 19th century. As Keith Tribe writes, “indeed, 
if one were to identify a specifically German trait in economic writing in mid-century, it would [be] [. . .] 
this universally accepted conception that the point of departure for the consideration of economic life was 
the human being and its needs. The existence of such human needs and wants generated a realm of 
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prosaic economy of Seldwyla into narratives of solvency and insolvency that cut across 
economic, juridical, and cosmic orders. Insolvency (“fallen lassen” in the words of the preface) 
means not only economic insolvency but entails the Fall out of the “Paradies des Kredits,” not 
only the inability to pay but metaphysical depletion (“entkräftet,” “fertig”) and the incurring of 
culpability/debt (Schuld). Through this semantic network of what in Kleider will be called 
“Falliment” (insolvency), Keller’s preface unfolds a certain lawful regularity, the 
“unveränderlicher Kreislauf der Dinge” in Seldwyla, that maps the prosaic/quotidian onto the 
cosmic and vice versa.27 And if, as Benjamin suggests, the system of grottoes and caverns in 
Keller’s work, its system of humor, brings with it a Kelleresque “Rechtsordnung,” then the 
adjudication of this order – operating through Keller’s humor as Benjamin sees it – becomes part 
of the narrative project in Die Leute von Seldwyla, a project that lies at least in part in how the 
‘circulation’ of Seldwyla’s economy produces not goods but narrative fates, debts and credits, 
fortunes, and forfeitures, that is, in how its stories attribute credit and debt, fault and agency, 
                                                                                                                                                       
economic activity in which these needs were satisfied. The exchanges that occurred in this realm were 
summarised in the all-embracing topos of Verkehr—communication, commerce, social intercourse, 
traffic, exchange. Economic man was here conceived as der verkehrende Mensch. Verkehr is the axiom 
that unites studies of telegraphs, railways, stock exchanges, banks, and trade with a conception of the 
marketplace as a location at which the activities of individuals transmuted into an ordered economic 
whole.” Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950, 72-73. 
27 Keller’s “Kreislauf der Dinge” has then little to do with the physiological figure of circulation in 
economic thought that dominates 18th century political economy. Circulation in that sense implies the 
balance or equilibrium of a zero-sum game. Keller’s “Kreislauf” can never quite be balanced, or, if it 
could be, it would no longer serve as a poetic principle of narration. See sections 1 and 2 of chapter 4 in 
Vogl, Kalkül und Leidenschaft. But “Kreislauf” in Keller does have much to do with Marx. In his analysis 
of a different economic “Kreislauf” – namely that of capital accumulation – Marx offers his own story of 
an “ökonomischen Sündenfall,” that, as an “Anekdote der Vergangenheit,” plays a similar role as the 
“Sündenfall in der Theologie.” In the sphere of political economy, the economic Fall explains not how 
man became condemned to labor for his bread but “wieso es Leute gibt, die das keineswegs nötig haben,” 
that is, it offers an origin myth of accumulation that condemns some and pardons others: “So kam es, daß 
die ersten Reichtum akkumulierten und die letztren schließlich nichts zu verkaufen hatten als ihre eigne 
Haut. Und von diesem Sündenfall datiert die Armut der großen Masse, die immer noch, aller Arbeit zum 
Trotz, nichts zu verkaufen hat als sich selbst, und der Reichtum der wenigen, der fortwährend wächst, 
obgleich sie längst aufgehört haben zu arbeiten.” Karl Marx, Das Kapital, 741. 
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within the narratives of insolvency it tells. Keller’s novellas instantiate an economy of 
Schuldenverkehr – they turn commerce in and of debt into the form of stories that often pivot on 
questions of payback, fault/guilt, unbalanced ledgers and broken contracts. Schuldenverkehr 
belongs therefore neither entirely to the prosaic order of bourgeois right nor the earthly cosmic 
order that Benjamin sees in Keller’s work; it complicates, as Menninghaus points out, any 
symmetry between “Recht und Mythos” as a “Gleich um Gleich von Verletzung und Vergeltung, 
der Wiederkehr von Zeichen und Konstellation, der Macht eines Identitätsprinzips über alles 
einzelne.”28 Moreover, Schuldenverkehr in Keller’s preface to Seldwyla takes the place of the 
Decameronian brigata or the conversational exchange of Tieck’s Phantasus or Hoffmann’s 
Serapionsbrüder as a communicative set-up for the novella cycle. What was previously a 
trafficking or exchange of storytellers is now one of debt, which will become the dominant 
narrative principle and ‘frame’ of the novellas to follow, a frame that doesn’t quite fit, as will be 
discussed below. Schuldenverkehr, as Keller names this principle, not only concatenates the 
economic event with larger story logics, it acts as the order of right, the principle of Keller’s 
unsual version of poetic justice that on semantic and narrative level links the inability to pay 
(insolvency, “Falliment”) with death, forfeiture, or demise (“fertig,” “zugrunde richten,” 
“Verfall”).29  But the semantics of “fallen” – out of the paradise of credit into post-lapsarian debt 
                                                
28 Winfried Menninghaus, “Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe: Eine Intepretation im Anschluss an Walter 
Benjamin” in Artistische Schrift, 91-161, here 107. 
29 To offer some examples of how stories of Schuldenverkehr and insolvency abound in Seldwyla: The 
death of a husband in Pankraz, der Schmoller who is “schon lange fertig geworden” in the double-sense 
of bankrupt and ‘down-and-out’ leads to a meager “Witwengehalt” (); The piece of land that becomes the 
“Grundstein einer verworrenen Geschichte” in Romeo und Julia, triggering not only a legal battle that pits 
differing conceptions of proprietary rights against each other but also to an incredible loss of money (); 
The “Schuldenwesen” of Frau Regel Amrain und ihr Jüngster, with its “verpfändeten Steinlagern” 
“gründete zum erstenmal die Unternehmung, statt auf den Scheinverkehr, auf wirkliche Produktion” (); 
the economic crisis in Das verlorenene Lachen leads to the bankruptcy of the house; the tailor-cum-count 
of Kleicher machen Leute finds himself in the opening of the novella, after his master goes bankrupt 
(“Falliment”), without a dime, etc. 
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– also point to another crucial category of narrative motivation in Keller: “Zufall,” which Keller 
links to the emergence of financial speculation in Seldwyla in the second preface and a shift in 
the character of Seldwyla’s residents who now exhibit “das blinde Vertrauen auf den Zufall.” 
This category is not the “fall” into a Schuldzusammenhang, as it were; indeed it marks the break 
with the Schuldenverkehr of the first volume’s preface. Zufall in Keller is connected not only to a 
wheel of economic fortune, a “Glück” that falls into one’s place (fällt einem zu), as it were, as 
part of the lottery of life: like for the wife of Viggi Störteler in Die Missbrauchten Liebesbriefe, 
for whom “ein ziemliches Vermögen  . . . von auswärts zugefallen war” (379). Zufall is also, as 
this chapter will demonstrate for Kleider machen Leute, a logic of conjuncture or “Fügung” as 
Keller will name it in Kleider, that even as it conjoins incurs debts.  
 
Narrating waste 
To reiterate: as part of what Benjamin calls the “Durchdringung des Erzählerlischen und 
Dichterischen” in Keller, signs of value like the promissory note (a symbol much like the Falke 
Paul Heyse identifies as the keystone of the genre),30 patterns of insolvency, and instances of 
credit and debt take on poetological significance for the larger project of narration in Seldwyla. 
This project is itself inscribed in a law of value: Keller’s stories aim to narrate not simply the 
‘falls’ of Seldwyla’s trafficking in credit and debt, but what falls out of Seldwyla’s ‘circulation’ 
altogether; what, as the waste or refuse of Seldwyla, has no value at all. In a further inflection of 
the “Fall” of the debtor, Keller calls it Ab-fall:  
Doch nicht solche Geschichten, wie sei in dem beschriebenen Charakter von Seldwyla 
liegen, will ich eigentlich in diesem Büchlein erzählen, sondern einige sonderbare 
                                                
30 On Heyse’s Falke see Hannelore Schlaffer, Poetik der Novelle, 112-114. Schlaffer also suggests that 
such symbols in the novella operate as immanent “Agens der Handlung,” they “geh[en] aus dem 
Geschehen hervor und wirk[en] auf dieses zurück” (111). 
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Abfällsel, die so zwischendurch passierten, gewissermaßen ausnahmsweise, und doch 
auch gerade nur zu Seldwyla vor sich gehen konnten (13). 
 
As “Abfällsel” or waste Keller’s novellas would seem to lack both the exemplary value of the 
type and the singular value of the case. They appear to fall outside the “Kreislauf der Dinge” in 
Seldwyla, and indeed out of the circular dialectic of a part-whole, particular-general relation by 
constituting an exception to Selwdyla’s exceptional character. Yet it is precisely their status as 
exceptions to the exception, occasional occurrences that happen in the interstices of the 
Seldwylian “Kreislauf” – the cycles of growing old, incurring debt, being forced into exile, or 
performing grueling work – that make these stories ones that could only occur in the exceptional 
town of Seldwyla. Their exemplarity, if one can call it that, rests not on their typicality (they 
don’t stand in for a larger rule or a whole) but on the fact that they fall through the cracks. If 
Seldwyla is a place of ‘falls’ in the multiple senses outlined here, there can be no archive, no 
paradigmatic collection of its various incidences. Schuldenkverkehr requires a different poetics 
than the catalogue. The exceptional status of the subsequent stories is thus not relative to an 
established norm (there is no normalcy in Seldwyla with its “seltsamen Geschichten und 
Lebensläufen”) but second-order and for that reason does not dialectically result in the 
crystallization of a type, i.e. an exception that is also typical, but in waste. Yet as “Abfällsel” – 
and as part of the semantic constellation of the ‘Fall’ that characterizes Seldwyla’s 
Schuldenverkehr and paradise of credit – the subsequent stories do not actually stand outside 
Seldwyla’s “Kreislauf” but are embedded in the texture of the village’s daily life as its refuse, as 
extreme instances both part of and not part of Seldwyla’s larger story.31 It is only in their status 
                                                
31 This is similar to how Andreas Gailus reads the novella in systems-theoretical terms: the radical 
exceptionalism of the novella and its focus on contingency as ‘environmental irritations’ that are 
assimilated by the system “and used as stimulus for the construction of its own complexity.” See Gailus, 
“Form and Chance,” 762. 
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as ‘sonderbare’ waste – that is, as the word suggests, waste that is unusual and for that reason 
extraordinary and deviant or able to be exceptionalized or discarded (i.e. in the sense of 
ausgesondert) – that these stories can in fact become exemplary (etymologically that which is 
taken out)32 of Seldwyla: they might be waste but they can only be Seldwyla’s waste. 
Keller’s preface thus complexifies an understanding of the novella as the site for the 
integration of some exceptional event, promising a particularly complex model of narrative that 
does not ground its realist technique in the identity of generality and particularity, seeking the 
typical or exemplary in the particular, but absolutizes the exceptional as the refuse material of a 
given order. As Jörg Kreienbrock suggests in a reading of this scene, the “Abfällsel,” because 
they are worthless and can neither be exchanged nor used, upset a conventional ‘exchange’ 
between frame and novella and frustrate the interpretative effort altogether: “Es kommt zu keiner 
Akkumulation von Sinn im Falle der Novellen oder von Kapital im Falle der ‘fallierten’ 
Bankrotteure. [. . .] Muß nicht jeder Deutungsversuch damit rechnen, ‘fallen lassen’ zu müssen, 
und aus dem ‘Paradies des Kredits,’ in dem Werte und Worte identisch zu sein scheinen, 
herausfallen?”33 If, then, hermeneutics, as a lending of credit, an investment in value and word, 
falls due or lapses with the paradoxical worthlessness of Keller’s Abfällsel, a poetics of waste 
would, in the spirit of Seldwyla’s economy, call for a Verwertung of waste, indeed it would call 
for turning refuse into assets, capitalizing on their status as ‘sonderbar.’  
Keller’s narrative model of Verwertung points to a paradox in this regard: how can his 
novellas give narrative expression to stories qua refuse, allowing them to remain as remainders, 
                                                
32 Agamben, however, sees the example as “neither particular nor universal” but rather as a “singular 
object [ . . .] that shows its singularity.” Perhaps in this regard Keller’s “Abfällsel” could be called 
examples. See Giorgio Agamben, “Example” in The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
33 Jörg Kreienbrock, “Das Kreditparadies Seldwyla: Zur Beziehung von Ökonomie und Literatur in 
Gottfried Keller’s Die Leute von Seldwyla,” 121. 
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as ‘eccentricities’ (Rainer Nägele) that poses a crucial challenge to identity while complicating 
the realist novella’s orientation towards the norm?34 How can these stories be recuperated, 
verwertet, as waste without being accumulated? To recall the “Reichsunmittelbarkeit der 
Poesie,” one could say the poetics of waste in Keller rests on a self-aware confrontation of the 
same difference that is at stake between the age of the locomotive and the fable-like. The act of 
an immediate “anknüpfen” to the fable-like brings the poetic into the contemporary as its Abfall, 
without eliding its difference. This difference now becomes legible as part of the credit/debt 
logic of Seldwyla. Debt, in this regard, is an uncanny phenomenon, difficult to identify, make 
visible, or detect, as Richard Dienst writes, because it “shows us a world in which nothing really 
belongs to itself.”35 Keller’s Abfällsel in their paradoxical belonging in non-belonging share this 
structure with debt; Keller’s narrative of waste is thus about making visible or exposing the 
structure of debt as a structure that is everywhere and nowhere at once, as the refuse that is there 
but refuses to be seen.   
Keller’s preface to the second volume of Seldwyla, published in 1874, demonstrates how 
intricately the credit/debt structure of Seldwyla is tied to the project of narration. Narrating 
Abfällsel shifts to a more historicist mode in the second preface which Keller calls “Nachernte,” 
                                                
34 Erika Swales has suggested an affinity between Keller’s “narrative modality” and Adorno’s negative 
dialectics, with its emphasis on non-identity, though Adorno’s few comments on Keller would suggest the 
critical theoretician sees this differently. See Erika Swales, The Poetics of Scepticism, 195. This model of 
narrative waste, as a certain kind of materialism, would need to be contexualized against the background 
of Keller’s reception of Feuerbach. On the relation between Feuerbach and Keller in the Seldwyla 
collection, see Bernd Neumann, “‘Ganzer Mensch’ und ‘innerweltliche Askese;’” see also Paul Fleming, 
“Der Schmer des Realismus: Der Körper in Kellers Spiegel, das Kätzchen.” Keller’s Abfällsel display a 
similarity to Lacan’s concept of extimité (extimacy), i.e. what is most intimate is also exterior; the foreign 
object/remainder (Real) at the heart of the libidinal economy. Something of the uncanny lingers in 
Keller’s Abfällsel.  
35 Richard Dienst, The Bonds of Debt, 119. In a twist on an argument that Dienst makes about the early 
Marx’s Romantic account of credit, Annie McClanahan discusses the uncanny dimension of debt and 
argues that Marx – like Freud a reader of Hoffmann – discovers specifically in the mortgaged property 
relation a kind of uncanny alienation. See chapter 3 of Annie McClanahan, Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, 
and Twenty-First Century Culture. 
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an effort to belatedly revive the “guten lustigen Tagen der Stadt” after a series of changes in 
Seldwyla threaten to elide its exceptional status so that it “sich nicht mehr von der braven 
übrigen Welt unterscheid[et]” (295). These shifts and the elision of difference they bring with 
them, the preface suggests, would mean that there are no more interesting stories to tell; the 
“Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Poesie” absorbed entirely by prosaic reality’s ever-sameness. “Aber 
eben durch alles das verändert sich das Wesen der Seldwyler; sie sehen [. . . ] schon aus wie 
andere Leute; es ereignet sich nichts mehr unter ihnen was der beschaulichen Aufzeichnung 
würdig wäre” (297).  
 As a reflection, then, on what is worth being written down, the second preface clarifies 
the role of Schuldenverkehr in producing the waste that Keller will narrate. Things rapidly 
change in Seldywla and they do so to the tune of the world economy: “Es ist insonderlich die 
überall verbreitete Spekulationsbetätigung in bekannten und unbekannten Werten, welche den 
Seldwylern ein Feld eröffnet hat, das für sie wie seit Urbeginn geschaffen schien und sie mit 
einem Schlage Tausenden von ernsthaften Geschäftsleuten gleichstellte” (296). The material 
organization of Seldwyla shifts from a local economy of debtors and creditors, of a few haves 
and a few have-nots, and of a dynamic exchange between idleness and industriousness, to a new 
structure of financial capitalism that provides the breeding ground for the villager’s innate 
speculative proclivities. In the second preface, the villager’s propensity towards idleness – the 
“Müßiggang” that, as the proverb in the first preface tells us is “aller Laster Anfang” (13)36 – is 
recast as a suitable condition for their new economic activity, in terms literal and metaphoric at 
once: “Das gesellschaftliche Besprechen dieser Werte, das Herumspazieren zum Auftrieb eines 
                                                
36 On work and labor as a new variable of value at the beginning of the nineteenth century see Vogl, 
Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 335-346. For a study of Müßiggang and its consequences for aesthetics and 
literature, see Martin Jörg Schäfer, Die Gewalt der Muße: Wechselverhältnisse von Arbeit, Nichtarbeit, 
Ästhetik. 
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Geschäftes, mit welchem keiner weiteren Arbeit verbunden ist als das Erdulden mannigfacher 
Aufregung [. . .] sind so recht ihre Sache” (296). This “überall verbreitete 
Spekulationsbetätigung in bekannten und unbekannten Werten” becomes here a mode of 
economic activity that is decidedly non-laborious and seems to reap profit from simple chatter, 
strolling, and a bit of tenacity.37 The economy of grueling, belated labor and indebtedness is 
replaced here by a speculative financial economy that ushers in a new order of things: “Statt der 
ehemaligen dicken Brieftasche mit zerknitterten Schuldscheinen . . . führen sie nun elegante 
kleine Notizbücher, in welchen die Aufträge in Aktien, Obligationen, Baumwolle oder Seide 
kurz notiert werden.” This tidying-up of the ledger books, as it were, which produces, as Mary 
Poovey suggests of double-entry bookkeeping, an “effect of accuracy,”38 a semblance of 
precision, and an order in which nothing can fall through the cracks, marks an end, if not to the 
entire credit/debt structure, certainly to the specific character of Schuldenverkehr in Seldwyla: 
Statt der früheren plebjisch-gemütlichen Konkurse und Verlumpungen, die sie 
untereinander abspielten, gibt es jetzt vornehme Akkommodements mit stattlichen 
auswärtigen Gläubigern, anständig besprochene Schicksalswendungen, welche 
annäherungswise wie etwas Rechtes aussehen, sodann Wiederaufrichtungen, und nur 
selten muß noch einer vom Schauplatz abtreten (296). 
This introduction of an elegant system of bookkeeping, with its outsourcing of the credit/debt 
relation and move away from the ‘plebian bankruptcies’ would seem to leave no space for the 
previous “falls” of the debtor; in the tidy bookkeeping of the new Seldwyla, there is no more 
room for stories as Abfällsel. Keller’s preface suggests a reason for this: the Seldwylans now 
                                                
37 Financial speculation, wherever, it shows up in Realism must be read in the context of a post-1848 
rejection of philosophical speculation (i.e. Fontane’s remarks in “Unsere lyrische und epische Poesie seit 
1848:” “die Welt ist des Spekulierens müde und verlangt nach jener ‘frischen grüne Weide,’ die so nah 
lag und doch so fern”). In Keller speculation returns but in the guise of finance capital – which as an 
economic motif will play a central role in Realism/Naturalism (Balzac, Zola, Frank Norris) on both sides 
of the Atlantic. See Adorno’s essay on Balzac, speculation, and realism, “Balzac Lektüre” in Noten zur 
Literatur. 
38 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 64. 
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display a “blindes Vertrauen auf den Zufall” (297). In this context, Keller’s Kleider machen 
Leute will be a response to this Zufall, one that pulls it back – in the logic of “Nachernte” – into 
the fall of debt by imagining it as contingency in its literal sense: the coming together or 
conjuncture of events, a conjuncture that in Keller incurs debt. 
 
The “Fügung” of Fortune I (Kleider machen Leute) 
Keller’s canonical novella Kleider machen Leute, published 1874 in the second volume 
of his novella cycle – and immediately following the second preface – serves in many ways as an 
illustration of poetics of transfiguration as one of Verwertung: as the adage of the title suggests, 
the story concerns the value of appearances and to what degree these might be a measure of 
value for one’s person. But Keller’s story can more properly be called a narrative of Verwertung 
because it tells a kind of ‘rags-to-riches’ story, exploring the vicissitudes of fortune – the meeting 
point or conjuncture of economic and cosmic providence – while raising questions about the 
credit and debt, assets and liabilities, fictional character incurs. Keller’s story of a poor, 
vagabond tailor’s rise to wealthy capitalist, structured around a comedy of mistaken identity, is 
not a frictionless tale of fortune, as the pervasive presence of the figure of fortuna might suggest. 
Instead, it reflects upon the junctures and conjunctures necessary to tell a story of fortune or 
Glück, as the narrator becomes an arbiter of textual order, seeking to smooth out the narrative 
trajectory through a constellation of “Fügungen” or contingencies that ultimately leave economic 
and narrative ledgers unbalanced.  
Like many of the other Seldwyla novellas, fortune (economic and otherwise) in Kleider 
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becomes a question of fiction39 as the text strives to find the proper narrative economy for a 
narrative of economic fortune (between the figure of fortuna and textual contingency). Fortune, 
in Kleider, is a precarious narrative, one haunted by the debts and remainders its narrative 
economy incurs and by the threat of falling due (becoming “fällig”) at any moment. The 
Glücksgeschichte in Keller is thus always already haunted by the uncanny incessantness of 
Schuldenverkehr. As Benjamin writes, Keller’s “Vision des Glücks” is inextricable from his 
skepsis. 
 
Marx, Nietzsche, Keller 
A bit more than a decade after the publication of the second volume of Seldwyla, which 
opens with Kleider machen Leute, Friedrich Nietzsche, an avid reader of Keller,40 famously 
excavates a buried affinity between the moral concept of guilt (Schuld) and the “sehr materiellen 
                                                
39 Many of the Seldwyla novellas tie various forms of literary fiction and forms of writing to questions of 
economic and cosmic fortune. Often, Keller’s Seldwyla novellas raise the question of what genres are 
amenable to fortune: Die missbrauchten Liebesbriefe combines a fictional epistolary romance with 
bookkeeping and other notational forms of business. Der Schmied seines Glückes makes a family novel 
the fulcrum of economic Glück and when this ultimately fails fortune in life can only be had in a 
macabre/ironic realization of an adage/proverb. In this way the distinction that Frau Regel Amrain 
attempts to draw between the false value(s) at stake in the “Scheinverkehr” of “Schuldenwesen” and the 
real values of “wirkliche Produktion” (working “fleißig und ordentlich”) cannot be maintained since 
(fiction) Schein is always at stake. 
40 Nietzsche had become acquainted with Keller during his time in Zurich. The two corresponded in the 
1880s and Nietzsche sent Keller some of his books including Also sprach Zarathustra. See the references 
to Keller and Nietzsche in Sander L. Gilman (ed.), Begegnungen mit Nietzsche. Nietzsche mentions 
Keller in the second volume of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches (1878) in terms of the value of prose. In 
an aphorism entitled “Der Schatz der deutschen Prosa,” Nietzsche evaluates the works of German prose 
literature. Besides the “best German book,” Goethe’s conversations with Eckermann, and all other texts 
of Goethe, Gottfried Keller’s Die Leute von Seldwyla is one of the few books (together with 
Lichtenberg’s aphorisms, the first volume of Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling’s Lebensgeschichte, and 
Adalbert Stifter’s Nachsommer) that deserves to be read “wieder und wieder.” Nietzche, Menschliches, 
Allzumenschliches, 599. On the theological-economic subtext of Jung-Stilling’s Lebensgeschichte, see 
Richard T. Gray, “Counting on God: Economic Providentialism in Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling’s 
Lebensgeschichte” in Money Matters, 173-229. 
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Begriff” of debt (Schulden) in his Genealogie der Moral (1887).41 Nietzsche’s genealogy of the 
sense of guilt rests on demonstrating how the infliction of punishment, with the equivalence it 
creates between “Schaden und Schmerz” (298), become an institutionalized social technology for 
the exercise of justice and the project of “breeding” [heranzüchten] an animal capable of making 
promises (291). Nietzsche’s genealogy exhumes the asymmetric violence that underwrites 
human relations conventionally understood in terms of symmetry, reciprocity, and mutuality, a 
violence deeply embedded in the isomorphic emergence of the creditor-debtor relation together 
with the concept of a “Rechtssubjekt” (298). In referring an internalized human emotion (guilt, 
or bad conscience) back to the externalized forms of “Kauf, Tausch, Handel und Wandel,” 
Nietzsche is hardly interested in a historical materialist historiography as it’s formulated thirty 
years earlier in Marx and Engel’s German Ideology. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
Schuld shares with Marx’s account of the emergence of capitalist value relations the attention to 
gore: the geneology of morals exposes something like the primitive accumulation of pain that 
grounds human practices of memory, promising, etc., tracing how “alles Großen auf Erden” is 
written in blood: “gründlich und lange mit Blut begossen worden” (Nietzsche, 300).42 
Der Schuldner, um Vertrauen für sein Versprechen der Zurückbezahlung einzuflössen, 
um eine Bürgschaft für den Ernst und die Heiligkeit seines Versprechens zu geben, um 
bei sich selbst die Zurückbezahlung als Pflicht, Verpflichtung seinem Gewissen 
einzuschärfen, verpfändet Kraft eines Vertrags dem Gläubiger für den Fall, dass er nicht 
zahlt, Etwas, das er sonst noch „besitzt“, über das er sonst noch Gewalt hat, zum Beispiel 
seinen Leib oder sein Weib oder seine Freiheit oder auch sein Leben . . . Namentlich aber 
                                                
41 Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, 297. 
42 Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation similarly attempt to show how capital comes to the world 
dripping from head to toe with blood (“von Kopf bis Zeh, aus allen Poren, blut- und schmutztriefend” 
[Das Kapital, 788]). Marx’s analysis aims at different social forms than Nietzsche’s but the two accounts 
might be more compatible than they appear at first glance: Marx shows how certain social groups are 
“hineingepeitscht, -gebrandmarkt, -gefoltert in eine dem System der Lohnarbeit notwendige Disziplin” 
(Das Kapital, 765), mechanisms similar to those that discipline the human as “berechenbar, regelmässig, 
notwendig” and thus enable a whole set of economic activities: “Preise machen, Werthe abmessen, 
Äquivalente ausdenken, tauschen” (Nietzsche, Geneologie der Moral, 306).  
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konnte der Gläubiger dem Leibe des Schuldners alle Arten Schmach und Folter anthun, 
zum Beispiel so viel davon herunterschneiden als der Grösse der Schuld angemessen 
schien: — und es gab frühzeitig und überall von diesem Gesichtspunkte aus genaue, zum 
Theil entsetzlich in’s Kleine und Kleinste gehende Abschätzungen, zu Recht bestehende 
Abschätzungen der einzelnen Glieder und Körperstellen . . . Die Äquivalenz ist damit 
gegeben, dass an Stelle eines gegen den Schaden direkt aufkommenden Vortheils (also an 
Stelle eines Ausgleichs in Geld, Land, Besitz irgend welcher Art) dem Gläubiger eine Art 
Wohlgefühl als Rückzahlung und Ausgleich zugestanden wird (299). 
What Nietzsche calls the “älteste und naivste Moral-Kanon der Gerechtigkeit” rest upon a 
violent interchange between creditor and debtor, as the foundational social relation, in which a 
promise to pay, credit, requires the collateral of living ‘property’ and compensation for forfeiture 
comes in the form of the pleasure taken in someone else’s pain (306). Law here functions to 
establish a standard of equivalence for a payback, to underwrite a moral economy that transacts 
in the singular currencies of pleasure and pain rather than a general equivalent (in money or 
commodity form). Moreover, the bond between creditor and debtor serves the disciplinary 
function of rendering human behavior “berechenbar, regelmässig, nothwendig” (292). Indeed, 
credit, for Nietzsche is a structure that establishes a relation between present and future, training 
man to be able in the present to account for the future, “für sich als Zukunft gut sagen zu 
können” in the form of the promise: “ich werde thun” (292). For this speech act to work, a 
regimentation of time is necessary that credit-debt relations fortify by coercively training 
character, indeed by creating character (ethos) through the disciplining of a subject over time, a 
subject that can in the present account for the future and indeed promise at all.  The credit-debt 
relation is, in other words, not premised on moral values of reciprocity, mutuality, responsibility, 
etc., but produces these values in the first place through the “ungeheure Arbeit” of the 
“Sittlichkeit der Sitte” as a “soziale Zwangsjacke” (293). Credit-debt relations produce an ethical 
subjectivity along with an arsenal of social values steeped in material values and a schema of 
order that reduces contingencies of character to necessities of self-sameness/reliability. While 
  109 
Nietzsche’s account points to the many cultural emanations of the credit-debt relation, that range 
from spectacles of public punishment – a phenomenon that will later play a key role in 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish – to the tyranny of the state, to the entire Schuldzusammenhang 
of Christianity, its major feat lies in showing how the production of values through a materially 
motivated ‘work on the self’ generates a causal order of necessity/calculability that arises 
contingently. By excavating the “uncertain [unsicher],” “retroactive/belated [nachträglich],” 
“accidental [accidentiell]” history of ethical values (317), active in the spheres of law, economy, 
politics, etc., Nietzsche ruptures a semiology of value that would grasp something like guilt as a 
motivated sign of fault. 
In an early and marginal collection of notes on James Mill (1844), Marx identifies a 
similar ethical-disciplinary structure at work in credit and debt, defining credit as the “economic 
judgment of the morality of a man.”43 Marx draws attention to how credit literalizes the 
character, status, and body of a man: “Credit no longer actualizes money-values in actual money 
but in human flesh and human hearts” (264).44 In this way credit seems to generate a kind of 
value out of ethos. As Lazarrato writes, “The ‘moral’ concepts of good and bad, of trust and 
distrust, here translate into solvency and insolvency.”45 Significant, for the context of this 
argument about Kleider machen Leute, is the way in which the debtor in Marx’s account 
                                                
43 Marx, “Comments on James Mill, Élémens d’économie politique Translated by J.T. Parisot, Paris 
1823,” 215.These notes have become canonical in certain Nietzschean-inflected readings of Marx on 
credit. Maurizio Lazzarato, in particular, reads Nietzsche together with Marx in his essay on the politics 
of neoliberalism and financial capitalism, The Making of Indebted Man. Lazarrato is engaged in his own 
genealogy of the debtor prior to a neoliberal form of governance that produces a different subject of 
economic interest, a different homo economicus, namely indebted man. See Maurizio Lazzarato, The 
Making of the Indebted Man. Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control” belongs to this 
constellation when it claims, modifying Foucault, “Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt.” See 
Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October 59 (Winter 1992), 6. 
44 See Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy” in Early Writings (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1975). 
45 Lazarrato, Making of Indebted Man, 58. 
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performs for the creditor: the debtor’s ethos in the ethical sense becomes an ethos in the dramatic 
one, namely the character or persona controlled by the creditor, and the debtor’s entire person 
represents and embodies the repayment of debt for the creditor:  
When a rich man gives credit to a poor man [. . .] the life of the poor man and his talents 
and activity serve the rich man as a guarantee of the repayment of the money lent. That 
means, therefore, that all the social virtues of the poor man, the content of his vital 
activity, his existence itself, represent for the rich man the reimbursement of his capital 
with the customary interest. Hence the death of the poor man is the worst eventuality for 
the creditor. It is the death of his capital together with his interest (215-216). 
The creditor-debtor relation as it is thought in the mid-19th century thus circumscribes a relation 
wherein the human body becomes collateral for a debt obligation and whereby character (‘the 
morality of a man’ or the ability to keep one’s word) becomes the economic measure of human 
value.46 The creditor-debtor relation is inscribed in a hermeneutics of human morality, a reading 
of character that affixes a quantifiable value to the human backed and animated by the body, the 
flesh, of the human.47 This depends indeed on a certain performance of the debtor: to live for the 
                                                
46 This is by no means restricted to the mid-19th century. The lineage of texts that trace a relation between 
credit and character or moral and economic economies is long and includes Shakespeare’s Merchant of 
Venice, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, etc. Recent scholarly works 
have addressed this issue in particular since the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis (largely) in the 
United States. See for example: Richard Dienst, Bonds of Debt, Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the 
Indebted Man, David Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, Annie McClanahan, Dead Pledges, Margaret 
Atwood, Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth. For scholarly work on the relation between 
character and credit in literature see especially Deidre Lynch: The Economy of Character: Novels, Market 
Culture, and the Business of Inner Meaning. McClanahan forcefuly argues that Lazaretto misreads 
Marx’s in his emphasis on the ethics and subjectivity of debt. As McClanahan suggests, Marx’s point is 
that the debtor’s body serves as “ultimate collateral for the loan” in a way that obviates any need for 
“either accountability or for guilt, let alone ethics of subjectivity” since all that is necessary for the 
reinforcement of the credit-debt relation is the power to enact violence or deprive debtors of their 
livelihood. This, and not any sort of ethics, McClanahan argues is the reason one pays back a loan, even if 
one feels guilty or accountable for the loan. See Dead Pledges, 94-95. 
47 Eric Santner attempts to think the human body and its flesh literally as the subject-matter of political 
economy, as the substance of what Marx calls the “gespenstische Gegenständlichkeit” of value. He does 
so as an extension to his project on the political theology of sovereignty; in this light the new subject 
matter of political economy is a kind of secularization that still invests in the liturgical practices of 
glorification that have characterized other quasi-theological relations to symbolic material (i.e. the King’s 
body). Santner’s understanding of value is tied to this quasi-theology: “value is related to valor, glory, 
radiance, splendor” (107) and his notion of economy draws heavily on Agamben’s theological one in The 
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creditor while the creditor becomes spectator and hermeneut of this performance. 
While Nietzsche and Marx are writing on the human-moral underpinnings of the credit-
debt relation, Keller is a struggling author who is heavily indebted and hopes to receive an 
advance from his publisher.48 As he writes in a letter to his publisher:  “Hier muß ich Ihnen 
mitteilen, daß ich im letzten Sommer durch Schuldverhältnisse gezwungen war, einen Kontrakt 
abzuschließen.”49 And it is during this time that Keller composes his story of imposture in which 
a poor tailor turns wealthy capitalist. Kleider machen Leute not only examines the signs of 
human value (what ‘makes’ people) and the forms of conduct that motivate them, embedding 
this problematic in a fiction about reading and recognizing such signs, but casts this in terms of a 
credit-debt dynamic as well. Unlike Nietzsche’s genealogy or Marx’s, Keller does not aim in 
Kleider to demystify a social relation to value by pointing to the fictions that have obscured 
value but to produce his own fiction of an enchanted semiology of value, in an economy at once 
                                                                                                                                                       
Kingdom and the Glory. Eric Santner, The Weight of All Flesh: On the Subject-Matter of Political 
Economy. See also Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of 
Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
48 Like Nietzsche’s debtor, who offers his self, life, wife, or body parts not only as a pledge to generate 
trust in his promise to repay but also as a measure of self-discipline to assure himself of his 
“Verpflichtung” and reinforce his conscience, Keller adds clauses to his contracts with publishers that 
legally establish penalties for failing to meet deadlines. These deadlines also are meant to corroborate his 
character as non-delinquent author: “Ich habe aber schon bei den Vieweg'schen Erzählungen mit Erfolg 
die Maßregel getroffen, bei einer allfälligen Verspätung über einen festgesetzten Termin hinaus mir einen 
Abzug oder eine Konventionalstrafe gefallen zu lassen, da ich von dem Romane her im Geruch eines 
säumigen Autors stehe. Daher schlage ich auch jetzt wieder zur Sicherstellung des Verlegers vor, daß 
nach dem festgestellten Termin mir für jeden Monat weiterer Säumniß 25 Thaler von dem verabredeten 
Honorar abgezogen werden” (Letter to Franz Duncker, September 19, 1855). In another letter written less 
than a week later this plan has already seemed to backfire: “Ich habe mich mit den Stipulationen, die wir 
neulich getroffen, in eine Sackgasse verrannt . . . Ich habe nämlich über die Hälfte des Honorares schon in 
der Weise disponirt, daß ich sie nothwendig gleich jetzt brauche. In dieser Rücksicht habe ich auch die 
Konventionalstrafe vorgeschlagen, welche ohne jene Voraussetzung keine rechte oder billige Begründung 
hätte; denn wenn ich nicht spätestens vom 1ten Oktober an jeden Tag, ohne alle Ablenkungen und 
Sorgen, zu der Arbeit verwenden kann, so wird es nicht möglich sein, das Buch bis zum 15t. Nov. 
respektive bis zum 15t. Oktober druckreif fertig zu kriegen und ich würde jener Strafe verfallen, ohne die 
dieselbe begründende Wohlthat eines Vorschusses genossen zu haben . . . Den Konventionalabzug aber 
aufzuheben oder den Schlußtermin hinauszusetzen geht nicht wohl an, weder in Ihrem noch in meinem 
Interesse” (September 28, 1855). 
49 Keller to Vieweg, April 2, 1855, in Dichter über ihre Dichtung, ed. Klaus Jeziorkowski, 252-3. 
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moral, material, and narrative, that would align external (outward appearance) and internal 
(character) signs. Keller is interested less in how credit-debt relations produce and tame 
subjectivities than in how a fiction of character blurs distinctions between roles of creditor and 
debtor. Keller’s text, moreover, participates in the reorganization of the signs of value that 
Nietzsche and Marx identify in the course of the nineteenth-century. As part of an Umwertung 
der Werte, Kleider machen Leute complexly explores the relation between character and credit, 
both in terms of how the Goldacher evaluate Strapinski and find him credible as count, or do not, 
as in the case of the skeptic accountant Melcher Böhni, but also through the way the novella 
confounds Strapinkski’s imaginary and real identity and links this to the issue of culpability 
[Verschuldung] and debt [Schulden]. The fiction of economic fortune, of Strapinski’s ascent 
from rags to riches, rests on a fiction about character and a fiction of reading character, fictions 
that form the basis of the moral-economic problem of guilt and debt. 
In this way, Keller’s transfiguration is also a kind of transvaluation, one that explores the 
way in which signs of value (including Kleider) are embedded in relations of credit and debt. 
Kleider machen Leute cannot put an end to its Schuldenverkehr and in this regard offers an 
exemplary instance of Die Leute von Seldwyla: in the final turn of the novella, which ends with 
the word “Rache,” the cycle of credit and debt, the ledger of payback, remains as remainder. In 
this regard, the story is less an instantiation of Glück as it is a reflection on the literary conditions 
of possibility for a fiction of Glück.50 What Keller will repeatedly call “Fügungen” in the novella 
                                                
50 David Wellbery has suggested that with the end of the Enlightnement, Glück becomes ineffable and can 
no longer be integrated into any conceptual schematic. For this reason, Wellbery suggests, a modern 
understanding of Glück can only be sought in literature, in narratives that stage “auf wie vielfältige Weise 
Glück in ein je individuelles Leben eingehen kann.” Wellbery, “Prekäres und unverhofftes Glück,” 50. 
Keller’s story takes this a step further with the skeptical “Vision des Glücks” that Benjamin ascribes to 
Keller’s epic narrative style: Glück becomes something that can only be had in a fictional register (in 
imposture, a fictional narrative, an adage, etc.) and is thus always threatening to come undone. The 
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– the points of conjunecture that bring about some felicitous turn – all become “fällig” at some 
point, even as Keller’s novella strive to hold its fiction together as something valuable, 
meaningful and not determined by “blindes Vertrauen auf den Zufall.” 
 
The “Fügung” of Fortune II (Kleider machen Leute) 
Kleider machen Leute begins with a double insolvency: because of the “Falliment 
irgendeines Seldwyler Schneidermeisters,” the tailor Wenzel Strapinski loses “seinen 
Arbeitslohn mit der Arbeit zugleich” and is forced, like many journeymen, to wander, “in 
Ermangelung irgendeiner Münze,” in search of pay (298). The novella ends, however, with a 
fortune (“Vermögen”) that has “doubled” as Strapinski, who now has “ebenso viele Kinder” as 
he does wealth, becomes a very solvent “Schneidermeister” (346). By narrating a story of 
insolvency that ends in solvency rather than “krabbelige Arbeit,” Keller’s novella promises to 
offer a Seldwylian “Abfällsel:” the novella takes exception to the cycle of plebian 
“bankruptices/insolvencies” that characterizes Seldwyla in the first preface by telling of the good 
economic fortune of Strapinski, by telling a story of valorization rather than immiseration. The 
plot of the story revolves around an Urfabel of mistaken identity in which Strapinski is mistaken 
in the nearby town of Goldach for an eclectic Polish count on the basis of his outward 
appearance and a ruse by a coachman who offers Strapinski a ride into town. The solution to his 
insolvency comes not in the form of begging (“Fechten”) – the normal fate of an impoverished 
journeyman51 – but through a series of felicitous and not so felicitous turnings that allow 
                                                                                                                                                       
success or failure of Glück, and whether it is simply transitory or enduring, relies on the degree to which 
these fictions can be singularly actualized as narrative text. But in Keller’s prose, there is an expiration 
date on Glück. This is why the Schmied seines Glückes must literally become a smith of nails. 
51 Fechten, begging, was a normal source of income for journeymen, especially tailors. As one 
journeyman notes, “Da unser Geld knapp war und Fechten zu keener Zeit als Schände für einen 
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Strapinski to feign the identity of Polish count and live off the good graces and generosity of the 
Goldach villagers who eagerly welcome the mysterious figure into their small but wealthy town. 
After Strapinski’s exposure through a carnevalesque redoubling of the imposture fiction – a 
metafictive performance in which an actor plays Strapinski playing poor tailor turned fake count 
– all seems lost for the tailor until a fortunate turn of events not only puts him back on his feet 
but pardons him of any fault in the incident, delivers retribution, and rewards him with wife, 
children, and financial success.  
Keller’s novella thereby stages Strapinski’s turn from lack to plenty as a fiction of Glück 
in a double sense: Strapinski ultimately comes to economic fortune, to Glück, via a precarious 
fiction of identity, which in the text takes the form of an ‘imposture’ that is put to an end through 
a further fiction,52 a theatrical scene of revealing and finally a scene of anagnorisis, in order 
finally that Strapinski’s fortune be sealed not under the pretense of false identity but for the poor 
tailor himself. Only then can this fiction follow a pattern of (social, economic, and literary) 
Aufstieg that would occur as an exceptional event worth writing about. The fiction of fortune is 
operative in a second way since only an act of fortune, a Glück, can ensure that Strapinski’s story 
will not end as it began, in misfortune, but in a Glück that would last and in a story that would be 
                                                                                                                                                       
Handwerksburschen galt . . .” or “…wir sollten beide bei den Schneidermeistern Umschau halten .  . . . 
Hier sei bemerkt, daß bei einer Umschau bei den Meistern des Gewerbes die Geschenke wesentlich 
reichlicher ausfielen als beim Fechten; dafür hatte man aber auch die moralische Verpflichtung, wenn  . . . 
ein Meister erklärte, er habe Arbeit, diese anzunehmen” (223). For journeyman, ethical conduct and 
economic practice are deeply connected. Such practices were highly formalized in the codes of conduct 
that applied to the various guilds of handicrafts: “Jeder Beruf hatte seine eigenen Handwerksgebräuche, 
die Zunftformeln, die man genau kennen mußte; z.B. beim Umschauen nach Arbeit, wenn man sein 
Geschenk holt, beim Ausschenken usw. Diese Formeln kannte jeder abgefundene oder zünftige Geselle” 
(224). “Wanderschaft und Wanderbräuche” in vol. 1 of Deutsche Sozialgeschichte: Dokumente und 
Skizzen, ed. Werner Pols. 
52 Keller’s text cites more than actually stages an imposture since the tailor is mistaken for a count and 
then performs as one. Much of the narrative is concerned with exploring what distinguishes imposture 
from performance or play. 
  115 
worth telling.53 Keller’s novella thus reflects on the fictional, and in this case narrative, 
parameters of fortune while embedding the latter in Seldwylian Schuldenverkehr: it brings 
together issues of narrative motivation (on the level of plot, or mythos) and the credibility of 
character (on the level of ethos) to reflect on what makes a person and story valuable. Because 
the central event of Keller’s novella is a character’s turn from lack to plenty – the valorization of 
Strapinski as character – the Aristotelian primacy of mythos over ethos doesn’t hold: Keller’s 
novella, as we will see, makes the question of ethos a matter of plot, and turns the creation of a 
credible character into the primary task of plot. The concatenation of events, the narrative 
economy or mythos of the novella stands in the service of generating a solvent character.  
 Keller’s novella, as has recently been argued of many mid-19th-century texts, displays a 
high level of self-reflexivity in the sense that it incorporates knowledge about the sorts of literary 
devices and techniques it deploys and about its own conditions of possibility: Keller’s novella, 
like others in the Seldwyla cycle, interpolates other forms and traditions of literary writing for its 
narrative. In the case of Kleider machen Leute, Strapinski’s imposture is cast by the narrator as a 
sort of Bildungsroman in which Strapinski swiftly becomes the “Held eines artigen Romans” 
(319). This “Roman” begins with Strapinski’s arrival in the town of Goldach, where he is 
mistaken for a count, and ends not with the theatrical exposure by his “Doppelgänger” but with a 
final turn in fortune, an “abermaliger Glückswechsel,” – a scene of anagnorisis – that reunites 
Strapinski with his former love interest, who declares the novel to be over: “Keine Romane 
                                                
53 David Wellbery has discussed the precarity of literary representations of Glück in terms of the paradox 
that “ihr [die Glücksdarstellung] Gelingen allererst durch die Leidenserfahrung ermöglicht wird” (16). 
See Wellbery, “Prekäres und unverhofftes Glück.” This problem, which Wellbery sees reflected in the 
work of Georg Simmel as much as Georg Christoph Lichtenberg is, as Dieter Heinrich has suggested, part 
of a post-lapsarian “Figur-Grund-Verhältnis” between Glück and Not, or Unglück. Dieter Heinrich, 
“Glück und Not,” 136. As Simmel suggests, the best part of paradise is that Glück can be had without any 
relation to its opposite.  
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mehr!” (341). The Bildungsroman therefore spans precisely the distance between insolvency and 
wealth for Strapinski, between Strapinski as penniless journeyman and Strapinski as master who 
“wußte . . . gute Spekulationen zu machen.” This fiction becomes itself a “vergängliches Glück,” 
a temporary solution to Strapinski’s economic plight, and unfolds in the novella as a form of 
“Bildung” different than that of Wilhelm Meister or Heinrich Lee:54 
Er lernte in Stunden, in Augenblicken, was andere nicht in Jahren, da es in ihm gesteckt 
hatte, wie das Farbwesen in Regentropfen. Er beachtete wohl die Sitten seiner 
Gastfreunde und bildete sie während des Beobachtens zu einem Neuen und Fremdartigen 
um; besonders suchte er abzulauschen . . . was für ein Bild sie sich von ihm gemacht. 
Dieses Bild arbeitete er weiter aus nach seinem eigenen Geschmacke, zur vergnüglichen 
Unterhaltung der einen, welche gern etwas Neues sehen wollten, und zur Bewunderung 
der anderen . . . welche nach erbaulicher Anregung dürsteten (319). 
 
Strapinksi performs the role of a Polish count (by singing a Polish folk song, for instance) 
through ‘observation’ and ‘ablauschen,’ poetically producing (bildet) a fiction of character, an 
ethos (complete with Strapinski’s “eigenen Geschmacke” – a veritable aesthetic education).55  
More than aesthetic Bildung, however, Strapinski’s cultivated self-fashioning is a kind of 
labor performed on his “Bild,” a labor that becomes available to the otherwise unemployed 
tailor.56 one that elicits the investment of the “umsichtige Geschäftsmänner” in Goldach who, 
“stets begierig auf eine Abwechslung, ein Ereignis, einen Vorgang,” provide the poetic capital 
necessary for Strapinski’s “Roman:” “Das vierspännige Wagen, das Aussteigen des Fremden, 
                                                
54 Kleider has a complex relation to Wilhelm Meister: Meister’s “mich selbst, ganz wie ich bin, 
auszubilden” becomes Strapinski’s “Ich bin nicht ganz so wie ich scheine.” In the final collapsing of any 
dichotomy between Schein and Sein, Strapinski, of course, is exactly as he seems. 
55 On Bild and Bildung see Koselleck, “Zur anthropologischen und semantischen Struktur der Bildung,” 
in Begriffsgeschichten, Frankfurt: 2006, 105-154. 
56 Strapinski as Schneider would have to be compared to the figure of the Schneider in Marx, which 
shows up at a crucial moment in Marx’s definition of labor, when he is defining the value form. There the 
context is the abstraction from specific forms of labor through the value-relation of exchange. The tailor 
shows up, in other words, only to disappear as an example of abstract labor, a “produktive 
Verausgaubung von menschlichem Hirn, Muskel, Nerv, Hand usw., und in diesem Sinn [. . . ] 
menschliche Arbeit.” Keller’s Schneider confronts Marx’s Schneider (as a figure for his theory of value) 
not only with an inversion (Kleider machen Leute and not the other way around) but also with the 
Arbeitslosigkeit of his tailor, who has to spin something else: not material labor but the labor of fiction. 
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sein Mittagsessen . . . waren so einfache und natürliche Dinge, daß die Goldacher . . . ein 
Ereignis darauf aufbauten wie auf einen Felsen” (315).57 By turning the most simple and natural 
occurrence into an event, the residents of Goldach generate the plot or fiction (mythos) within 
which Strapinski’s character (ethos) will be embedded, a fiction of character that Keller’s novella 
inserts into a story of insolvency. The fictional plot of Keller’s novella thus revolves around the 
plot of a fictional “Roman” that is about producing an exceptional, if fictional, event – and for 
the unemployed tailor this becomes a form of literary labor performed together with the 
businessmen of Goldach (“eines artigen Romanes, an welchem er gemeinsam mit der Stadt und 
liebvoll arbeitete”). In a town in which “keiner dem andern etwa schuldig blieb,” Strapinski lives 
from the credit of his “Ereignis,” a credit extended to him by the residents of Goldach. This 
credit is granted to him not only in the form of credibility he garners as the hero of an “artigen 
Romans” (317) but also in the material form of money and gifts that Strapinski receives from the 
Goldacher residents under the pretense that he is an eclectic Polish count. Strapniski’s fortune – a 
“vergängliches Glück” – is thus a double one, backed by the material and immaterial investments 
he receives. 
In its material form, the credit that underwrites Strapinski’s performance as count solves 
more than his economic need, it also solves Strapinski’s other “Bedürfnis:” “etwas Zierliches 
und Außergewöhnliches vorzustellen, wenn auch nur in der Wahl der Kleider” (319). While this 
“Bedürfnis” first expresses itself in the story through the elegant coat that Strapinski wears, 
which lends him “ein edles und romantisches Aussehen,” it now wanders, like Strapinski 
himself, from fashion to self-fashioning. Paradoxically, his ability to fashion himself in more 
                                                
57 See Gerhard Kaiser on this point as well: “Bei näherem Zusehen kann man die gesamte 
Hochstaplerkonstellation als nichts anderes den ein ausgefallenes Verfahren der Kreditgewährung an 
Wenzel lessen. Seine Selbstinszenierung ist ein Lernprozeß, bei dem er fähig wird, dieses Kapital für sich 
arbeiten zu lassen.” In Kaiser, Gottfried Keller: Das gedichtete Leben, 347. 
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noble ways is precisely what, in the form of the coat, originally exacerbates his economic despair 
as an unemployed tailor: because of the noble appearance of the coat, “Fechten fiel ihm äußerst 
schwer . . . ja schien ihm gänzlich unmöglich” (298) and in this way he becomes a “Märtyrer 
seines Mantels . . . und [litt] Hunger, so Schwarz wie des letztern Sammetfutter” (299). If Keller 
defines transfiguration as an act of “Veredelung,”58 the protagonist’s self-ennobling exposes the 
paradox of transfiguration as an everyday praxis. 
As martyr, Strapinski falls even harder than the “Falliment” of his former employer: he 
falls entirely out of any economy based upon the satisfaction of material needs. His need is his 
ethos or habitus of transfiguring himself: “Solcher Habitus war ihm zum Bedürfnis geworden, 
ohne daß er etwas Schlimmes oder Betrügerisches dabei im Schilde führe.” In his role as count 
in Goldach, Strapinski finds an opportunity to practice this habitus in such a way that the tragedy 
of his attire can become a comedy of errors. The shift the text suggests from habitus to need 
inserts the production of or work on character – a character that seems more than it is – into an 
economy:59 self-fashioning and cultivating a romantic appearance aggravate the insolvency of 
Strapinski the tailor until the proper fictional mode is found within which Bildung can generate 
credit for the count. The ‘imposture’ entails a move from insolvent martyr to solvent count via a 
fiction that is self-proliferation, like the ‘enumerative catalogues’ (Nägele) of all the things 
Strapinski receives as count:  
… als er spät erwachte, sah er zunächst den prächtigen Sonntagsschlafrock . . . ferner ein 
Tischlein mit allem möglichen Toilettenwerkzeug bedeck. Sodann harten eine Anzahl 
Dienstboten, um Körbe und Koffer, angefüllt mit feiner Wäsche, mit Kleidern, mit 
Zigarren, mit Büchern, mit Stiefeln, mit Schuhen, mit Sporen, mit Reitpeitschen, mit 
Pelzen, mit Mützen, mit Hüten, mit Socken, mit Strümpfen, mit Pfeifen, mit Flöten und 
Geigen, abzugeben von seiten der gestrigen Freunde, mit der angelegentlichen Bitte, sich 
                                                
58 See Keller’s review of his fellow Swiss contemporary Jeremias Gottfhelf. 
59 In another way, through this emphasis on habitus as need, as hexis, one could say, Keller collapses any 
distinction between being and having, or being and seeming. 
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dieser Bequemlichkeiten einstweilen bedienen zu wollen (315).   
Like the Virginian cigars Strapinski is offered the day before, this inventory of gifts is “durchaus 
nicht käuflich” (307). It is consumed by the reader and by Strapinski under the premise of 
fiction, which is to say upon credit. 
Through the fiction of his “Roman,” Strapinski enters “eine andere Welt” in which signs 
of lack turn to signs of plenty that have to proliferate in order to keep spinning the fiction. The 
logic of this turn is twofold. On the one hand, it involves a quasi-Romantic multiplication of 
what is already there: Strapinski’s Kleider become even more Kleider through the gifts; his 
proclivity for romantic and elegant self-fashioning multiplies into an elaborate fiction). On the 
other hand it involves a poetic-Realist logic of transfiguration that turns what is into something 
exceptional and better, a logic that the text casts in terms of a certain hermeneutics of signs: 
“Denn er [Strapinski] möchte tun oder lassen, was er wollte, alles wurde als ungewöhnlich und 
nobel ausgelegt” (313). 
If this is the logic of transfiguration, it quickly becomes one of Verwertung: creating 
value where there was none. This logic is figured through a kind of semiotic alchemy. Strapinski, 
in a first reaction to the lavish “Warenlager” he receives, reaches for the thimble he carries in his 
pocket “in Ermangelung irgendeiner Münze,” to determine whether he is dreaming or awake 
(315). When Strapinski finds his “Fingerhut” in his pocket, it no longer compensates for a lack of 
coin but sits “traulich zwischen dem gewonnenen Spielgelde.” The thimble turns here from a 
sign of lack to a sign of plenty, one that metonymically indexes both Strapinski’s insolvency and 
solvency in the story. Moreover, as a sign for the quasi-alchemy of generating currency where 
there was none, the thimble avows the reality of the fiction, as it were, the reality of Strapinski’s 
Roman. In this function the thimble is consistent in signifying the potential of Verwertung: it is 
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both a sign of Strapinski’s occupation as tailor (what he is) and a sign of what he can do (his 
habitus or what he has), namely spin fictions of fortune. And while this fortune is enacted 
through a shift from lack to plenty, insolvency to solvency, coins that are there which weren’t 
before, the thimble’s presence in both worlds, as it were, collapses the difference between 
seeming and being, the fiction of the Roman and the ‘reality’ of the imposture, indeed between 
being and having. 
Keller’s assimilates this collapse of Sein and Schein into the economic semiology (or 
semiotic economy) of the story and calls it an “Art moralisches Utopien,” one which Strapinksi 
reads as the ability of signs (the signs of businesses) to index his fortune, indeed to serve as 
allegories with a kind of practical power: 
er [Strapinski] glaubte sich in einer anderen Welt zu befinden. Denn als er die 
Aufschriften der Häuser las . . . war er der Meinung sie bezögen sich auf die besonderen 
Geheimnisse und Lebensweisen jedes Hauses und es sähe hinter jeder Haustüre wirklich 
so aus, wie die Überschriften angab . . . So war er geneigt zu glauben, die wunderliche 
Aufnahme, welche er gefunden, hänge hiemit im Zusammenhang, so daß zum Beispiel 
das Sinnbild der Waage, in welcher er wohnte, bedeute, daß dort das ungleiche Schicksal 
abgewogen und ausgeglichen und zuweilen ein reisender Schneider zum Grafen gemacht 
würde (317).60 
In Strapinski’s “Roman,” the signs of the village become agents of the tailor’s fortune, of his 
economic miracle or Wirtschaftswunder (“wunderliche Aufnahme”), through an elision of the 
difference between Sein and Schein: behind every door, things really are as their signs indicate 
just as Strapinski can really become the elegant count (the character) that his outward appearance 
(his attire) suggests. In Goldach’s moral utopia, the traces of authorial labor behind Strapinski’s 
                                                
60 Kreienbock sees Strapinski’s behavior in the inn, for instance his “schüchternes Zögern,” as an 
“Auschub des direkten Konsums, welche es erlaubt, einen semantischen Mehrwert zu erzeugen und das 
ungeschickte Verhalten als Zeichen verborgenen Vermögens zu deuten” (131). The semantic surplus-
value that Kreienbock mentions is, I find, a crucial though not primary source of Strapinski’s Vermögen. 
While Keller clearly links the semiotics of behavior to Strapinski’s economic fortune and misfortune, this 
alone is not enough to motivate the tale of fortune. See also Kaiser’s afterword to Die Leute von Seldwyla: 
“Landeswohl als Haspelei, Verfassung als Herstellung von Fäßchen” (690).  
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fictional character, the “Geheimnis” of self-fashioning, are erased and signs are no longer 
arbitrary, that is to say their meaning isn’t differential: in Goldach, Strapinski can become the 
eclectic nobleman, the hero of the novel, which he already appears to be, just as the thimble 
[“Fingerhut”] affirms the reality of his new fortune. In this moral utopia, Strapinski neither finds 
his Glück nor smiths it (as in the novella that follows Der Schmied seines Glückes) but rather has 
it all along and must curate and develop it. In this way, his fortune is not simply the result of a 
Los or part of the Glückspiel in which he plays. Nor is it fate, which can only be read as a kind of 
ironic code-word for habitus: i.e. when the narrator suggests, “Das Schicksal machte ihn mit 
jeder Minute Größer,” this line immediately follows a description of Strapinski’s “guten 
Anstand” and his modesty in properly folding his Mantel (“seinen Mantel sittsam 
zusammennehmend”). Strapinski’s fortune is not a “Fortuna” and not the result of a lottery but, 
as Gerhard Kaiser has suggested, “Kredit + Arbeit + weiteres Glück” (afterword to Leute von 
Seldwyla, 690). This last variable is the Glück created by narrative fiction.  
Casting Strapinski’s transition from tailor to count as a matter of balance (“abgewogen” 
and “ausgeglichen”) with the symbol of the scale, Keller’s narrator points to the calculus that 
underwrites his fortune: not the credits, but the debts [“Verschuldung”] that are incurred. 
Strapinski himself is indeed as concerned that his real status as a poor tailor will be revealed, that 
his performance will fail, as he is about paying off the debts he accumulates through the 
hospitality and generosity of the Goldach villagers (with the lavish lunch meal in the “Waage” 
tavern and the inventory of luxury goods) under the pretense that he is a wealthy count: “er 
[nährte] beständig den Vorsatz . . . die Mittel zu gewinnen . . . alles zu vergüten, um was er die 
gastfreundlichen Goldacher gebracht hatte” (319). Debt is here an obligation to recompense, 
inscribed in a logic of quid-pro-quo that is entirely asymmetrical. While the credit lent by the 
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Goldacher villagers provides them with the “Ereignis” that they seek in their own novella, for 
Strapinski it is felt as debt, that is, as financial obligation and moral imperative: “er [wollte] 
seinen Verbindlichkeiten nachkommen” (320). This is precisely the logic of Schuldenverkehr as 
narrative principle in Seldwyla: the bond or “Verbindlickeit” is not dissolved or forgiven but 
opens onto an ever unfolding, proliferating narrative horizon): “Anstatt aber kurz abzubinden, 
seine Schulden geradaus zu bezahlen und abzureisen . . .” (320). Strapinski remains, bonded as it 
were, in the Roman.  
In Keller’s economy of fortune, Glück can be had only on credit and not by sheer force of 
will. In a scene that cites the dichotomy of the Bildungsroman’s forced choice between two 
alternatives (business or poetry), Keller casts alternatives that involve red ink on both sides. 
Strapinski, ready to leave town and fictitious identity behind with the bit of money he has won 
from a lottery finds himself at a crossroads between “Glück, Genuß und Verschuldung” and 
“Arbeit, Entbehrung, Armut, Dunkelheit” (318). The alternative is noteworthy in that both sides 
imply a lack: the forked path presents an economic alternative between debt (living off the credit 
of the Goldacher) and labor (the grueling belated labor of Seldwyla), an alternative which maps 
onto a moral one between enjoyment/pleasure/fortune and deprivation/poverty/gloom; the fact 
that only the latter path (without “Verschuldung”) would ensure a “gutes Gewissen” anticipates 
the genealogical origin of “schlechtes Gewissen” in the credit-debt relation that Nietzsche would 
identify a decade later. Crucially, however, the choice is obviated by the hand of the narrator: in 
a move that thwarts Strapinski’s decision to leave town with a clear conscience, a wagon in 
which Strapinski’s romantic interest, Nettchen, sits, suddenly appears and prompts Strapinski to 
return “unwillkürlich” to Goldach to continue his performance as false count. The debts 
Strapinski incurs persist. In the place of a “balanced” scale, the Schuldenverker continues and 
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indeed repeats as if incessantly. A few lines after the crossroads scene (one possible way out of 
the Schuldenverkehr) the story of debt continues yet again: “anstatt aber kurz abzubinden, seine 
Schulden gradaus zu bezahlen und abzureisen” Strapinski remains caught in the fiction of 
identity. 
While the compulsion to indebtedness characterizes what Walter Benjamin calls 
Schuldzusammenhang as the net that Schicksal casts,61 Keller attempts to balance the ledger of 
Strapinski’s double fiction and resolve the distance between Strapinski as tailor and Strapinski as 
count through a series of “Fügungen,” i.e. by invoking the force of contingency in its literal 
sense of “Fügung,” of ‘coming together.’62 “Fügung” as a narrative principle of concatenation is 
what guarantees the Schein and Wahrscheinlichkeit of Keller’s narrative fiction and what unites 
the novella’s multiple fictional levels. When a coachman initiates the romance/Roman of false 
identity by naming the poor tailor “Graf Strapinski” to the villagers in Goldach, the narrator 
remarks: “Nun mußte es sich aber fügen, daß dieser [the poor tailor/protagonist], ein geborener 
Schlesier, wirklich Strapinski hieß, Wenzel Strapinski, mochte es nun ein Zufall sein oder 
mochte der Schneider sein Wanderbuch im Wagen hervorgezogen, es dort vergessen und der 
Kutscher es zu sich genommen haben” (306). “Fügung” here occurs as a moment of chance or 
“Zufall” (something different in this regard than Benjamin’s Schicksal) that brings together, 
“fügt,” Strapinski’s identity as tailor with his identity as count, and in this way elides the 
difference between fictional levels, the Roman of the Polish count and the non-romance of the 
                                                
61 Benjamin, “Schicksal und Charakter,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, bk. 1, 175. 
62 The Grimm Wörterbuch defines Fügung as: “das in seinen verbindungen auszer aller menschlichen 
berechnung befindliche, zu einem ergebnis oder zu ergebnissen führende walten, die aus dem in seinen 
verbindungen auszer aller menschlichen berechnung stehenden walten hervorgehende anordnung.” 
Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm. 
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poor tailor. Even as the narrative – as an assurance of its probability – provides two logical 
possibilities for this “Fügung,” one Romantically felicitous and the other realistically banal, the 
conjuncture is preceded by the logic of Schuldenverkehr, in this instance in the guise of payback: 
the coachman’s joke, the narrator shares, is an act of revenge (“um sich an dem Schneiderlein zu 
rächen” [305]) for the protagonist’s failure to deliver a ‘word of thanks.’ In this regard, the 
Roman of imposture or Hochstapelei in Kleider – which itself is thrown into critical relief 
insofar as the novella questions Strapinski’s active role in perpetuating his fictitious identity – is 
a fiction of Schuldenverkehr: it is inserted in an ethical-economic economy of payback and 
penance, guilt (Schuld) and retribution, a quid-pro-quo structure that begins with the coachman’s 
revenge and ends with the novella’s final words: “Undank oder Rache.” Inscribed in this 
Schuldzusammenhang – the consequence of the fall out of Seldwyla’s paradise of credit – the 
novella’s conjunctures, their Zufälle, are themselves part of the initial “Falliment” that opens the 
story. As a logic of cause and effect, conjuncture is always preceded by an insolvency or debt it 
can’t balance. 
As a principle of narrative economy, “Fügung” is, moreover, the conjunctural logic by 
which Strapinski’s final fortune, his Glück, is to be motivated.63 In two crucial ways, this mode 
of economic contingency aims, like any Konjunktur, to solve the economic crisis in the story, the 
dramatic scene of Strapinski’s exposure as a poor tailor; it acts in this way as an attempt to align 
or balance the ledger of Strapinski’s economic fate. Both forms of “Fügung” hold together the 
narrative fabric of the text and ultimately ensure Strapinski’s final fortune as a wealthy tailor.  
The first is dramatic insofar as it involves a scene of anagnorisis in which Strapinski is 
                                                
63 Fügung is in this regard a Eindeutschung of “Konjunktur,” a term that, originally an astrological term 
for fortunate constellations, is used since the middle of the nineteenth century in the commercial or 
economic sense of a fortuitous economic state of affairs.     
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financially rescued by the daughter of Goldach’s “Amtsherr.” When the protagonist’s romance 
with Nettchen, the daughter, pursued under the false premise that he is the wealthy Polish count, 
threatens to dissolve upon his exposure, the crisis is averted in a further dramatic turn. In a spin 
on the classical scene of anagnorisis that has its locus classicus in the Odyssey, when Odysseus’ 
scar is recognized by Eurycleia, Strapinksi recognizes the daughter of the councilman as a child 
from his past, for whom he played a custodial role and from whom he was tragically separated, 
by a contingent external feature:64 her hair. The recognition leads to a reunion and eventually to a 
wedding.  Structurally for the story, the scene of anagnorisis plays a number of roles. It presages 
the story’s ending by first announcing a plot of revenge against the Seldwyla villagers that 
exposed Strapinski as false count: “Wir wollen nach Seldwyla gehen und dort [. . .] die 
Menschen, die uns verhöhnt haben, von uns abhänig machen” (341). With this, the cycle of 
Schuldenvekehr is set in motion anew; not in the form of “Verschuldung” through imposture but 
in the form of a structure of payback/revenge with its own economy of quid-pro-quo. Moreover, 
the anagnorisis draws attention to a logic of latency in Keller’s novella. Just as Strapinski’s 
habitus of self-ennobling is something he always has (something he inherits from his mother), as 
a constitutive but not always operative or actualized potential that Strapinski fashions into a kind 
of symbolic capital (though one that doesn’t always work in his favor depending on the 
audience), the anagnorisis points to a latency in Strapinski’s biography which, reactivated in this 
moment, will become actual capital through the marriage to Nettchen: “in Verbindung mit 
                                                
64 Terrence Cave differentiates between modern and classical anagnorisis on this ground. See Cave, 
Recognitions. Caves reads anagnorisis, like I do here, not as a kind of narrataive resolution but as 
“‘problem’ moments.’ “At first sight anagnorisis seems to be the paradigm of narrative satisfaction: it 
answers questions, restores identity, and symmetry, and makes a whole hidden structure of relations 
intelligible. Yet the satisfaction is also somehow excessive, the reassurance too easy; the structure is 
visibly prone to collapse” (Cave, 489). See also on anagnorisis in German realism, Eva Geulen, 
“Anagnorisis statt Identifikation (Raabes Altershausen).” 
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seinem [. . . ] Schwiegervater” Strapinski learns “gute Spekulationen zu machen, daß sich sein 
Vermögen verdoppelte und er [. . .] mit ebensovielen Kindern [. . .] ein angesehener Mann 
ward.” The potential of habitus (as a having or being) is turned here, through the anagnorisis, 
into an actualized (financial, reproductive, and social) potency. Finally, the anagnorisis puts an 
end to the Romantic fiction of Strapinski’s false identity, announced not incidentally in the house 
of the “Zinsherr” or moneylender, in Nettchen’s exclamation: “Keine Romane mehr!” The 
ending of romantic fiction thus rests on actualizing through this scene of recognition the 
conjunctures that until this point in the story gave the fiction its texture: the coincidence of 
Strapinski’s actual name and the name the coachman shares, the time spent in the military in 
Poland that provided Strapinski with just enough cultural knowledge (or lack thereof on the part 
of the Goldach villagers) to play the part of Polish count, the thimble that marks both the 
protagonist’s solvency and insolvency, etc. The anagnorisis is, then, the actual exposure of 
Strapinski as the exposure of the lack of anything to be exposed; it provides the event through 
which the Roman ends but the novella continues.  
The second Fügung is juridical and involves the legal acquittal and clearing of 
Strapinski’s name. After Strapinski’s exposure as false count, a lawyer appears to address a 
complicated legal scenario: Nettchen’s father, the councilman, contests the marriage of his 
daughter to Strapinski and a legal battle ensues which Keller describes in the bureaucratic detail 
and prose only a “Stadtschreiber” could know: though the engaged couple is convinced that “das 
Aufgebot ihrer Ehe nach Sammlung aller nötigen Schriften förmlich stattfinden und daß 
gewärtigt werden solle, ob und welche gesetzliche Einsprachen während dieses Verfahrens 
dagegen erhoben würden und mit welchem Erfolge,” the documents and procedure nonetheless 
have to be examined by a lawyer since the father’s objections “bei der Volljährigkeit Nettchens 
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einzig noch erhoben werden [konnten] wegen der zweifelhaften Person des falschen Grafen 
Wenzel Strapinski” (345). At stake in this legal process is thus precisely Strapinski’s character or 
mask (persona), his ethos as determined by his “Verschuldung;” the question, in other words, of 
whether he is legally creditworthy and complicit to or the victim of the “Roman.” The lawyer is 
able to rule in his favor for the following reason:  
Was die Ereignisse in Goldach betraf, so wies der Advokat nach, daß Wenzel sich 
eigentlich gar nie selbst für einen Grafen ausgegeben, sondern daß ihm dieser Rang von 
andern gewaltsam verliehen worden; daß er schriftlich auf allen vorhandenen 
Belegstücken mit seinem wirklichen Namen Wenzel Strapinski ohne jede Zutat sich 
unterzeichnet hatte und somit kein anderes Vergehen vorlag als daß er eine törichte 
Gastfreundschaft genossen hatte, die ihm nicht gewährt worden wäre, wenn er nicht in 
jenem Wagen angekommen wäre und jener Kutscher nicht jenen schlechten Spaß 
gemacht hätte (345).  
Strapinski’s acquittal – the settlement of his debts/guilt – thus depends on him never having 
maliciously or even volitionally intervened in the Romantic fiction of fortune, indeed it rests 
precisely on the taming and rationalization of character that Nietzsche attributes to 
“Verantwortlichkeit:” if accountability, as Nietzsche suggests, relies on the “Sittlichkeit der 
Sitte” that trains the human to promise, that is, to be able to vouch in the present for themselves 
in the future, Strapinski’s signature acts here as the sign of his “having been present in a past 
now, which will remain a future now, and therefore in a now in general, in the transcendental 
form of newness,” as Derrida famously writes of the signature.65 In other words, his signature, 
like his habitus or the scene of recognition, draws on a history that belongs to him as something 
that can find new contexts, be reactualized, or newly deployed in different scenarios, part of the 
tailor’s text, as it were. For this reason, his signature draws his history into the present as a sign 
for the future: Strapinski, the narrator remarks, has “nie ein Vergehen zuschulden kommen 
lassen,” “soweit seine Gedanken in die Kindheit zurückreichten, war ihm nicht erinnerlich, daß 
                                                
65 Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” in Margins of Philosophy, 328. 
  128 
er je wegen einer Lüge oder einer Täuschung gestraft oder gescholten worden wäre” (329). The 
Fügung of Strapinski’s two identities through the signature that erases their difference is the 
birth, as Nietzsche will write, of Strapinski as a “Rechtssubjekt” out of the spirit of the debtor. It 
is an acquittal that does not, however, put an end to Schuldenverkehr. 
The crisis of Strapinski’s “verlorenes Glück” (312), his fall, is solved through these 
narrative “Fügungen” that paradoxically put an end to all fiction (“Keine Romane mehr!” [341]) 
in order to ultimately realize Strapinski’s fortune not in the Romanticism of Strapinski’s fictional 
identity but in the realism of Seldwyla: this would be the transfigurative Verwertung of the poor 
tailor, the final “Ausgleich” of Keller’s poetic justice. The turn to a ‘real’ but prosaic “Glück,” an 
economic fortune, does not, however, bring the Schuldenverkehr to an end but proliferates it 
once more: Strapinski starts a successful career as a tailor in Seldwyla and establishes a sort of 
short-term loaning system in which Strapinski’s customers are in debt to him but must payback 
their debts before any more credit is extended: “Alles waren sie ihm schuldig” – “sie [klagten] 
untereinander . . . er presse ihnen das Blut unter den Nägeln hervor” (346). When Strapinski 
finally doubles his ‘fortune’ at the end of the story through ‘Spekulationen,’ he moves with 
Nettchen back to Goldach. The final word of the novella clarifies the kind of payback Strapinski 
is after: “Rache.”  The story’s final words ultimately leaves the logic of debt intact in the form of 
payback as Strapinski’s economic answer to the “Roman” that must come to an end. If the 
“Fügungen” aim to acquit or balance the ledger of credit and debt, the ending of the novella turns 
the screw of Schuldenverkehr once more: Strapinski’s solvency rests on the payback he receives 
as the “Roman” goes on in this new structure of debt. 
Debt, both in its moral and economic modes, introduces a crucial temporal dimension of 
the story that ‘economizes’ Glück – this is precisely what makes Strapinski’s fortune 
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“vergänglich” (312).66 In the “Paradies des Kredites” credit is temporary and always already 
defined by its opposite: the debt to come. The “Fügungen” of Keller’s story become part of this 
temporal structure by cashing in on the past (Strapinski’s personal biography, i.e. his prior 
relation to Nettchen, his time in Poland, etc.) and making this past profitable in the present. In 
this way, the “Fügungen” as narrative device elide the difference between Strapinski as tailor and 
Strapinski as count. The limit of the “Fügungen” however remains Strapinski’s own finitude: the 
horizon of the Glück they bring with them is always death; that is the meaning of the near-death 
scene after his exposure as false count and the intention behind his plans with Nettchen: “Ich 
wäre mit dir in die weite Welt gegangen, und nachdem ich einige kurze Tage des Glückes mit dir 
gelebt, hätte ich dir den Betrug gestanden und mir gleichzeitig den Tod gegeben” (337). The 
economization of Glück through the introduction of debt in the story (a dimension that is 
furthermore reflected in the Glücksspiele of the novella) means that fortune is prone to absolute 
risk, i.e. to death, and to the possibility of its own “Falliment” or forfeiture. If the “Fügungen” 
solve the problem narratively/dramatically (through anagnorisis) and juridically (through 
Strapinski’s honest signature), they do so only on credit, on the deferral of Strapinski’s 
“Fälligkeit” and thus on the deferral of his death. Strapinski, in other words, pays – as Nietzsche 
and Marx suggest in their accounts of credit – with his life. In this regard, the Fügungen rupture 
the chain of Schuldenverkehr as the linking of “Falliment” with the forfeiture of life, thereby 
granting Strapinski solvency: without them he is “fällig.” But his solvency comes at the price of 
remaining within the economy of exchange: once solvent he makes others fällig. 
The ending of Kleider machen Leute finally makes clear why, as the preface to the 
                                                
66 Cf. the economization of “Glück” in Joseph Vogl’s reading of Fortunatus in Kalkül und Leidenschaft, 
177-186; and the precarization of Glück in Wellbery’s account of post-enlightenment fortune that can 
only come punctually; i.e. in the moment in “Unverhofftes und Prekäres Glück.” 
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second volume of Seldwyla suggests, there are no longer interesting stories to tell after the 
tidying up of the ledger books: the debt Kleider leaves standing at the end, the perpetuation of 
Schuldenverkehr in the form of revenge is the sign of difference that the narrative “Fügungen” 
cannot elide. As the continuation of the Roman in a different key, it is, in fact, the remainder or 
Abfällsel to Strapinski’s fortune, the presence of the “Antike” in the present, that Benjamin 
attributes to Keller’s prose, and it is the thread of Anknüpfung that links the poetic to the age of 
the locomotive. Even as the prosaic bourgeois ‘order of right’ performs the exculpation that 
would balance the ledgers (the dramatic and juridical Fügungen that acquit Strapinski as 
‘impostor’), a certain ‘poetic justice’ remains in the form of Schuldenverkehr’s continuation, left 
discarded at the end as the novella’s Abfällsel. And it is precisely this remainder that makes this a 
story about Seldwyla. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Performance & Invention:  
Robert Walser’s Leistungsroman 
 
“‘Das steht doch alles in den Romanen,’ erwiderte eine Privatangestellte, als ich sie bat, mir aus ihrem 
Büroleben zu erzählen.” 
—Siegfried Kracauer, Die Angestellten 
Scenes of Performance 
 Robert Walser’s novel Der Gehülfe (1908) begins with the clerical assistant Joseph 
Marti’s first day on the job in the home office of the entrepreneurial engineer and inventor Carl 
Tobler. After breakfast at the family dining table, a brief tour of the workplace, an initiation into 
the “Geheimnisse der Toblerschen geschäftlichen Unternehmungen,”1 and another hearty meal, 
the employee takes a seat at his desk and begins his first task: “die Zusammenstellung, die 
genaue Gewinnberechnung dieses Unternehmens” (14). What follows is a scene of dictation and 
writing, one that would have been intimately familiar to Walser who worked himself as a clerk 
for the Swiss engineer and inventor Carl Dubler: 
Während der Angestellte nun schrieb, wobei ihm der Prinzipal von Zeit zu Zeit über die 
Schulter in die entstehende Leistung hinabblickte, spazierte dieser, eine krumme, 
langstielige Zigarre zwischen den schönen, blendend weißen Zähnen tragend, im Bureau 
auf und ab, um allerhand Zahlen anzugeben, die jeweils flink von einer heute noch ein 
wenig ungeübten Angestelltenhand nachgezeichnet wurden (14).  
 
Between the rhythmic back and forth of the pacing boss and the dutiful work of the clerk’s out-
of-practice hand, the secrets of the Toblerian business enterprise would seem to be rather banal.2 
                                                
1 Robert Walser, Sämtliche Werke in Einzelausgaben, ed. Jochen Greven, vol. 10, Der Gehülfe (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 12. All further citations of the novel are to this edition. 
2 In Walser’s first novel, Geschwister Tanner (1905), the predecessor to the protagonist of Der Gehülfe, 
Simon Tanner, quits his job when he disappointingly realizes that his position as clerk in a bookshop 
offers no insight into “das geheimnisvolle Wesen des Buchhandels.” Walser, Geschwister Tanner, 16. For 
this reason, Klaus-Michael Hinz reads Simon Tanner as a kind of Romantic epigone or as a “Don 
Quichotte des Industriezeitalters” who holds open the possibility of mystery and secret in a ‘fully 
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For the most part, the business consists in dictation and transcription, in bookkeeping, drafting 
advertisements, flyers, and sales quotes, or corresponding with business associates to promote 
the sale and financing of “technical [technische]” inventions perhaps more likely to be found in a 
carnival or fair than a world-market: an ostentatious clock with wings that displays billboard 
advertisements, a vending machine that dispenses ammunition for marksmen’s festivals, an 
awkward and uncomfortable wheelchair, and a ‘deep drilling machine’ [“Tiefbohrmaschine”]. 
As if to strengthen the sense that a written performance is transpiring before the eyes of the 
reader, Walser’s novel sometimes even presents the product of this writing, the “Leistung” itself, 
as blocked-off text for the reader:  
“Setzen Sie folgendes Inserat auf.”  
Joseph zog einen Bleistift und ein Notizbuch aus der Tasche. Es wurde ihm folgendes 
diktiert:  
 
Für Kapitalisten! 
Ingenieur sucht Anschluß an Kapitalisten zwecks Finanzierung seiner Patente. 
Gewinnbringendes, absolut risikofreies Unternehmen. Offerten unter ... (47). 
 
Writing scenes such as these frame the entrepreneurial enterprise in the novel as a different 
kind of inventing, farther from the romantic image of the genius inventor and closer to the 
uninspired rhetorical inventio: the systematic search for the means (capital) that would realize the 
engineer’s ideas. Moreover, as will be discussed below, the set-up of dictation underscores the 
division of labor between engineer and clerk; if the former invents, the latter, just writes. 
Walser’s novel thus ties its economic plot (searching for venture capital) to the rhetorical and 
literary exercise of advertising, which involves, like literature, a kind of embellishment: 
promising profits, eliding risk. While this kind of ‘enterprising’ activity shapes the plot of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
disenchanted world’ of work. Hinz, “Robert Walser’s Souveränität,”156. Joseph Marti is quite different in 
this regard: even after the secrets of the Tobler enterprise have been disenchanted, he continues working, 
both on the tasks assigned to him by his employer and on straining to see something enchanting in his 
employer’s enterprise and home after all. 
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novel in an ironic and very prosaic modulation of the âventiure3 – as the medieval Romance 
predecessor to the risky undertakings of the entrepreneur – the novel’s emphasis lies more 
squarely on the enterprise as office work, directed by the engineer and executed by the clerical 
hand. Indeed, the many (ultimately failed) attempts in the novel to generate financial liquidity for 
the Tobler firm – to find “flüssige Kapitalien” or make “Geld flüssig” – always meet in some 
sort of writing scene, one that might more properly be called the scene of performance or 
Leistung.4  
Narrated primarily through the perspective of the clerical assistant, Walser’s novel turns 
the clerk’s written “Leistungen” into its dominant mode of literary action or plot – in German the 
term Handlung signifies both – in a story that otherwise lacks almost any action whatsoever and 
fits Walser’s own depiction of his prose quite well: a “lange, handlungslose, realistische 
Geschichte.”5 Scenes of writing in Walser’s novel thus might be said to highlight not so much 
the “nicht-stabiles Ensemble von Sprache, Instrumentalität und Geste” that constitutes writing as 
an “Arbeit der Zivilisation” or as the “Effekt von Techniken,”6 – Rüdiger Campe’s standard 
definition of the writing scene – bur rather a different aspect of this labor and a different 
                                                
3 Walser’s narrator repeatedly compares the “Unternehmen” to fantastic medieval romance plots: “Was 
hatten technische Unternehmungen mit grünen Waldschluchten, weißen Rössern, edlen, lieben 
Frauengestalten und mit mutigen Taten zu tun? Ritten in früheren Jahrhunderten die Ritter und 
Unternehmer auch auf der ‘Reklame-Uhr’ und auf dem ‘Schützenautomaten,’ oder auf ähnlichen Gäulen 
herum” (99). Joseph Schumpeter also wonders whether there is any room for the Romantic hero in the 
modern business world: “Capitalist civilization is rationalistic ‘and anti-heroic.’ The two go together of 
course. Success in industry and commerce requires a lot of stamina, yet industrial and commercial activity 
is essentially unheroic in the knight’s sense—no flourishing of swords about it, not much physical 
prowess, no chance to gallop the amored horse into the enemy [. . . .] in the office among all the columns 
of figures.” Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 127-128. See also Moretti on this 
quote in The Bourgeois, 16, n. 31. 
4 Throughout this chapter I prefer the usage of the original German Leistung over performance given the 
different though not entirely unrelated semantics of the English term. 
5 Walser, “Eine Art Erzählung” in Sämtliche Werke, vol. 20, Für die Katz. Prosa aus der Berner Zeit, 
1928-1933. 
6 Rüdiger Campe, “Die Schreibszene. Schreiben,” 760. 
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materiality of literature: writing as job performance, i.e. as “Leistung.” To be sure, scenes of 
writing abound in Walser that frame the act of writing as a labile nexus of instrument, gesture, 
and language, as many scholars have noted.7 But in Der Gehülfe and in Walser’s other clerical 
texts these writing scenes are figured, first and foremost, as scenes of “Leistung” that transpire 
not at the literary author’s desk but, like many of Kafka’s, “inmitten der Zeichenbretter und 
Zirkel und umherliegenden Bleistifte” in the workspace of the technical office or comptoir (9).8  
The Leistungsroman 
 Walser’s novel narrates the humdrum life of the clerical assistant as largely a series of 
such Leistung-scenes, collapsing any distinction between work and life in a space that is both 
workplace and home, housing both family and the “technisches Bureau.” This chapter argues 
that Walser’s novel of clerical life is not a Bildungsroman but, as the mise-en-scène of the scene 
of Leistung suggests, a novel of performance – a Leistungsroman. The genre of the 
Leistungsroman rewrites the ‘value form’ of the modern novel (its economy of meaning) by 
highlighting a different teleology, trajectory, and structure than the Bildungsroman as a 
“‘symbolic form’ of modernity.”9 The Leistungsroman gives a different form to life, as this 
chapter will show, and is structured around a tension between two kinds of activities: Leistung 
and Erfindung. Walser’s Leistungsroman comprises, in this regard, the story of a set of divisions: 
between invention and performance, between the engineer and the clerical assistant, between a 
kind of Promethean foresight and an Epimethean afterthought (“Nachdenken” in the language of 
                                                
77 On the furnishings of these scenes of writing and their ergonomics in particular see Jason Groves, 
“Unbecoming Furniture.” Stephen Kammer is one of the first to explicitly address scenes of writing in 
Walser’s prose in Kammer, Figurationen und Gesten des Schreibens. See also Elke Siegel, Aufträge aus 
dem Bleistiftsgebiet: Zur Dichtung Robert Walsers. 
8 The comptoir as a primary setting for the writing scene has a prominent place in German literature 
throughout the 19th century and at least since at least the end of the 18th century. See for instance my 
introduction on the preface to Jean Paul’s Siebenkäs.  
9 Moretti, The Way of the World, 5. 
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Der Gehülfe), and, finally, between a consequential, heroic exertion and a mode of doing that 
remains ultimately folgenlos. Moreover, the self-aware modernism of Walser’s Leistungsroman 
makes the genre a reflection on literature’s own value as a Leistung, raising questions of what 
precisely literature achieves qua “Erfindung.” Walser’s Der Gehülfe, published in 1908 and 
drafted during Walser’s highly productive years in Berlin, lends itself in particular as a paradigm 
for Walser’s Leistungsroman for the way the novel ties its narrative trajectory not to Wilhelm 
Meister’s famous dictum, “mich selbst, ganz wie ich da bin, auszubilden” (Goethe), but to the 
protagonist clerk’s anxious question: “Was leiste ich eigentlich” (Der Gehülfe, 55)? Taking this 
question as its basis, Walser carves out a quasi-genre of the modern (bourgeois) novel irreducible 
to its predecessors in the picaresque novel, the novel of conversion, or the novel of development 
or Bildungsroman, novelistic schema which Walser’s novels famously cite and reject at once.10 
Walser’s Leistungsroman gains its contours through a revision and reification of the 
modern novel in a number of ways. First, it radicalizes and updates the novel’s turn to the 
empiricism of ordinary life and ordinary characters, to prosaic relations11 – a move towards the 
minor character that at times in Walser’s work threatens to turn to nothing, as with the 
protagonist in Jakob von Gunten who famously aspires to become “eine reizende, kugelrunde 
                                                
10 On the picaresque see Malkmus, The German Picaro and Modernity; Performance, moreover, is 
different than the “ambition” that Peter Brooks claims replaces the picaresque novel’s motive: “By the 
nineteenth century, the picaro’s scheming to stay alive has typically taken a more elaborated and socially 
defined form: it has become ambition. It may in fact be a defining characteristic of the modern novel (as 
of bourgeois society) that it takes aspiration, getting ahead, seriously, rather than simply as the object of 
satire . . . and thus it makes ambition the vehicle and emblem of Eros, that which totalizes the world as 
possession and progress.” Performance might be different than either Bildung or ambition but it is 
probably no less bourgeois. The Leistungsroman, one could say, deeroticizes this ambition and turns it 
into the performance imperative. 
11 In his Theory of the Novel, Lukács points to the novel’s source in empirical life but the idea is much 
older. See for instance, Rüdiger Campe, “Form and Life in the Theory of the Novel.” The novel’s relation 
to ordinary life is a central premise of Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, but is also crucial to Erich 
Auerbach’s definition of modern realism (a cornerstone of the novel) in terms of the “serious treatment of 
everyday reality” and “the rise of more extensive and socially inferior human groups to the position of 
subject matter for problematic-existential representation;” see Auerbach, Mimesis, 491. 
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Null.”12 In particular, the Leistungsroman is a novel of the Angestellter in various guises: as 
clerk or assistant, as Commis or Gehülfe. In this regard, the Leistungsroman begins in Walser’s 
early satirical depiction of the figure of the clerk, “Der Commis” (1902), which makes Leistung 
the basis of its an attempt to turn the clerk, which Walser calls a true “Romanheld,” into the 
“Gegenstand einer schriftlichen Erörterung.”13 But the Leistung of the clerk will preoocupy 
Walser well into his later hih-modernist ‘microscript’ writings.14 Second, the Leistungsroman 
pins the novel’s scope of action to clerical Leistungen, what Walser calls the clerk’s 
“Wirkungsfeld” and the plots it generates.15 Handlung in the Leistungsroman is thus the unheroic 
work of Leistung, a work Walser himself knew well from his own stints as clerical assistant. 
Finally, it reroutes the metaphysical leanings of the novel as an invention of possible worlds – 
and the imperative of probability that follows from this – through an economy of technical 
invention or “Erfindung” in Walser’s words; it is no longer Kompossibilität, probability, or 
                                                
12 On the relation between major and minor characters in the novel as part of a larger social text, see Alex 
Woloch, The One vs. the Many. 
13 “Der Commis” in Im Bureau: Aus dem Leben der Angstellten, 10. Walser suggests elsewhere that all of 
his prose texts might be read together as “Teile einer langen, handlungslosen, realistischen Geschichte. 
Für mich sind die Skizzen, die ich dann und wann hervorbringe, kleinere oder um- fangreichere 
Romankapitel. Der Roman, woran ich weiter schreibe, bleibt immer derselbe und dürfte als ein 
mannigfaltig zerschnitte- nes oder zertrenntes Ich-Buch bezeichnet werden können.” “Eine Art 
Erzählung,” in Für die Katz, 322. In this regard, his sketch of the clerk can be read together with other 
novels as part of a single novel about the clerk. Jochen Greven has taken Walser’s words literally and 
assembled a novel out of 132 prose pieces and one longer text from Walser’s Berner period to comprise 
this so-called “Ich-Buch.” See Walser, Der Roman, woran ich weiter und weiter schreibe: Ich-Buch der 
Berner Jahre, ed. Jochen Greven.  
14 Elke Siegel analyzes Walser’s microscripts as part of the ‘work’ of art, see Elke Siegel, Aufträge aus 
dem Bleistiftsgebiet. 
15 Walser’s “Leistungsroman” participates in an entire genre of secretary literature, a form of literature, 
that, as Ethel Matala de Mazza writes, “dem normativen Anspruch homogener Identität nicht Stand halten 
will und gegen die forschende Innenschau eigentümlicher Subjekte eine Phänomenologie der Nicht-
Besonderheiten aufbietet, als Spurenlese der Einschreibungen, in denen am Ort des Eigenen das Vor-
Gesetzte anderer Reden und Diskurse insistiert.” Matala de Mazza, “Angestelltenverhältnisse: Sekretäre 
und ihre Literatur, ”144. With its expertise in pratices of writing, copying, notating, secretary literature, 
Bernhard Siegert and Joseph Vogl write, entails an authorship that “um so besser Bescheid über sich 
weiß, als sie sich von jenen Überschätzungen absetzt, mit deinen seit dem 18. Jahrhundert Genies, 
Originale und auktoriale Schöpfer ein Privileg schreibenden Handelns beansprucht haben.” Bernhard 
Siegert and Joseph Vogl, eds., Europa: Kultur der Sekretäre, 8. 
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degree of order or efficiency that comprise the economy of invention, as has been argued for 
Leibniz in early modernity,16 but the marginal Leistung of a literature in which, as Walser writes 
of Der Gehülfe, “almost nothing is invented [brauchte fast nichts zu erfinden].”17 As itself a 
Leistung without invention, the Leistungsroman thus stakes a certain claim to realism: as Walser 
writes, “Der Gehülfe ist ein ganz und gar realistischer Roman” and it so because it is rooted in 
“das Leben.” In this way the Leistungsroman figures the ideal kind of novel: one that is so bound 
to life, as it were, that a kind of minimal techne, the technique of Leistung rather than invention, 
is enough for its realization. Thus while the inventor-engineer requires both Leistung and 
Erfindung for the realization of his products, the clerical assistant-cum-author is the opposite: 
Leistung and life are enough.  
In Der Gehülfe the scene of Leistung begins at the workplace desk (as the performance of 
writing) and within the employment relationship (as the imperative to perform well) but quickly 
extends beyond the comptoir: scenes of performance occur in the garden, at the dining table, in 
Joseph Marti’s bedroom as well. Walser’s clerk is preoccupied throughout the novel with his 
performance, even when outside the gaze of his supervisor. Before heading to bed for the night 
he asks himself: “Was leiste ich eigentlich” (55)? When he awakes on a Monday morning he 
tells himself: “Man spaziert nicht immer, man leistet auch einmal etwas” (141). And at his boss’ 
family dinner table he thinks to himself: “Werde ich diesen unverschämten Appetit durch 
                                                
16 On the economy of inventing possible worlds in Leibniz see chapter 3 of Vogl, Kalkül und 
Leidenschaft.  
17 Walser in conversation with Carl Seelig, September 23 1945 in Seelig, Wanderungen mit Robert 
Walser, 57. Walser later emphasizes the uninspiredness of his novel and his Leistung of writing the novel 
in six weeks; indeed this is what leads him to write of clerical Leistung in the first place. Not incidentally, 
the occasion for writing the novel is, Walser remarks in a conversation with Carl Seelig, a literary prize 
competition: “Wie sie wissen, lud mich der Scherl-Verlag ein, mich an einem Romanwettbewerb zu 
beteiligen. Nun gut, warum nicht? Es fiel mir aber nichts anderes ein als mein Angestelltenverhältnis in 
Wädenswil. Das schrieb ich also auf, und zwar gleich ins Reine. In sechs Wochen war ich damit fertig” 
(99). 
  138 
entsprechende Leistungen rechtfertigen” (12)? Joseph Marti sums up this concern with his 
Leistung in a reply to his boss early in the novel: “Was mich betrifft, ich glaube und hoffe des 
Bestimmtesten, daß ich jederzeit dasjenige zu leisten imstande sein werde, was Sie glauben 
werden, von mir verlangen zu dürfen” (10).  
The concern with performance thus becomes, as the clerk expresses it here, a performance 
imperative that not only shapes the scene of clerical writing but conscribes the protagonist’s 
entire being and life in the novel; at stake is thus more than just job performance, it is the 
question, more broadly: “Werde ich taugen? (14)? In this regard, the performance imperative 
serves as the central motif – or motor – of the story of invention and insolvency the novel tells 
via the life story of the assistant. Der Gehülfe is a life story or biography to the tune of a job 
letter. In this regard, the plot of insolvency (being unable to pay lenders)18 and indebtedness (the 
“über und über verschuldetes Haus”) mirrors the problem of Leistung: both describe the same 
structure of obligation. And just as every novel produces a theory of life that governs its form, as 
Rüdiger Campe has recently argued,19 the Leistungs-imperative in Walser’s novel serves as a 
theory of life. Precisely for this reason, the individual scene of Leistung is turned from a single 
episode in the clerk’s life to its animating principle par excellence. This is less a vitalist than a 
technical or technological point in the novel: as I will discuss below, Leistung is a modern 
inflection of techne and in this regard the link between Leistung and life and Leistung and 
writing raises the very question of writing life and thus or writing a novel: what happens to 
writing and the novel when the ‘labor’ of writing and the technique that is the novel are 
conceived of as Leistung? Where does the threshold between Leistung and invention lie 
                                                
18 Much of the story revolves around the engineer’s attempts to make “Geld flüssig” in order to pay the 
“unbezahlte Wechsel und Rechnungen.” 
19 Rüdiger Campe, “Form and Life in the Theory of the Novel.” 
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(including the inventions or contrivances of the novel)? Or can Leistung also be form of 
inventive praxis? In examining the relation between performance and invention through the 
division of labor between clerk and engineer, and linking this relation to the liquidity and non-
liquidity, success and failure, solvency and insolvency of the entrepreneurial enterprise, Walser’s 
novel generates a kind of allegory of literary inventiveness, one that questions its value, not only 
for an industry of letters increasingly oriented towards a metric of Leistung but also for the novel 
as a form-of-life. At stake, then, is Leistung as Lebensform. 
The Institution of Leistung 
 As Rüdiger Campe has recently shown in a study of another early Walser novel, the 
modern novel, as a ‘formless form’ that lacks traditional poetic schema and which is immanently 
bound to life, must invent a fiction of form.20 This fiction of form, Campe suggests, might be 
most strongly realized in what he calls the institutional novel. The Institutionenroman is a 
different type of novel whose genealogy Campe traces to one of the earliest treatises on the novel 
by the French bishop Pierre Daniel Huet, and, in particular, to imaginary ‘founding myths’ – 
which get short shrift in Huet’s treatise – that (re)emerge at the beginning of the 20th century to 
displace the traditional ‘analogs’ (such as biography) through which the novel gave form to an 
individual’s life. Institutional novels invent fictions whose form depends, as Campe shows in 
Walser’s Jakob von Gunten, on an ironic interplay of perpetuation and disintegration that 
characterizes institutions which in the etymological sense of the word ‘set up’ human lives and in 
doing so meet the novel’s imperative of giving form to life.21 Der Gehülfe doubtlessly belongs to 
                                                
20 Campe, “Robert Walsers Institutionenroman.” 
21 Campe’s reading brings together several valences of institution: institution in the sense of Arnold 
Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology as technical constructs invented by humans to support their lives as 
‘deficient beings’ in overly complex and contingent environments; institution in the sense of French legal 
theorist Pierre Legendre as a vitam instituere, a body of law that institutes life; and, of course, institution 
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this type of novel with the caveat that its dispositive is shifted from the pedagogical project of 
the school – in Jakob von Gunten, the Institut Benjamenta - to the economic project of Leistung 
and the setting of the engineering office: ‘the technical office’ of Tobler and his house (oikos). In 
other words, the institution of Der Gehülfe – the structure that enables life to take form in the 
novel – is not the courthouse with its legal order (Kafka’s The Trial), nor the schoolhouse with 
its pedagogical project (Walser’s Jakob von Gunten), nor the sanitorium with its mission to 
promote public welfare (Mann’s Magic Mountain) but rather the “Kontor,”22 or accounting 
office of the engineer and entrepreneur. The institution is, simply put, the economy or household: 
the oikos of the engineer’s home office whose order (nomos) is equally split between the 
entrepreneurial enterprise of inventing new technological devices and the management of family 
affairs.  
 This institutional difference in Der Gehülfe is big and small at once. On the one hand 
Walser’s novel retains the two logically-related strands of institutional fiction that Campe 
identifies as the crux of the institutional novel in Jakob von Gunten: the personification or family 
novel of the institution – evident in Joseph Marti’s efforts to integrate himself and find ‘position’ 
within the Tobler family household – and the topography of the institution, including the passage 
across and within institutionally-sanctioned borders, which Der Gehülfe represents through the 
architectonics of the Tobler villa (from the clerk’s turret room at the top of the house, via the 
domestic middle of the home and the garden, to the basement office) and Joseph’s various 
                                                                                                                                                       
in the Foucauldian sense of sites or media, dipositives, for the exercise of power, be it the prison, the 
hospital, or, importantly for Campe, the school. Though it takes its cue from philosophical anthropology 
and biopolitics, Campe’s notion of institution is less concerned with vitalism than with a kind of 
anthropological aesthetics and an understanding of the institution as the logic for how humans develop 
‘techniques,’ artifices, or constructs, in short, techne. 
22 See Campe’s individual essays on each of these institutional novels: “Body and Time: Thomas Mann’s 
The Magic Mountain” in Börnchen, Mein, Schmidt (eds.), Thomas Mann: Neue Kulturwissenschaftliche 
Lektüre; Campe, “Kafkas Institutionenroman;” Campe, “Robert Walsers Institutionenroman.” 
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excursions from the villa into nature (wandering in the forest, swimming in the lake) or the city. 
In particular, the topographic descriptions of the Tobler household in Walser’s novel suggests a 
theory of the institution of their own. As in the institution theories that underwrite Campe’s 
reading of the institutional novel (Gehlen, etc.), the artifice of a human-designed support 
mechanism ‘props up’ or institutes the Tobler mansion against a hostile nature: “Solch ein Haus 
ist nicht leicht umzuwerfen; fleißige, geschickte Hände haben es dauerhaft zusammengefügt, mit 
Mörtel, Balken und Ziegelsteinen. Ein Seewind weht es nicht um, selbst ein Orkan nicht einmal. 
Was können ein paar geschäftliche Verfehlungen solch einem Haus schaden” (103)? Moreover, 
the house’s interplay of inner and outer (“ein Haus [besteht] aus zwei Seiten, aus einer sichtbaren 
und einer unsichtbaren, aus einem äußeren Gefüge und aus einem inneren Halt”) – its oiko-
nomos, or order of the house, threatens to come unwound precisely by “geschäftlichen und 
ökonomischen Fehler.”23 In this regard, Walser’s Leistungsroman avoids the geneological 
metaphor of a family or house’s Verfall – operative for instance in Thomas Mann’s 
Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie (1901). If in Der Gehülfe, the house and economy, the 
oikos and oikonomia, are as inseparable as they are in Mann’s novel, Walser’s novel depicts not 
a loss of values (in the decadent, quasi-biological sense of moral Verfall) but a loss of value in 
the sense of economic Verluste. 
 The bigger difference in the novel’s institutional shift to the economy of the technical 
office concerns the specific structures of “Setzung und Zerstörung” or “Demontage und 
                                                
23 On the economy of the house see, for instance, Thomas Wegmann, “Über das Haus: Prolegomena zur 
Literaturgeschichte einer affektiven Immobilie,” Zeitschrift für Germanistik 52, no. 1 (2016): 40-60. 
Wegmann’s essay traces a “Gleichzeitigkeit der Emotionalisierung wie Ökonomiesierung des Hauses” 
since the late eighteenth century. “Die almahliche Ökonomisierung des Hauses pulverisiert den 
alteuropäischen Oikos als häusliche Sozial-, Rechts- und Herrschaftsverhältnisse und reduziert das Haus 
auf ein käufliches Gebäude, eine Immobilie” The breakdown of a concept of the ‘ganzes Haus’ (Wilhelm 
Heinrich Riehl) that Wegmann addresses is brought into connection with Walser’s der Gehülfe in chapter 
4 of Karl Wagner, Herr und Knecht. 
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Selbstfortzetzung” that Campe identifies as the ironic kernel of the institutional novel more 
generally.24 In the institutional novel, according to Campe, the institution gives “Dauer” to the 
lives of individuals in a way that opposes the flux of development in the Bildungsroman; this 
permanence or durability – which depends, as Campe acknowledges, on the institution theories 
of a Gehlian philosophical anthropology – comes at a high cost: it frequently lapses into an 
artificial, semantically-empty repetition compulsion. The institution institutes over and over; its 
realization is simultaneously the bureaucratic nightmare of the perpetual pro forma, the self-
reflexive irony of which is captured by Kafka’s and Walser’s bleak institutional novels. But in 
Der Gehülfe, this logic takes on a kind of division of labor, a split between performance and 
invention. Crucial, then, to Walser’s Leistungsroman is how the institution organizes and 
reinforces the division between engineer and clerk, invention and Leistung but also the question 
of whether the Leistungen of the clerical assistant can be institutionalized after the demise of the 
institution proper (the household economy); or whether, instead, the clerk finds himself once 
again at a different institution: the “Schreibstube für Stellungslose.”25 
 Walser’s shift in institutional framework is, moreover, what enables the specific nexus of 
performance and technical invention that characterizes Walser’s Leistungsroman as a particularly 
reified version of the modern novel. Walser’s novel does not confront what in his Theorie des 
Romans Georg Lukács’ calls ‘the bad infinity’ of the novel with the biographical form of a 
‘hero’s life – a form which for Lukács is meant to coordinate and order, i.e. to form, the “diskrete 
                                                
24 This is ironic in the specific sense in which Campe defines the irony of the instiuttion: the way, in the 
sense of philosophical anthropology, the institution compensates for the human being’s fundamental lack 
by furnishing artifice in the place of human “Wesen:” “Sie kann das nur, indem sie das prinzip des 
Kunstersatzes auf sich selbst anwendet. Die Institution ist unaufhörliche Selbstersetzung durch Kunst.” 
Campe, “Kafkas Institutionenroman,” 200. 
25 On the institution of the Schreibstube für Stellungslose in Walser as part of a poetics of the welfare state 
see Roloff, Der Stellenlose. 
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Grenzlosigkeit des Romanstoffes,” empirical life, by anchoring the extensivity of life in the 
protagonist’s “Werdegang.”26 Instead, Der Gehülfe turns the life course of its hero into a literal 
curriculum vitae: it bookends Joseph’s life with his ‘position’ or “Anstellung” as assistant in the 
Tobler house, a position that begins on the first page of the novel at 8 A.M. on a Monday 
morning and ends, on the last page of the novel, with Joseph’s departure from the Tobler office, 
unpaid at that. The formal problem of the novel is, perhaps, provisionally solved at the price of 
its absolute reification: if, for Lukács, the individual human life becomes, as the stuff of the 
novel, a “mere instrument” for the novel’s formal imperative of making life meaningful 
(“wesenhaft”), the life of Walser’s protagonist becomes an aid (Gehilfe) to the economy of 
(novelistic) invention. Walser’s Leistungsroman is thus fully reified prose, prose in which the 
central trope of the modern novel, as Lukács expresses it – less than a decade after Walser and 
with the same publisher, as Campe has noted – is taken literally economic face-value: “So 
objektiviert sich die formbestimmende Grundgesinnung des Romans als Pyschologie der 
Romanhelden: sie sind Suchende” (Lukács, 58). Walser’s Leistungsroman folds in the distance 
traversed by Lukács from his Theorie des Romans to his Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, 
from transcendental homelessness to reification: seeking, in Walser, is a “Stellensuche” – and 
retaining a position, as the formerly unemployed (“stellenlos”) Joseph Marti knows, depends 
upon meeting the imperative of performance: “etwas zu leisten” (Walser, 147).27 The success of 
                                                
26 Georg Lukacs, Theorie des Romans, 80. 
27 On the consequences of the Stelle and being stellenlos in Walser see Jason Groves, “Unbecomimg 
Furniture” and Simon Roloff, Der Stellenlose. Elke Siegel’s is one of the earliest studies to address the 
implications of Stellungslosigkeit for Walser’s writing. See Siegel, Aufträge aus dem Bleistiftsgebiet. 
Walser’s novel frequently addresses the precarity of the Angestellter: “Beim Antritt der Stellung war ihm 
bereits lebhaft der Austritt aus derselben vor Augen getreten” (22). The metaphysics of the novel’s search 
for position in life is thus turned outward in Walser: it becomes gainful employment. The trope of 
homelessness that Lukács theory of the novel famously cites was not lost on Walser’s readers. As Werner 
Weber notes in a review in 1955, Walser’s novel is an “uncanny idyll” that dramatizes “Obdachlosigkeit 
als Schicksal” through the story of a house that “slowly ceases to be one.” The homelessness of the 
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invention in the novel – both on the thematic level of the development and financing of the 
engineer’s technical inventions in the novel and on the metapoetological level of novelistic 
invention which the former figures – depends upon this imperative. 
The Techne of Leistung  
Far more than parlance, the term Leistung in Walser’s novel circumscribes an entire 
spectrum of job-related tasks, from what the clerk writes to what his achievements or merits in 
the workplace, in short: his job performance.28 Moreover Leistung transposes the materiality of 
writing (as a coordinated exercise between hand, head, and instrument) onto the division of labor 
between engineer and assistant, inventor and clerk: the engineer invents, the clerk (mindlessly) 
performs.  
Leistung is a nebulous word. Situated between common parlance and a technical term, it 
seems to supply a general metrics or schema for what counts as socially significant, 
economically optimal, technologically, biologically, or athletically impressive, but also seems 
unable to decide between quantity and quality. In Eros and Civilization Herbert Marcuse names 
the performance principle the “prevailing historical form of the reality principle.”29 For Marcuse 
the Leistungsprinzip historicizes Freud’s reality principle by feeding the psychoanalyst’s basic 
                                                                                                                                                       
protragonist is, as Weber notes, not only metaphysical but corresponds as a mood or “Stimmung” to a 
“Obdachlosigkeit der Form.” This formal homelessness entails a revision and renewal of the novel’s 
project of providing a “home” or lifeworld amenable to human life. Werner Weber, Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, no. 1956, July 23, 1955, quoted in Greven’s afterword to Der Gehülfe, 306. 
28 The valences of the German word Leistung cover far more semantic ground than the English 
‘performance.’ The Grimm Dictionary ties the German “Leistung” to the fulfillment of a (legal or 
monetary) obligation or indebtedness, even a pledge or delivery of something promised, in the sense of 
the latin praestatio (guarantee, warranty, payment), exhibitio (delivery, hand-out) complementum 
(completion or fulfillment), effectio (achieving, performing, doing); and also to demonstrating an ability 
or particular accomplishment, and, more generally, to denoting an action (“das verbum tritt . . theils im 
ursprünglichen scharfen sinne, mit betonung der verpflichtung, theils in einem abgeschwächten, mit 
bloszer hervorhebung einer thätigkeit auf . . .”). “Leistung” in Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und 
Wilhelm Grimm, (Leipzig: S. Hirzel,1854-1961), cols. 726-727.  
29 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 35. 
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premise of the reality principle – “the fact of Ananke or scarcity” – through a historical narrative 
of the division of labor and a “specific organization of scarcity.” Performance, then, in 
Marcuse’s sense, is what happens when “work has now become general” and “libido is diverted 
for socially useful performances in which the individual works for himself only insofar as he 
works for the apparatus, engaged in activities that mostly do not coincide with his own faculties 
and desires.” In Walser, too, Leistung designates a certain version of the reality principle but not 
exactly in the sense of sublimation towards the socially-useful. Leistung, as will be discussed 
below, is also a way of getting by under the conditions of working for someone else, of being 
‘engaged in activities’ that, as Macuse puts it, “do not coincide with [one’s] faculties and 
desires.” In this scenario, of “work[ing] for an apparatus which [one] does not control” 
(Marcuse, 45), Walser will imagine Leistung as both an alienated activity and one that might 
lead somewhere else. 
Leistung in Walser also raises the question of a metric for regulating and gauging the 
productivity or efficacy of the clerical worker; but it also applies to the technical inventions he 
works on and even to the literary author and the literary invention. The German Leistung denotes 
a human activity or accomplishment, a service rendered as obligation as much as it marks the 
performance of a machine, invention, or device.30 As Walser would have known,  performance 
principle attempts to suture the value of a given work – whether written advertisement, technical 
invention, or novel form – to its own metric of achievement, merit, and effectiveness, a metric 
that in turn is always tied to a market-derived notion of (marginal) value: the market for venture 
capital, the market for a given invention or the patent market, the book market. What counts as 
performance or Leistung in each of these various value spheres differs but the value attached to 
these “Leistungen” is in every case linked to a notion of invention and innovation.  
                                                
30 See Lars Distelhorst, Leistung: Das Endstadium der Ideologie.  
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 Central to how Walser’s novel of performance (re)writes the value form of modern 
literature is the way in which it interjects a bit of the history of technology into the history of the 
novel, or, put otherwise, how it imagines the production of the novel as part of the history and 
economy of technological invention. This is not simply because of the historical realism of Der 
Gehülfe: the fact that the novel turns Walser’s work as clerical assistant for the actual inventor 
and engineer Carl Dubler into literature, incorporating the language of patent in its descriptions 
of the advertising clock or the ammunition vending machine (of which actual patents are 
registered in the name of Carl Dubler with the Swiss Federal Institute for Intellectual Property),31 
and protocolling the difficulties in securing reliable investment capital. Walser’s Leistungsroman 
reactualizes and alters a critical moment in the history of technology, a moment that sees the 
linking of technological invention and human performance. In his idiosyncratic tendency to 
identify key moments of modernity (pre)figured in the middle ages, Blumenberg suggests that 
this relation between Leistung and invention appears first in the writings of Nicolas von Cusa. In 
Blumenberg’s account, Nicolas von Cusa’s figure of the idiota, the non-scholastic and humble 
handworker, is engaged in a mode of production, a techne or ars that prefigures the radical break 
with the imitation of nature principle that will later come to define late 18th-century aesthetics. 
Blumenberg reads Cusa’s figure of the idiot, a spoonmaker, as an illustration of precisely what is 
at stake in the principle of the imitation of nature, namely “die Frage, was der Mensch in der 
Welt und an der Welt aus seiner Kraft und Fertigkeit leisten könne.” The spoonmaker, in this 
context, comes to a novel conception of production not in a scene of inspiration but through the 
lowly craft of his spoonmaking: his invention of the spoon is something absolutely new, which 
                                                
31 In a moment of historical irony, Dubler’s patents were processed in the same office in which Albert 
Einstein worked as an evaluator of patents for numerous such inventions at the same time [1903] that Carl 
Dubler submitted his patents. Did Einstein, the modern myth of invention, evaluate Dubler’s patents? 
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no exemplar precedes. In this regard, the spoonmaker’s art is a techne that becomes invention, 
one that radically adjusts the cosmological position and self-understanding of humans. The 
example of the spoonmaker, Blumenberg writes, points to a “neue Prägung des Menschen, der 
sich selbst aus dem heraus versteht und seine Geltung rechtfertigt, was er tut und kann.” In this 
sense then, Blumenberg can claim: “Der historisch keineswegs selbstverständliche Verbund von 
Leistung und Selbstbewußtsein ist an dem cusanischen Idiota greifbar, und zwar gerade in der 
Hinsicht, die uns hier beschäftigt.”  In the case of the spoonmaker, Leistung is a form of being, a 
form of life, and a praxis that can become inventive.32  
Clerical Fehlleistung 
To be sure, there is precedence in the history of the modern novel for something like the 
Leistungsroman. Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe offers an early possible prototype for the 
novel of performance, particularly in its link between Crusoe’s ingenuity as an average human 
and his sense of self-determining accomplishment, the self-affirmation he experiences in his 
craftiness; the connection, however, that Crusoe makes between performance and invention, 
while it inaugurates a scene of Leistung in the modern novel, differs greatly from the clerk, who 
because of the division of labor between invention and performance knows only the latter. 
 As Crusoe – the archetypal homo faber – remarks at one point in the novel, “… I think I 
was never more vain of my own performance, or more joyful for anything I found out, than for 
my being able to make a Tobacco-Pipe.”33 This comment comes at a moment in the first novel 
when, after coming to terms with his fate on the island, Crusoe resolves to improve himself in 
the “mechanical exercises” that furnish his island-stranded existence. Unlike the “necessities” 
                                                
32 For a more detailed discussion of the spoonmaker as an example of Leistung in Blumenberg, see my 
forthcoming article “Blumenbergs Idiot.” 
33 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 122. 
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that Crusoe crafts to aid in or secure his survival, the pipe is an object whose sole purpose lies in 
how it “exceedingly comforted” Crusoe as someone who “had been always used to a smoke.” 
Like Crusoe, an ordinary British mariner, the pipe is nothing extraordinary, but by importing the 
comfort of habitual British life to the minimal setting of the island it becomes a marker of 
extraordinary inventiveness, of a performance irreducible to the resourcefulness that otherwise 
characterizes Crusoe. The pipe and the vanity in performance its “Invention” invites are not 
merely incidental or circumstantial to Crusoe’s autobiographical “Strange Suprising Adventures” 
but could be seen as what enable the autobiographical, novelistic account of his life in the first 
place. For only in the context of this performance – which emanates from what Crusoe calls his 
“Invention” and “Contrivance” - does “the story of a private man’s Adventures” become, as 
Defoe’s preface suggests, “worth making Publick.” In the scene of invention Crusoe’s ordinary 
life as an everyday mariner becomes the wondrous stuff of the novel, indeed its invention, 
“exceed[ing] all . . . that is to be found extant.” This is the case not because the pipe is a 
wondrous object - Crusoe in fact dubs it a “very ugly, clumsy thing” - but because the pipe 
signals Crusoe’s ability to make the impossible possible: if earlier the tobacco pipe was 
something he “fain would have” but which “was impossible . . . to make,” Crusoe “found a 
Contrivance for that too, at last.”  
Performance, as Crusoe experiences it, thus comes from an inventiveness that is not the 
offspring of necessity, as the conventional trope would have it, but which exceeds the brute 
necessity of the island. Within the economy of Defoe’s novel, as itself also a founding myth of 
political economy, Crusoe’s performance with the invention of a tobacco pipe falls out of the 
calculus of labor and leisure time that otherwise, as Marx famously suggests, characterizes 
Crusoe as a ‘good Englander” who in the manner of the bookkeeper “keeps account of himself” 
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(Capital). As an object that does not fall within the inventory of necessary things Crusoe devises 
for his survival (since its purpose is solely in comforting Crusoe), nor elicit one of Crusoe’s 
pervasive religious meditations on the work of “Providence” in his adventure, the pipe and its 
scene of invention marks the point at which the novel moves beyond a tale of adventurous 
survival or religious conversion (the predominant topoi of the early novel), or of contingency or 
order, to become the autobiographical account of a protagonist that does things for the sole 
purpose of performance and wherein the invention of the novel coincides with invention in the 
novel. (i.e. where Crusoe’s excogitations - the stuff of his autobiography - become a fictional 
novel). 
Though Defoe’s novel lays some of the foundation for Walser’s Leistungsroman – the turn 
to an ordinary character, the trope of self-accounting (a major pastime of Walser’s bookkeeping 
clerks and he protagonist of Der Gehülfe), the relation between invention and performance – 
Robinson Crusoe couldn’t be farther than Walser’s clerical novel. Crusoe’s story of performance, 
even as it marks what in the novel exceeds a story of survival, participates in a trajectory of 
personal and literary development (beyond the ‘middle State, or what might be called the upper 
Station of Low Life” promoted by Crusoe’s father) which must be utterly foreign to Walser’s 
clerks who experience neither joy nor vanity in invention and indeed have been severed from the 
act of inventing altogether. The unity of invention and performance in Robinson Crusoe – 
imperative for the grounding of Crusoe as a figure of modern individualism, as Ian Watt has 
argued – belongs the “Selbstbewusstsein” that Blumenberg attributes to the spoonmaker. By the 
time one reaches Walser’s clerks, this “Selbstbewusstsein” has all but evaporated. 
While Crusoe and Blumenberg’s idiot offer two archetypes of Walser’s Leistungs-obsessed 
clerks, there are stark differences: whereas both Robinson and the layman combine performance 
  150 
and invention, for Walser’s clerks this option is structurally unavailabe: the division of labor 
between clerk and engineer, or clerk and boss effects a division between the techne of Leistung 
and that of invention.  
The classic figure of performance in Walser is always the assistant or clerk whose 
employment prospects – and Anstellung – often depend upon job performance. Sometimes, the 
figure of the clerical assistant feels underchallenged by the demands on their performance, like 
Simon Tanner, the protagonist of Walser’s first novel, Geschwister Tanner, who quits his 
position as an assistant at a bookstore after eight days, disappointed with a “Beschäftigung” that 
he feels doesn’t suit his talents and feeling as if he “kann ganz anderes leisten” as that which is 
demanded of him (Geschwister Tanner, 16). Other times the figure of the clerk takes his job 
performance very seriously, working “langsam, Zahl für Zahl, Buchstabe für Buchstabe, richtig, 
gesetzt, leidenschaftslos, wie es sich schickt vor einer Leistung, die keine Anforderungen an die 
Begabung stellt.”34 And other times still, the clerk struggles with his own performance and feels 
the wrath of a boss or manager who finds the worker’s performance to be lacking. This is the 
story of Helbing, one of Walser’s recurring clerical figures.  
 A short text published in the same year that Walser drafted Der Gehülfe, dramatizes 
Helbing’s inability to perform by slowly narrating, nearly minute by minute, a Monday morning 
from 8:10 AM to 11:58 AM in the bookkeeping department of the bank in which Helbing works. 
In the eyes of his colleagues, Helbing is a “Muster der natürlichen Ungeduld” (Im Bureau, 38), 
astoundingly slow and prone to wasting time at work, when he should be writing, with pastimes 
such as twirling his mustache, bending over as if to tie his shoe (and not actually tying it), or 
comparing the time on his pocketwatch to that of the wall clock in the comptoir. In a scene 
                                                
34 Walser, “Das Büebli,” in Im Bureau, 38. 
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remarkably similar to the scene of performance between boss and employee in Der Gehülfe, 
Helbing is reprimanded by his boss for his miserable “Leistung” (29), a mere “drei Zahlen” that 
take Helbing an entire hour. Helbing’s inability to perform his job adequately is noted not only 
by his superior, who sits at a “quasi Aussichtsturm” (27) to monitor the employees of the 
bookkeeping department, but also by his colleagues who, after Helbing steps outside for a short 
break, gather around the latter’s desk to gawk at Helbing’s inefficiency. 
 If the clerk is the figure par excellence of performance in Walser – precisely because 
performance is the crux of the clerk’s job description – Helbing’s inefficiency demonstrates all 
the ambivalences, difficulties, and problems that the imperative to perform brings with it for the 
clerk’s position in both workplace and world. For Walser’s clerical workers, performing well on 
the job is frequently measured by both the precision and accuracy of the clerk’s calculations, by 
punctuality and a conscientious sense of purpose, as well as by the speed with which the clerk 
can compose the greatest amount of numbers/statements/record sheets.35 The clerk’s 
performance is tied to a kind of literary arithmetic that is always monitored, checked, disturbed 
and reinforced by the gaze of the boss but that also reflects the inner disposition of the clerk: 
“Ein guter Rechner und Haushalter ist der Commis ohne allen Zweifel [. . .] Ein guter Rechner 
ist moistens ein guter Menschen, das beweist ein Commis zehnmal im Tag” (“Der Commis,” Im 
                                                
35 In part, this notion of performance aligns with concepts of “Leistung” that see it as a rationalization of 
the workplace; this notion of “Leistung” is central to Max Weber’s giant economic study in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, in which the central analytic term is 
“Nutzleistung;” Walser’s notion of performance allows, by contrast, for an irrational response to the 
performance imperative; In an entirely rationalized system of clerical work, in which the thirteen minutes 
Helbing spends outside “getting fresh air” are noted precisely, Helbing’s inefficiency would be chastised 
as irrational timewasting but Helbing uses his time more rationally than any of his colleagues, squeezing 
the most amount of time-wasting out of every minute on the clock while still performing enough to retain 
his position, at least for a while. 
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Bureau, 15).36 However, the clerk’s link between economic prowess and moral virtue begins to 
break down when the demands on the clerk’s job performance become too stringent. For the 
clerk’s numerous virtues – these include, as Walser lists them, diligence shyness, loyalty, 
flexibility, tact, naiveté, modesty, extraordinarily averageness, and docility – frequently fail to 
translate into the kind of performance expected of the clerk by the principle or boss.  
 In the case of Helbing, for instance, a clerical proclivity to mediocrity and working 
prevents Helbing from getting anything done at all.37 As Helbing puts it in his autobiographic 
account of himself – a story he narrates himself since, as he notes, “sonst wahrscheinlich von 
niemandem aufgeschrieben würde”38 –  “Es ist jedenfalls ein Hemmnis, das mich hindert, mich 
                                                
36 In Der Gehülfe the gaze of the boss extends to the entire household/oikos; even the gaze of the boss’ 
children and wife question the clerk’s position within the household/family/life: “Diese ungeniert 
fragenden und forschenden Blicke entmutigten ihn. Solche Blicke erinnern eben an die Angeflogenheit an 
etwas Fremdes, an die Behäbigkeit dieses Fremden, das für sich eine Heimat darstellt, und an die 
Heimatlosigkeit desjenigen, der nun so dasitzt und die Pflicht hat, sich möglichst rasch und guten Willens 
in das behagliche fremde Bild heimatlich einzufügen. Solche Blicke machen einen frieren im heißesten 
Sonnenschein, sie dringen kalt in die Seele, bleiben da einen Moment kalt liegen und verlassen sie 
wieder, wie sie gekommen sind” (Der Gehülfe, 13). 
37 Helbing’s character as a “übertrieben gewöhnlicher Mensch” is undermined by his rather exceptional 
proclivity to arrive late to work, attract attention through his ostentatious and disruptive time-wasting 
strategies. Helbing’s self-description of his averageneess seems to ironize a notion of averageness that 
translates the classical notion of a golden mean into a modern understanding of the statistical average: 
“Ich bin mittelgroß von Gestalt und habe deshalb Gelegenheit, mich zu freuen, darüber, dass ich weder 
hervorstechend klein, noch herausplatzend groß bin. Ich habe so das Maß, wie man auf schriftdeutsch 
sagt.” “Helbings Geschichte” in Im Bureau, 55. The irony lies in Helbing’s self-undermining statement: 
“Das Hervorstechende an mir, ist, dass ich ein ganz, beinahe übertrieben gewöhnlicher Mensch bin” – 
precisely Hebling’s averageness is what is so conspicuously unaverage about him. Helbing’s obsessive 
averagness turns then into a kind of exceptionality. On the problem of this conspicuous inconspicousness 
in Walser and Kracauer see Ethel Matala de Mazza, “Angestelltenverhältnisse. Sekretäre und ihre 
Literatur” in Europa. Kultur der Sekretäre. Kracauer approaches the conspicuous inconspicousness of the 
average salaried masses of clerks and other white-collared employees with recourse to Poe’s purloined 
letter, opting for a constructionist method to capture the normality (and quotidian status, a related but 
slightly different inflection of the averageness problem) of the clerk that abandons the reportage – 
typically employed for the representation of everyday life – in favor an exotic mosaic.  What Walser’s 
and Kracauer’s clerks have in common is an inconspicuous mediocrity and nondescript commonness that 
simultaneously renders them invisible and the object of singular observation. In many ways the 
ambivalence of the clerk’s job performance stems from the lack of clarity as to what precisely constitutes 
“Leistung.” 
38 Walser, “Helbings Geschichte” in Im Bureau, 55. 
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auszuzeichnen, denn wenn ich beispielsweise einen Auftrag erledigen soll so besinne ich mich 
immer erst eine halbe Stunde, manchmal auch eine ganze!” (“Helbings Geschichte,” 56). Indeed, 
it is precisely when Helbing feels most “obligated” to perform that he fails to do so. On the one 
hand, his work demands too little of his mind – and of his mind’s capacity for excessive 
deliberation; on the other hand, it demands far too much. Paradoxically, though, Helbing’s 
“exaggerated averageness,” as he puts it, is what allows him to excel and distinguish himself 
from the rest of his colleagues in a different kind of occupation, a different sort of performance: 
wasting time. When Helbing’s boss reprimands him for performing too poorly on the job, 
Helbing draws out the conversation, argues back, makes excuses, “damit ich das Gespräch mit 
ihm [seinem Chef] ein wenig in die Länge ziehen kann, vielleicht eine halbe Stunde, dann ist 
doch wiederum eine halbe Stunde verstrichen, während deren Verlauf ich mich wenigstens nicht 
gelangweilt habe” (59). Helbing’s job performance doesn’t consist in accomplishing anything 
(“Ich vollbringe so wenig, daß ich selber von mir denke: ‘Wirklich, du vollbringst nichts!”) but 
in reflecting on and avoiding boredom; his pastime at work is to pass time. 
 Yet Helbing’s occupational boredom is not simply the opposite of performing well on the 
job;39 the economy of Helbing’s time-management still sits squarely within, even as it tests, 
irritates, and rebuts, the imperative to perform. Drawing a connection between time and money, 
Hans Blumenberg writes in his essay on Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money, that the time 
devoted to pastimes “ist nicht gemessene Zeit; wer sich die Zeit vertreibt, entfernt sich von den 
                                                
39 The paradox that Karl Marx noted in Ricardo’s theory of labor – namely that slow workers don’t 
produce more surplus value even if they require more labor time for a given productive task – is Helbings 
performance paradox but also his test of the employment relationship. Can one be a poet of his time? Can 
one sleep on the clock? Can sleep be a Leistung that the firm remunerates? Can an employee perform 
without accomplishing? 
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Uhren, den er hat Zeit, um sie sich zu vertreiben”.40 The logic of the pastime, Blumenberg 
writes, is similar to that of money: one saves time and money in order to spend or pass it; and at 
its absolute limit this economy would entail a situation, Blumenberg suggests, in which one is 
able to spend time and money without any regard whatsoever for what one is spending 
(time/money); a kind of infinite expenditure that no longer corresponds to its opposite, namely, 
the finite effort involved in procuring money and time.41 To be sure, in his own way Walser does 
play with this limit fantasy in narratives that imagine Helbing having a “pile of money” so large 
he would never have to work again. Or, in a move that drives this pathological logic to its 
extreme, one prose piece imagines how one of Helbing’s favorite work pastimes – sleeping in 
and showing up late – leads to a situation in which “kein Helbing mehr zu spät zur Arbeit 
an[langte]” and in which Helbing could “so lange liegen bleiben als es ihm behagte” because his 
frequent tardiness leads to his dismissal from his job (89-90). But far more usual than this sort of 
paradoxical possibility of exiting temporal and monetary economies altogether – of exiting the 
economy of the performance imperative and the necessity of working to live – is the way 
Helbing goes about his pastime within the constraints of his job description and demands, the 
way he turns his use of time at work into its own sort of “Leistung.” Helbing doesn’t enjoy his 
pastime because it allows him to forget or banish time altogether; Helbing, in fact, obsesses over 
the clock, constantly checking his pocketwatch and turning this gesture into its own, literal 
pastime (“Jeder Schlag, den das Werk macht, wird von einem Seufzer aus Helblings Mund 
begleitet.” “‘Ich sollte eigentlich nicht soviel auf die Uhr schauen, das kann nicht gesund sein,’ 
                                                
40 “Geld oder Leben,” 185. Blumenberg calls this relationship between money and time the “Pathologie 
des Geldes” and refers here to the “scheinbar absurde Verklammerung von Erwerb und Verschwendung, 
die bei der Zeit als Anstrengung des Zeitgewinns und Bedenkenlosigkeit des Zeitvertreibs auftritt” (185). 
41 In this vein, Hannah Arendt critically notes that this modern notion of spare time, i.e. the time saved 
from laboring, has little left of its predecessor in the ancient concept of skhole. See Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 131, no. 84.  
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denkt er;” or in words of a colleague observing Helbing observing his clock: “Ist das nicht eine 
Schande, wie jetzt der Helbing wieder seine Zeit totschlägt”[28]). Unlike Blumenberg’s time-
passer whose surplus of time to spend allows for the luxurious banishment of time altogether, 
Helbing enjoys his pastime only in the presence of the clock, which, after all, confirms that time 
is passing. Thus, it’s not so much that, while on the clock, Helbing doesn’t perform what is asked 
of him with these pastimes (he does, after all, compose three numbers). Rather, Helbing performs 
something slightly different than what is asked of him while trying to pass this performance off 
as the “Leistung” proper to his job.  
 Helbing’s performance has, in other words, the structure of what Freud, writing during 
the same time Walser is drafting his sketch of the clerk, calls a Fehlleistung, which in its most 
basic form involves faultily delivering one thing in place of something else (intended). While 
Helbing does not commit any of the classically Freudian unconscious linguistic slips – and 
indeed little about Helbing’s behavior seems to suggest any disclosure of the unconscious – there 
is a pathological consistency to how Helbing performs or accomplishes something that is almost 
always amiss or fehl vis-à-vis what is demanded of his time on the clock. And his response to his 
boss who irritatedly inquires, yet again, “what are you doing there?” approximates the linguistic 
confusion of the slip, a confusion that arises not because Helbing misspeaks when he replies, 
“Ich bin jetzt am ‘Ausland’-Zusammenstellen,” but because of his boss’s (analytic) play on a 
colloquialism: “Ich glaube, Sie sind eher im Ausland als am ‘Ausland’-Zusammenstellen.” 
Moreover, like Freud’s parapraxis, Helbing’s misperformances are almost always followed by a 
kind of excuse: “Er habe den guten Willen gehabt, zu arbeiten, aber wenn er keine rechten 
Federn mehr habe, so sei es schwer, vorwärts zu kommen.” What Helbing’s boss calls his “sad 
excuses [faule Ausreden]” function, indeed, like the excuses of someone who has committed a 
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parapraxis. The crucial difference is, of course, that Helbing’s behavior is not unconscious. In 
this regard, clerical parapraxis is not a symptom but an attempt at appropriation: a mis-peforming 
of Fehl-Leistung that isn’t a moment of truth or revealing but a willful resistance with the same 
Wiederholungszwang. 
 With his deeply ironic sketch of the clerk, Walser makes the Fehlleistung the structure 
wherein the clerk becomes poet or novelistic hero, even as he remains clerk:42 this Fehlleistung, 
which borrows from but doesn’t perfectly overlap with Freud’s, entails marks a kind of using 
time that originates in the performance imperative of the workplace but becomes the condition of 
possibility for poetry. Instead of clerical performance, the clerk delivers poetry, which draws on 
and uses the resources of the job for a different purpose, refunctionalizes writing, time on the 
clock, and the “Leistung” of the job as the Fehlleistung of the literary.  
 In Walser, this clerical Fehlleistung is linked specifically to the clerk’s use of time, 
whose fate is to find himself constantly unemployed (also and paradoxically because of their 
parapraxes) and in search of work, a time of waiting, of pastimes, of boredom: “What do 
unemployed clerks do? They wait! They wait for a new position, and while they wait they are 
tormented by remorse, which accuses them in the coldest tone of voice.” While a self-accusatory 
remorse issues as negative consequence out of the clerk’s internalized imperative to perform, the 
constitutive Fehlleistung of the clerk delivers something else. In this waiting time the 
                                                
42 This, one could argue, is also what Kafka called the “schlechte Karriere” of Simon Tanner. Many 
interpret Kafka’s phrase as indicative of clerical careers gone awry in Walser (Grove: awry in sense of 
careering out of control, a non-positionality mirrored in the mobility of Walser’s Spaziergang; 
Kreienbrock: a career that isn’t simply an inversion of the straight path of Bildung, the path towards 
perfected mastery – i.e. not a negative theology of failure --  “characterizations such as good and 
complete are not simply sublated/cancelled or entirely dispelled; but the continuum that stretches between 
pupil and master, the line which traditionally would provide orientation to a becoming artist becomes 
brittle [need better translation]”); but the feat or art of the bad career is to find the margin between what 
passes as job performance and what constitutes mis-performance; The bad careers of Walser’s clerks are 
still careers, and still follow a performance principle.  
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unemployed clerk makes poetry: ““Dieser Commis fing an, aus verzehrender Langeweile 
Gedichte zu schreiben, und er hat deren einige schöne gemacht. Er war eine feine, empfindliche 
Seele. Ob er jetzt Stellung hat? Nein, er hat sich neuerdings aus der neuen Stellung gestrichen, so 
blöde und unklug ist er. Es muß eine Art Krankheit bei ihm sein, daß er es nirgends aushalten 
kann, und einige, die Einsicht in derlei Sachen haben, sagen ihm ein schlimmes Ende voraus” 
(“Der Commis,” Im Bureau, 18). As Jason Groves has pointed out for this clerical/literary writer 
in Walser, “clerical activity (‘Abschreiben’) can support a literary activity (‘Schreiben’) in a 
symbiotic form” through “furnishing material – a scene of writing – but not the actual writing – 
and by being so unengaging that this other writing . . . may emerge. The work of ‘Abschreiben’ 
must become a write-off for a waiting that, in turn, will never bring in a steady income. Proper 
literary work originates in the space and time opened up by a vacated position.”43  
 Helbing – and Walser, too – shows that a kind of literary work is possible within the 
performance demands of clerical employment. Even as this work will always be fehl with 
regards to formal job performance it nevertheless lays claim to compensation; Helbing: “Ich 
denke gar nicht, daran, mir zu sagen, daß ich nicht einmal so viel verdiene mit meinen 
Leistungen” (); but still, I know I achieve just about nothing.” An achievement, a Leistung, that 
is just about nothing – still more than nothing – but deserves to be better compensated – what 
Helbing imagines here only obliquely (by vocalizing what he purports not to bethinking about) is 
the margin in which a clerical literature becomes possible that originates not in the idleness or 
passivity of non-work (which in Schlegel’s famous “Idyll on Idleness” becomes the locus par 
                                                
43 See Groves, “Unbecoming Furniture: Robert Walser’s Ergonomics.” Groves essay shares many of the 
premises and foci of this chapter but differs insofar as what Groves identifies as the law of work in 
Walser, his ergo-nomos, which, Grove argues, “develops out of, and in response to, the neglect of 
ergonomic principles in the workplace,” more strongly emphasizes the symbiosis of clerical and literary 
writing as an aporia in Walser (quoting Siegel, Walser’s ‘Stellenloses  Ouevre’ is, Groves suggests, ‘a 
writing that can take place only by taking leave from writing’). 
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excellence of literature: “What is essential to [all art and science] is thought and poetry and that 
is only possible through passivity”) but in the performance imperative of the comptoir; this is a 
clerical literature that coopts the form of work for a poetic activity that otherwise is not 
sanctioned as proper performance.  
 In other words, qua misperformance, this is a literature that is continuous with clerical 
performance insofar as it is conceived as a kind of usage: a usage of time, a usage of instruments; 
but one that becomes literature through a discontinuity in the substance of what is performed. 
The clerk becomes a poet not so much because he writes poems – Grove is right here in 
suggesting that the clerical activity of Abschreiben does not furnish the actual writing for the 
literary activity of Schreiben. Indeed, it’s not by virtue of the substance of the clerk’s activity, 
which is often the banal work of bookkeeping, but rather because the clerk’s performance works 
on the form of this usage, that is, on how bookkeeping does or doesn’t get done, on how its 
techniques might be transported to other writing scenes, etc.. As will be discussed later in the 
context of Walser’s so-called pencil method, becoming an artist for Walser is not a matter of 
literary stuff but of literary technique and disposition (patience), in short, a matter of “Leistung” 
as Blumenberg understands it: as a kind of techne that shifts the valuation of human doing (a 
handiwork that becomes invention; a ‘Demut’ that becomes ‘Hochmut’).  
 In this regard, Walser capitalizes on his clerical performance: he turns the skills required 
of his job description, via a kind of Fehlleistung, into literary ones. This basic structure of a 
clerical writing scene that can but must not necessarily turn into a literary one, this conflation of 
the clerical and literary haunts Walser as a writer exceedingly familiar with the precarity of a 
literary career in which an author’s words stand under the dictates of a book market but also as a 
clerical writer who frequently moved between short-term jobs in banks, offices and proto-
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unemployment offices, so-called “Schreibstube für Stellenlose” where the unemployed literate 
could put writing skills to work. At the desk, whether in the “Schreibstube” for the unemployed, 
in the comptoir of a firm, or at home, the imperative to perform can cripple or enable writing that 
knows little boundary between the literary and the clerical. It is in this context that, as Walser 
suggests in his early sketch on the clerk, the feather of the exacting and calculating bookkeeper 
can morph into that of the poet:  
The feather of an upstanding clerk is usually quite pointy, sharp, and vicious . . . A diligent 
clerk hesitates for a few moments when putting feather to paper . . . Then he fires away and 
. . . letters, words, sentences fly . . . and every sentence gracefully expresses very much. . .  
In rapid pace he invents linguistic constructions that would amaze many a scholarly 
professor . . . Immodest poets and scholars ought to gently follow his example. 
 
Poetic inventiveness, Walser’s early sketch Der Kommis (1902) suggests here, is not opposed to 
the very economical and prosaic “world and sphere of activity” (“Welt und Wirkungsfeld”) of 
the clerk, namely the “narrow, slim, barren, dry office” with its mundane tasks such as business 
correspondence. In fact, the clerk’s poetry finds its proper if vexed place in Walser’s offices, 
where writing takes center stage and in which the feather and pencil, as potential instruments of 
the poet and clerk alike, sit alongside “all sorts of interest rate tables.” If the figure of the clerk in 
the office provides a model of literary excellence to poets and scholars, it is because, as Walser 
notes, the clerk is able to accurately keep account of “assets and liabilities” as much as 
“sensations and observations.” It isn’t simply the shift to the latter – the stuff of literature – that 
makes the clerk a poet, but the redirection of the clerical performance.44 Against the poetry of the 
                                                
44 This suggests a different point of convergence of the clerical and the literary than for instance the one 
identified by Marc Shell, who suggests that the “same medium that seems to confer belief in fiduciary 
money (bank notes) and in scriptural money (created by the process of bookkeeping) also seems to confer 
it to literature. That medium is writing.” Shell, Money, Language, Thought, 7. For Shell, the relationship 
between symbol and thing that writing and language negotiate depends upon a kind of “[c]redit, or 
belief,” that is, in turn, the “very ground of aesthetic experience.” Just as bookkeeping raises questions 
about the symbolic value of a debit or credit noted on paper, literature questions the relation between 
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establishment – the immodest poets and scholars – Walser’s clerk turns his lowly techne, office 
work, into literature. Like in Blumenberg’s reading of Cusa’s idiot, here it is the craft of the 
layman clerk vis-à-vis the poet and scholar (in Cusa it’s an orator and philosopher, both 
scholastic) as a kind of Leistung that can – but must not necessarily – lead to inventiveness. The 
danger of the margin between Leistung and Erfindung here is that the craft can easily just remain 
office work or bad poetry, written while waiting for a job. The notion of the layman’s modest 
craft Leistung – as a usage of the instruments or apparatus, including the clock, that stand at the 
clerk’s disposal – lies at the heart of Walser’s own frequently-invoked self-description of his 
work: “Ich weiß, daß ich eine Art handwerklicher Romancier bin [. . .] Bin ich gut aufgelegt, d.h. 
bei guter Laune, so schneidere, schustere, schmiede, hoble, klopfe, hämmere oder nagele ich 
Zeilen zusammen, deren Inhalt man sogleich versteht ” (“Eine Art Erzählung”).45 Inventiveness 
is here not the complex cogitations of the genius inventor or learned philosopher but the plump 
moods of the craftsman. The Leistungs-imperative thus frames the work of the clerk as much as 
it motivates literary writing in Walser as a kind of work that can hardly be cordoned off from the 
sort of workplace writing performed by Walser and his clerks. In this context, careful and 
diligent handwriting, a technique or skill central to the performance imperative becomes, for 
instance in Walser’s so-called ‘pencil method,’ an art that is inventive through rather than as the 
                                                                                                                                                       
“substance and sign.” In contrast to Shell’s semiological argument, Walser’s text seems to locate the 
convergence of the bookkeeping/administrative/economic world and the literary one at the level of 
material practice: the instruments, setting, and activity, in short, the writing scene, that both share and 
which, in both cases, is framed as a scene of performance.    
45 Walser’s frequent invocations of craftsmanship to figure his work as literary author belong to a long 
history of the relation between the mechanical and fine arts, from Plato’s elevation of the craftsman’s 
(dēmiourgós) production above the painter’s (zōgráphos) imitation in the tenth book of The Republic, to 
Kant’s explicit separation of craftsmanship from the beautiful arts in the Critique of Judgment, to the 
frequently cited topos of the poet as craftsman. Not incidentally, the engineer of Der Gehülfe is, among 
other things, an inventor of (advertising) clocks, perhaps an ironic citation of the topos of the 
“Uhrmacher” which in the deism debates among rationalists such as Wolff, Newton, and Leibniz is a 
crucial figure of creative invention. 
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opposition to Leistung. 
   
    
Performance Anxiety 
In Der Gehülfe the imperative of performance reaches from the lowest level of life, 
securing one’s daily bread, to the highest, reflecting on who one actually is. The novel’s 
protagonist clerk, Joseph Marti, not only worries about whether his performance will compensate 
for provisions he receives from his employer (“Werde ich diesen unverschämten Appetit durch 
entsprechende Leistungen rechtfertigen?”) but also whether this performance will be enough to 
ontologically qualify him as more than nothing, as something vital or substantial in the first 
Figure 1. Walser hones his handwriting. A profits and loss statement from December 
1896 likely drafted by Walser during his stint as an assistant bookkeeper for the 
transportation insurance company Schweiz. From Robert Walser: Sein Leben in 
Bildern und Texten. 
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place. As the narrator puts it in one of the many instances of indirect speech, used here to refract 
and vocalize the clerk’s mental state: “Morgen früh würde es sich ja zeigen, ob er eine Kraft oder 
eine Null, eine Intelligenz oder eine Maschine, ein Kopf oder ein Hohlkopf sei” (15). Against 
another basic materialist maxim that one is what one eats, Walser’s Leistungsroman plays with 
the idea that one is what one performs, to make up for what one eats: “Wer schon zu Mittag ißt, 
wie Joseph, muß diese durch verdoppelte Leistungen wieder gut zu machen suchen” (25). For the 
clerk in Walser’s Leistungsroman, performance does not correspond to pay as in the schema of 
merit-based pay; indeed, Joseph never receives a full wage at all from his employer and in a 
manner typical for the clerk’s playful, self-deprecating response to the demands on his 
performance, Joseph once remarks to his boss: “O, ich will gar keinen Gehalt. Ich verdiene ihn 
nicht.” Rather, performance serves as a kind of existential justification for a constitutively 
precarious and constitutively subservient being, i.e. dependent upon the whims of a boss. Being, 
in Walser’s novel – and this includes eating – is being ever able to perform whatever the boss 
demands of his employee, as Joseph remarks to his boss upon their first meeting: “Was mich 
betrifft, ich glaube und hoffe des Bestimmtesten, daß ich jederzeit dasjenige zu leisten imstande 
sein werde, was Sie glauben werden, von mir verlangen zu dürfen”.  
 By linking the (ontological) question of what one is to what one performs, Walser’s 
breaks not only with the Feuerbachian equation of eating and being but also with the materialist 
tenet according to which what one is coincides with one’s productive activity. Despite being 
rooted in the performance demands of an employment relationship, the anxious connections 
Joseph draws between his job performance and “having a head,” would only seem to point to a 
consciousness shaped by work, a consciousness that, as Marx and Engels write in their founding 
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text of historical materialism, is “nie etwas Andres [. . .] als das bewußte Sein,46” rooted in an 
“wirklichen Lebensprozesß” of productively securing what is necessary to live. On the contrary, 
Joseph Marti is hardly a conscious being and never really engaged in an actual life-process (“ich 
bin zurückgeblieben im Leben,” he once remarks); never quite sure of what he does or who he is, 
Joseph only ever has what the narrator calls “Schluß-Bewusstsein” when he finally decides to 
stop working and leave his job at Tobler’s firm at the end of the novel. His job performance can 
thus hardly be described as a “certain type of activity” (“eine bestimmte Art der Tätigkeit”) – 
Marx and Engels’ definition of productive labor in The German Ideology. This sort of definite 
activity is unavailable for Joseph in an employment relationship that lacks definition altogether: 
Die Obliegenheiten eines Angestellten liegen in einem solchen Haus weder ausdrücklich 
da noch ausdrücklich dort, sondern überall. Auch die Stunden der Pflichterfüllung sind 
keine exakt begrenzten, sondern erstrecken sich manchmal bis tief in die Nacht hinein, 
um bisweilen plötzlich mitten am Tag für eine Zeitlang aufzuhören. 
 
Within this flexible topography and temporality of the workplace, under employment conditions 
that blur distinctions between free time and work, home and office, there is nothing exact or 
definite about Joseph’s work performance at all. Indeed, Joseph’s sphere of performance extends 
“everywhere,” far beyond the less than ample office desk at which he performs his clerical duties 
of drafting letters and advertisements in the service of Tobler’s ‘technical office’; in the Tobler 
household Joseph performs, for instance, as a gardener, a waiter, a boatsman, and in one case a 
personal scribe to his boss’ wife. The position or Stellung Joseph gains through the employment 
relationship is simultaneously depositioned, ent-stellt, through the performance imperative that 
doesn’t assign definite tasks but places absolute ontological demands on the clerical employee’s 
flexible abilities. Performing as employee is thus not just what Joseph does to make a living but 
is that living tout court, a nervous form of life that constantly undermines the actions or 
                                                
46 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie, 26. 
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“Leistungen” that are meant to legitimate and institute it in the first place; a form of life 
characterized by an impetuous worrying, a ‘headlessness’ that upsets all forward-looking 
biographies. 
 The depositioning or dispersion of the performance obligations of the clerk alter the 
institutional parameters, in Campe’s sense, in which Joseph is positioned: in a household that 
encompasses the private and the public, wherein “family and firm are situated in such immediate 
proximity that there is, as it were, physical contact,” the divisions which it is the task of the 
institution to enforce, between a restricted and a general economy, between the management of 
the household (oikonomia) and the art of getting rich (chrematistike), between work and play, (an 
incest taboo on the intermingling of family and firm) etc., collapse, altering too the shape of the 
protagonist’s life since it is the institution that provides stability/position and forms this life. In 
other words, the Tobler household is an institution that can never quite become or remain one, 
just as Joseph Marti’s life can never quite be formed into a sensible curriculum vitae. Like the 
school in Campe’s reading of Jakob von Gunten, the Tobler household is an institution that 
works on its own (self-realizing) unwinding by maximizing its institutional project, carrying it 
too far: “The institution disposes itself of the contents that – perhaps – were previously assigned 
to it, contents which the institution – perhaps – served to foster and propagate. What remains are 
exercises” (Campe, 242). The danger of the institution in Der Gehülfe, tied as it is to the 
economic imperative of performance, achievement, and realizing invention, is that it, too, can 
become reduced to such exercises, to a kind of headless performance of churning out 
advertisements, ideas, inventions that fail to lead in any real way to either the “head” the 
protagonist seeks to prove he has nor, semantically related, to the “capital” the engineer hopes to 
procure for his inventions. 
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  One scene in particular in Der Gehülfe demonstrates how the clerical task becomes a 
headless exercise. As one of the few analeptic scenes of the novel, it describes a traumatic 
reprimand from his boss in Joseph’s previous position in an elastic factory when Joseph’s 
“hollow head” causes him to make an accounting mistake that costs the firm (the 
“Handelsgeschäft”) “considerable harm.” In this biographical episode the clerk’s concern about 
“having a head” or being a “Hohlkopf,” concerns that emanate from the imperative to perform, 
recasts the antithetical relation between mental and manual labor. In the scene, the imperative to 
perform a certain bookkeeping calculation leads to a collapse of any distinction between the 
work of the hand and the work of the head collapses, to a kind of discoordination:  
Der Prinzipal machte Joseph eines Tages ganz gehörig herunter, ja, er machte ihn schlecht, 
er nannte ihn geradezu einen Betrüger, und weswegen? Das war auch wieder so eine 
Kopfträgheit gewesen. Hohle Köpfe können ja nun allerdings einem Handelsgeschäft 
erheblichen Schaden zufügen. Man kann schlecht rechnen, oder aber, und das ist das 
Schlimme, man rechnet einfach gar nicht. Für Joseph war es so schwer gewesen, eine in 
englischer Pfundwährung aufgestellte Zinsenrechnung zu prüfen. Dazu fehlten ihm die 
paar Kenntnisse, und statt das nun offen dem Geschäftsherrn einzugestehen, wovor er sich 
schämte, setzte er unter die Rechnung, ohne sie wahrhaft geprüft zu haben, die lügnerische 
Bestätigung. Er schrieb mit Bleistift ein M zu der Schlußzahl, was so viel zu bedeuten 
hatte als die feste und ruhige Tatsache des Richtigbefundes. An diesem einen Tage nun 
kam es plötzlich durch eine mißtrauische Frage seitens des Prinzipals heraus, daß die 
Prüfung nur geschwindelt, und daß ja Joseph gar nicht imstande war, eine derartige 
Rechnung im Kopf zu lösen. Das waren eben englische Pfund, und Joseph wußte mit 
solchen absolut nicht umzugehen. Er verdiene, sprach der Vorgesetzte, mit Schimpf und 
Schande fortgejagt zu werden. Wenn er etwas nicht verstehe, so sei das keine 
Unehrenhaftigkeit, wenn er aber Verständnis lüge, so sei das Diebstahl. [. . .] O das war 
ein tobendes Herzklopfen für ihn gewesen. Er spürte eine schwarze, fressende Welle über 
seinem ganzen Dasein. [. . .] Er zitterte so heftig, daß die Zahlen, die er eben schrieb, 
nachher ungeheuerlich fremd, verschoben und groß aussahen (24-25) [italics mine]. 
 
Two different modes of Leistung break down here. On the one hand, Leistung marks the proper 
execution of a task that requires certain “Kenntnisse,” a calculation. On the other hand, the scene 
depicts a Fehl-Leistung that does not move outside of the performance imperative altogether but 
continues to perform a headless, clerical work of the hand, signing off on the calculation in the 
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account book, the clerk performs beyond the proper performance demand placed on him until 
“Leistung” becomes a response and continuation, almost an automatism, of the performance 
imperative in spite of itself. It is only with the boss’s stern rebuke that even the performances of 
the clerk’s hand are deformed and become estranged and the being of the clerk threatened. The 
institution in which the performance imperative is operative knows misperformance, or the lack 
of the necessary conditions for performance altogether, only as “Diebstahl;” here, Joseph’s 
signing-off on his Fehl-Leistung is a compensatory gesture that ultimately fails. Joseph Marti’s 
curriculum vita, insofar as one can speak of a course of life at all for a character who imagines 
himself “zurückgeblieben im Leben,” is thus determined in large parts not by adequate 
performance but by these sorts of errors and mental lapses, which performance anxiety produces 
in the workplace. 
 By cancelling any reliable pathways between doing and being or performance and 
consciousness, the performance imperative not only questions the schema of development that 
grounds the ontology of the Bildungsroman but, through an alteration of what constitutes the 
work of the protagonist, presents an alternative understanding of action or doing in the novel and 
ultimately a different relation between work and literature.47 The Bildungsroman, even when it 
sways towards the Künstleroman, is oriented towards a protagonist’s course to a more or less 
steady sense of position in the world, a position underwritten by a kind of doing or undertaking. 
In Dilthey’s ur-formulation of the Bildungsroman – proffered two years prior to Walser’s novel 
– the protagonist’s development is a story of self-finding, of becoming “certain of [one’s] task in 
                                                
47 On the relation between aesthetics, work, and non-work, see Martin Jörg Schäfer, Die Gewalt der 
Muße. With Schäfer, one could say that even a narrative of Bildung opposed to the work-world of 
bourgeois society, a Bildungsroman that fully embraces the aesthetic as its lifeform, is still premised on a 
kind of work, the work of Bildung or aesthetics. As Schäfer suggests, attempts to distinguish work from 
the non-work of the poet fall within a productive/unproductive labor dichotomy that reproduces the 
aesthetic as a better form of work. 
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the world,” and Goethe’s task in the Bildungsroman was, Dilthey writes, to tell a “die Geschichte 
eines sich zur Tätigkeit bildenden Menschen”. The lack of clarity of the clerical assistant’s 
performances and his indefinite position in the Tobler household means not only that the 
Leistungsroman cannot be a novel of social integration, socialization or finding position via 
one’s action but must instead be a story of Leistungen that can become Fehl-Leistungen, of 
inventions that can flop, and of solvencies that can lapse into insolvencies. The clerk’s Leistung 
in Der Gehülfe constitutes, by contrast to the Bildungsroman, a form of novelistic action that 
doesn’t quite add up to any well-formed curriculum vitae; lacking a telos, there is something 
fundamentally anxious or “unruhig” about the clerk’s actions that demonstrate more trouble than 
the toil of Bildung and that alters the course of the novel’s plot, which knows action only within 
the framework of the clerk’s Leistungen and Fehlleistungen.  
 In his reading of the figure of the assistant in Walser and Kafka, Giorgio Agamben has 
suggested precisely an ontology of incompletion and not of Bildung for the assistant. For 
Agamben, the figure of the “Gehilfe” is, like the child, fraught by the paradox of incompleteness, 
becoming a sign of “what becomes irrevocably lost.”48 Just as Agamben had suggested that 
Walser’s characters display a radical neutrality to any kind of redemption, and indeed to the 
entire theological economy of salvation, Walser’s assistant figures become traces of projects that 
are never finished: “they do not succeed in finishing anything and are generally idle [senz 
opera]/without a work.” They are, in short, by Agamben’s reading, creatures of inoperativity, 
“irreparably and stubbornly busy collaborating on work that is utterly superfluous, not to say 
indescribable.” 
 The aesthetic generated in Walser’s novel by this flexibility in the clerk’s position – who 
                                                
48 See Weitzman on the child and servant, also in relation to Agamben, in Walser. Weitzman, Irony’s 
Antics, 81-82. 
  168 
was “temporarily employed” in an ‘elastic’ factory of all places – and the anxiety-inducing 
susceptibility to the performance demands of his job comes close to what, in a recent study of 
contemporary aesthetic categories, Sianne Ngai has described as an aesthetics of the zany, an 
aesthetics that is ultimately, as Ngai puts it, “about work – and about a precariousness created 
specifically by the capitalist organization of work” (188). Ngai’s zaniness, which she likewise 
links to an imperative to ‘perform-or-else’ – albeit one specific to a post-Fordist American 
economic culture – is applicable to many of the features of Walser’s clerical workers: it has a 
“stressed-out, even desperate quality” that cancels the lightheartedness or distance of any comic 
or ironic position;49 it indexes a collapsing distinction between work and play; it denotes 
“incessant doing,” “perpetual improvisation,” “absolute adaptability” and a kind of “trying too 
hard” that frequently backfires, as in the many examples Ngai draws from the work of the 
character Lucy Ricardo in the mid-century American sitcom I Love Lucy. Indeed, zaniness for 
Ngai specifically describes the laborious aesthetics of servants and service workers, originating 
in the figure of the zanni in sixteenth-century Italian commedia dell’arte, an itinerant household 
servant whose precarious status as a temporary worker is mirrored in the zanni’s indefinite and 
diffuse character position within the commedia dell’arte, and extending via Beaumarchais’ ex-
servant Figaro in the Barber of Seville (1775) and others to contemporary iterations of the zany 
service worker in Thomas Pynchon’s Crying of Lot 49, Lucy Ricardo in I Love Lucy, or even Jim 
Carrey’s role as television service-worker in the film The Cable Guy. 
                                                
49 While Walser scholars are unanimous in attributing a comic or ironic dimension to Walser’s prose, the 
specific quality of this irony is up for debate. Reading Walser’s works via the perspective of a 
performance imperative suggests that Walser’s writing is equally informed by an earnestness similar to 
that of Ngai’s zaniness. As much as Walser’s clerks adopt an (often Romantic) ironic position vis-à-vis 
their surrounding world, the way they yield to a performance imperative frequently has serious 
consequences that preclude a total ironic disengagement or detachment from their worlds. The interplay 
of earnestness and irony deserves greater examination. On the ambivalences of Walser’s irony and 
comedy, see Erica Weitzman, “The Playgrounds of Literature: Robert Walser” in Irony’s Antics.  
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 Many scenes of Joseph’s performance in the Tobler household indeed suggest a kind of 
zany anxiety about job performance: Joseph frequently says the wrong thing, commits social or 
business-related errors and mishaps and finds himself frequently overacting in situations that 
demand more moderate degrees of action – all the while reflecting on the inadequacy of his 
behavior for the situation in the mode of a reflection on his ability to perform what is asked of 
him. The most zany moments are those in which the anxiousness about performance don’t lead 
to a busied or erratic doing but halt action altogether and disrupt the performance of a service. 
 Whatever quiescence characterizes Joseph’s person – he believes, as he remarks, that he 
“came into this world equipped with an oddly generous portion of repose” [“mit einer 
merkwürdig umfangreichen Portion Ruhe ausstaffiert zur Welt gekommen”] – is upset by the 
imperative to perform; as long as he suffers from the anxiety to perform, there is nothing restful, 
reflective, or composed about him. His repose becomes, under the performance imperative, 
indistinguishable from “dry indifference.” The opposite of work/toil/labor, namely rest and 
quietude, amounts to a state that would have no ontological currency within the dictates of the 
performance principle, something that would not be being. For this reason,  even outside of the 
performance imperative, in his spare time, the clerk is engaged in a kind of recreational activity 
that is itself a form of Leistung: swimming. As the description of the clerk’s swimming makes 
clear, recreation and exertion coincide for and activity that, similar to Helbing’s dilly-dallying, is 
past-time and Leistung in one:   
Er schwamm weit hinaus, es war ihm so wohl zumute. Welchem Badenden und 
Schwimmenden, wenn er nicht gerade am Ertrinken ist, ist es nicht wohl zumut? [. . . ] 
Und mit den nackten empfindungsvollen Armen macht man Schnitte in dieses nasse, 
saubere, gütige Element. Jeder Stoß mit den Beinen bringt einen ein Stück vorwärts in 
diesem schönen, tiefen Nassen. Von unten her wird man von warmen und kühlen Strömen 
gehoben. Den Kopf taucht man, um den Übermut in der Brust zu bewässern, auf kurze 
Zeit, den Atem und den Mund und die Augen zudrückend, hinab, um am ganzen Leib 
dieses Entzückende zu spüren. Schwimmend möchte man schreien, oder nur rufen, oder 
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nur lachen, oder nur etwas sagen, und man tut's auch.  
This erotics of this passage point, of course, to another form of exertion that borders on 
performance and pleasure. Crucially, however, swimming unlike sexual activity is a Leistung 
that remains folgenlos and uninventive. Blumenberg will in fact describe techne for the ancients 
as “diejenigen Fertigkeiten und Geschiklichkeiten, die bestimmte Leistungen [. . . ] 
hervorzubringen vermochten und die im Absehen und Nachmachen erlernen konnte, so wie man 
heute noch eine ‘Technik’ – im Sport etwa – erlernen kann.”50 If swimming then is Walser’s 
modern techne, a Leistung that can’t decide between recreation and exertion, a scream or a laugh, 
etc., it belongs to a class of non-inventive action that could never be endowed with the 
Promethean force of foresight but is destined to always be a kind of Epimethean “Nachdenken.” 
The point of Walser’s Leistungsroman, contra Schlegel in his praise of “Müßigang” in Lucinde, 
is not the Romantic emergence of literature out of the passivity of vegetation as the ‘highest, 
most complete life.’ Rather, for Walser literature must become a kind of misperformance. 
Moreover, while the clerk in Walser would seem closer to the anxious toil and trouble of 
Prometheus that never allows rest and only knows boredom than to Hercules’s godly exertion 
with its “noble idleness [Müßiggang],” as Schlegel describes it, Joseph’s anxious exertion is 
neither Promethean nor Heculean: as the narrator pithily surmises, “Herkules war er jedenfalls 
nicht.” Indeed there is nothing of the divine hero about Walser’s clerks. 
Disruption of Service 
 
Even and most especially when Joseph Marti hopes to definitely (“des Bestimmtesten”) deliver 
an unequivocally satisfactory performance as clerk, his preoccupations with and anxieties about 
                                                
50 Blumenberg, “Lebenswelt und Technisierung,” in Schriften zur Technik, 168. 
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his job performance get in the way of his accomplishing much at all, satisfactorily or not. Like 
Helbing, Marti has trouble adequately delivering what is asked of him and suffers too from 
frequent parapraxis. But whereas Helbing can turn his parapraxis into a different kind of praxis 
and a different type of employee-being, Marti’s performance anxiety cripples him sometimes 
entirely. In a scene in which Marti welcomes a key potential investor for the advertising clock 
while his boss is away from the office, Marti doesn’t simply misperform but is incapable of 
performing altogether. After presenting the capitalist investor, Johannes Fischer, with the details 
of the advertising clock, Marti, who is instructed to keep the investor occupied until his boss 
returns, is rendered speechless by his performance anxiety:  
“Und die Uhr kostet?  
Joseph versuchte auch das dem Herrn Fischer klar zu machen, wobei er ein ganz klein 
wenig, er wußte selbst nicht warum, stotterte” (79). 
 
Joseph’s stuttering quickly turns to a full-fledged inability to speak: “ Aber Stimme und Lippe 
wollte ihm den erforderlichen Dienst nicht leisten” (79). Unlike other scenes of parapraxis 
wherein, similar to Helbing, Joseph inadvertently talks back to his boss in long, drawn-out 
speeches that frequently end in the boss’s reprimand to perform his job well, there is no 
possibility to redirect or sublimate Joseph’s performed actions in this case. As service provider, 
Joseph is here, physiologically, unable to provide any service; he fails to control the instruments 
necessary to do so (voice and lips).  
 Similar to the scene in the elastic factory, in which the clerk’s trembling hand disturbs the 
form of his writing, this failure of a physiological “Dienstleistung” from the body of the one who 
ought to be in the position to deliver a performance is something Walser himself knew well and 
characterizes not only clerical work but the literary scene of writing in Walser’s oevre as well. 
Walser frequently imagines his hand as a kind of “service worker” in the business of writing, his 
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writing utensils, too, render a service (see “Asche, Nadel, Bleistift und Zündhölzchen”), as he 
describes it. But one scene in particular demonstrates how the disruption of the body’s ability to 
perform a service, a failed “Dienstleistung” of the hand, yields to a different kind of performance 
altogether. In what is probably the most cited writing scene in his oeuvre – his letter to his 
publisher Max Rychner from June 20, 1927 – Walser explicates how what he famously calls his 
“pencil system” – his unusual art of first composing texts with pencil in a miniaturized and 
enigmatic Kurrent handwriting and then copying these pieces into more legible form for 
publication – corrects a failure to perform. The pencil method, Walser suggests is not simply an 
artistic method or technique, employed for aesthetic purposes, but belongs, his letter suggests, to 
an “entire history of creative work and life” [Schaffens- und Lebensgeschichte]. For the pencil 
system, as Walser describes it, allowed him to overcome a daunting “malaise of the pen 
[Schreibfederüberdruß,]” a writer’s block accompanied by a physical “breakdown of the hand” 
that only a shift to a different instrument, a pencil, could remedy by (re)enabling the playful 
pleasure of literary authorship and allowing Walser to “learn, like a young boy, to write again,” 
purportedly a central aspect of the microscripts. What this poetology of the microscripts reveal, 
however, is perhaps less any de- and recomposition of the authorly self;51 nor any ciphering and 
deciphering gestures of self-reflexive authorship.52 Rather, Walser’s letter describes the literary 
process whereby an author’s suffering performance is recuperated in the modus of clerical 
achievement and the clerk’s literary parapraxis becomes the literary author’s proper and good 
performance. The pencil method belongs, in other words, to the repertoire of a literary author 
                                                
51 On the decomposition that Walser’s letter attests to see Anette Schwarz, who reads Walser’s letter as 
the culmination of a baroque melancholia. Schwarz, Melancholie. 
52 Siegel: “Folgt man der Textur des Briefs [an Rychner], so zeigt sich, in der Bewegung von Verhüllen 
und Enthüllen, daß nicht über das Bleistiftssystem geschrieben werden kann, ohne daß skizziert würde, 
daß nicht geschrieben werden kann ohne ‘Bleistiftauftrag,” Aufträge, 67. 
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who stands under the dictates of a performance imperative, who imagines himself as a service 
provider of literature, and whose literary productivity suffers.  
 But the pencil method can’t be seen simply a solution to Walser’s writerly malaise; the 
homeopathic resuscitation of schoolboy-like writing that it promises only partially offers any sort 
of writerly convalescence. Even as it leads to a “liberat[ion]” from his writing problems and 
repaves the way to “dichten” for Walser, the pencil method is overshadowed by a different sort 
of torment: “I owe to the pencil system, which is fused with a consistent, office-like copy-
system, true agonies. But this agony has taught me patience such that I’ve become an artist in 
having patience.” One agony follows upon another as the pen-induced breakdown of Walser’s 
hand leads to the “sluggish languor” of the pencil. But whereas the pen signaled a crisis of 
literature for Walser, condensed in his inability to write, the pencil and its system turns – via the 
parapraxis of delivering clerical writing where literary writing is demanded (by the publisher)  -- 
the crisis of writing and the agonies caused by this crisis into a renewed possibility for literary 
performance, for the emergence of an artist who ambivalently oscillates between a boyish 
pleasure in writing and the very adult pain of clerical work. While the pencil method treats the 
symptoms of Walser’s pen malaise (‘hatred of the feather,’ ‘pen fatigue,’ ‘breakdown of the 
hand,’ “cramp,” “swoon,” “breakdown”), it is nevertheless not so much a cure as itself 
symptomatic of the truly agonizing work of “Schrifstellerei.” In other words, the pencil method, 
in its mimicry of the strict order and dutiful transcription of clerical copywriting, constitutes less 
a (modernist) homeopathic aesthetic response to writing’s materiality than the resuscitation of 
the performance of writing as an activity that can never be cordoned off from the office and its 
performance demands on its employees. As a mode of using the office set-up for a different 
purpose, the pencil method shares in the parapraxis, the Fehl-Leistung-structure of Helbing. The 
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final paragraph of the letter projects the performance demands of literary productivity back onto 
the publisher from whom they emanate:  
Sie finden mich vielleicht uninteressant, weil aufrichtig; daher beeile ich mich, Sie so 
interessant und gekünstelt wie möglich zu grüßen und bleibe in unaufrichtigster, dafür aber 
schimmerndster Hochachtung, die ich frei von Herzlichkeit hoffe, weile Letztere müde 
macht, Sie aber unter allen Umständen leistungsfähig zu bleiben haben, Ihr ergebener 
          Robert Walser. 
This final paragraph is wrought with the sort of contradictions that shape Walser’s writing: a 
nuanced and ironic tension between a posture of genuineness and just plain posturing, between a 
shame-induced or timid courteousness and an impudence that tends towards the hyperbolic. 
These tensions, in turn, imply those between art(ifice) and life, the interesting and non-
interesting, sincerity and disingenuousness and culminate in the author’s submission 
to/rearticulation of the publisher’s absolute (“unter allen Umständen”) imperative to remain, like 
the clerk of Der Gehülfe, ever capable of performing, leistungsfähig. From this final line, the 
performance imperative works back on Walser’s entire letter and indeed amounts to a poetic 
program in its own right, determining the tone and speed of Walser’s writing: it demands the 
author not bore his reader and avoid the sort of cordialities that would do so; it allows for an 
insincere or even contrived and overstylized tone so long as the author interests his reader. In 
other words, as Walser writes, in order not to detract or tire his publisher who must remain under 
all circumstances capable of performing, Walser becomes an artist, playing with the speed of 
writing, with a maximum and minimum degree of artifice and sincerity, and even invents a 
method that itself playfully mimes the performance imperative of the office. Finally, then, the 
performance imperative clarifies the paradoxical homeopathy of Waler’s pencil method: if the 
pencil method seems to treat the malaise of the pen and its symptoms with an even more 
agonizing productive mode, this is because writing in Walser is this agony of the pressure to 
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perform; or rather, writing is the point at which this agony (and its symptomatic ‘Ohnmacht’ and 
cramps) coincides with and paradoxically revitalizes literary pleasure (“Schriftstellerlust”).53 
What separates Walser the artist from Walser the clerk, literary writing (the “wieder schreiben” 
of the recuperated author) from clerical copying (“abschreiben”),  is thus not the writing scene, 
the writing method, nor the writing instruments, but the “patience” the literary author brings to 
writing’s torments, to the “colossal, sluggish slowness” [ins Kolossale gehende,schleppende 
Langsamkeit]” that characterizes the “process of writing” as subject to a performance imperative, 
for publisher, literary author and clerk alike. Becoming and artist in and of patience – “…. so that 
I became an artist in being patient [daß ich im Geduldhaben ein Künstler bin]” – is not just a 
coping mechanism for the demanding and torturous work of the office but the feat or “Leistung” 
of the literary author able to deal with, refunctionalize (or in Walser’s language “umstempeln”), 
and redirect the performance demands of the publishing industry.54 
 While in Walser’s letter to Rychner performance anxiety takes the form of an ironic 
epistolary confession, in Walser’s Leistungsroman it takes the form of Joseph Marti’s numerous 
‘monologic’ ruminations and reflections on his self (actual monologues, unsent letters, attempts 
at memoir, a list of bad habits). These reflective moments give form to and vocalize the 
protagonist’s overwhelming concern with his performance through direct speech, reported and 
                                                
53 Literature is therefore not simply the opposite of Marcuse’s performance principle, that is, a perversion 
or act subject to the pleasure principle. Rather it is, at best, a kind of second-order reality principle: the 
patient negotiation of pain (agony in performance) and pleasure. This is a different structure of repression: 
as Marcuse notes, fantasy, including artistic imagination, supply a perversion or rejection of the 
performance principle with an image of “freedom and gratification” and point to something “outside the 
dominon of the performance principle,” a kind of, as Adorno will also say of the work of art, quoting 
Stehndal, “promesse de bonheur” – not so for Walser. In Walser, by contrast, writing is the 
misperformance that results directly from the performance principle and from which it cannot escape.   
54 This reading differs slightly from Erica Weitzman’s suggestion that “with the Bleistiftsgebiet, Walser 
becomes, not just his own absolute educator, but also his own absolute boss, from whom he—the clerk in 
perpetuum—is permanently obliged to take dictation.” Weitzman also sees in the office-like 
dictation/transcription system a transformation of “virtuousity itself . . . from a sign of freedom into a sign 
of submission” though her emphasis is on the parodic and ironic nature of this transformation. 
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indirect speech, as the example above shows, but most crucially through (no less ironic) 
“soliloquies” or monologues. Soliloquy appropriately voices the performance anxiety suffered by 
a clerical employee for a number of reasons: as a literary technique for rendering consciousness, 
it marks the nebulous point at which mental states, i.e. interior being, take on material existence, 
the point at which external activity (speaking) and inner contemplation (thinking) collide – this is 
particularly the case for scenes of soliloquy in Walser’s novel wherein it’s unclear whether 
thoughts are verbally spoken in the novel or not (soliloqouies imply not solipsism but a relation 
between self and world shaped by the relation between boss and worker). Moroever, soliloquy in 
Walser’s novel exposes mechanisms of self-inquiry and self-accusation that result from the 
protagonist’s internalization of the performance imperative. Finally and related, Joseph’s 
soliloquys exhibit structural parallels with the administrative tasks of bookkeeping and 
accounting that fall under his job description. This is particularly clear in one lengthy 
“Selbstgespräch” that occurs when Joseph plans to retire for the evening to his “posh” and 
“romantic” room at the top of the Tobler villa’s turret. Instead of the anticipated rest one enjoys 
at the end of a work day, Joseph is “plagued for a good while” by self-accusations of 
“headlessness,” the corollary to performance anxiety: 
“Was leiste ich eigentlich? Ich kann mich da, wenn ich will, sogleich ungestört zu Bett 
legen, um in einen sehr wahrscheinlich gesunden und tiefen Schlaf zu versinken. Ich 
bekomme in Biergärten Bier zu trinken. Ich kann mit Frau und Kindern Gondel fahren, ich 
habe zu essen. . . Aber was gebe nun ich dafür? Ist das etwas Reelles und Gewichtiges, was 
ich zu bieten vermag? . . . Was sind das für Dienste, die ich bis zum heutigen Tage Herrn 
Tobler bereits geleistet habe?  . . . [I]ch bin felsenfest davon überzeugt, daß mein Herr und 
Meister noch wenig Nutzen durch mich davongetragen hat. Sollten mir der Schneid, die 
Initiative, die Begeisterungsfähigkeit fehlen? Das ist möglich, denn in der Tat, ich bin mit 
einer merkwürdig umfangreichen Portion Ruhe ausstaffiert zur Welt gekommen. Aber 
schadet denn das etwas? Freilich schadet es, denn die Unternehmungen Toblers verlangen 
leidenschaftliche Anteilnahme, und die Ruhe der Seele ähnelt bisweilen der trockenen 
Gleichgültigkeit. . .”  
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Joseph’s performance soliloquy moves here from the animating question of the novel, “Was 
leiste ich eigentlich,” via a reflection on the material parameters of his existence as employee in 
Tobler’s home office (from sustenance to physical rest) and his social integration into his 
employer’s family to a (worrisome) reflection on the substance of his performance and 
ultimately on the substance of his self. The performance soliloquy thus does more than fulfill the 
conventional function of monologic discourse in the novel, namely to render Joseph’s 
consciousness for a reader,55 and in this particular case to render Joseph’s consciousness of the 
performance imperative and the anxiety it induces. The performance soliloquy responds, 
furthermore, to the question “was leiste ich eigentlich” with a kind of autobiographical text. The 
question of performance becomes an occasion to weave a text of the self out of various threads: 
an inventory of the affordances of his position in his employer’s house; an account of the 
performed services he has quid pro quo rendered his boss; and a sort of self-genealogy meant to 
account for why something is lacking in the present because of circumstances in the past. The 
question of performance invites an existential text, opening onto the question of  
who or what one is and what one can do. 
The Service Worker (Leistung and Immaterial Labor) 
 Both Joseph’s flexible performances and misperformances in the Tobler household as 
well as Walser’s ambivalently ironic/serious description of performing literary work under the 
performance demands of his publisher anticipate a historical shift from thinking work in terms of 
a dynamic and productive force, embedded within a paradigm of industrial management – 
factories, shift-workers, management levels, panoptic oversight – to a far less definite notion of 
work, which recent theorists have described as immaterial, creative, or flexible, and indeed 
                                                
55 See Dorrit Cohn, Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. 
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affective and gendered in many cases. This shift, prepared in many ways by the work of Italian 
neo-Marxists, has made and continues to makes available a number of possibilities for thinking 
the cultural work of the artist or the intellectual work of the scholar (not to mention the domestic 
work of a caregiver and other forms of working on the reproduction of the labor cycle that were 
previously eclipsed by more stringent divide between productive and unproductive labor, or the 
divide between mental and manual labor). Indeed, the depiction of the clerical assistant’s “world 
and sphere of activity” in his 1908 novel, to quote again Walser’s phrase from his earlier 
illustration of the clerk’s “Gelage,” keenly attests to the rise of a new type of flexible and 
immaterial laborer, one with which Walser was very familiar in his own curriculum vitae: the 
Angestellter or white-collar worker. By the time Siegfried Kracauer drafts his well-known study 
of the masses of white-collared workers populating Berlin for the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung in 1930, the figure of the Angestellter was – even despite its terminological and political 
ambiguities and lack of definition – already a well-established social reality in Weimar Germany 
and other modern, industrialized states on and off the continent. Walser’s novel of the clerk – 
more than Kracauer’s “mosaic” study of Angestellten, whose central analytic ultimately remains 
the rationalist organizational logic of Taylorist management discourses and practices – points in 
its depictions of this new type of employee to the rather anachronistic periodization of the 
flexible laborer as a phenomenon of post-Fordist capitalist economies in many ‘end of work’ 
discourses.56  
                                                
56 As Maurizio Lazzarato originally conceives it, the notion of immaterial labor is specific to an 
information age in which what work is must be redefined to accommodate both a breakdown of discrete 
divisions between mental and manual labor – between “conception and execution, between labor and 
creativity, between author and audience” writes Lazzarato – and a corresponding shift in how this labor is 
valorized in post-Fordist workplaces (roughly after the 1970s). If immaterial labor comes to mark the 
production of the “informational and cultural content of the commodity” rather than any material good in 
its own right this is because the skills now required of laborers are increasingly tied to informational 
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 Highlighting the fluid, networked, and communicative dimensions of work, the concept 
of immaterial labor aims to supplement Marxian notions of productive labor with a more 
capacious categorization of what counts as work – affect, caring, playing, sleeping, etc. – and to 
elevate the worker’s ‘self-care,’ her self-entrepreneurial energies, to the sine qua non of capitalist 
valorization, even as these modes of work occur outside any formal relation between capital and 
labor. As Lazzarato writes, “The worker's personality and subjectivity have to be made 
susceptible to organization and command. It is around immateriality that the quality and quantity 
of labor are organized [. . .] Work can thus be defined as the capacity to activate and manage 
productive cooperation. In this phase, workers are expected to become “active subjects” in the 
coordination of the various functions of production, instead of being subjected to it as simple 
command” (134-5).57   
 It’s easy to see in the existential demands that the performance imperative places on the 
clerk’s self an early instance of the subjectification of work that Lazzarato describes here. The 
                                                                                                                                                       
economies  (“cybernetics and computer control”) and because those kinds of activities traditionally 
relegated to the sphere of culture (“activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic 
standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and  . . . public opinion”) are now integrated into the 
workplace. In short, the result, one could say, is that what formerly – in earlier Marxian framework – 
counted as consumption becomes a central component of the production process at the same time that the 
prime mechanism of capital’s valorization no longer consists in the consumption of a worker’s labor 
power, nor even in the controlled utilization or management of labor power, but rather in the proper 
implementation of a worker’s autonomous subjectivity: “My working hypothesis, then, is that the cycle of 
immaterial labor takes as its starting point a social labor power that is independent and able to organize 
both its own work and its relations with business entities. Industry does not form or create this new labor 
power, but simply takes it on board and adapts it (138).” Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labor.”  
57 This is, of course, similar to Deleuze’s (1990) albeit more ontological supersession of Foucault’s 
disciplinary societies with his modulating “societies of control,” which are themselves characterized by 
flexibility/flux tout court, not interning (Foucault) but itinerant: “controls are a modulation, like a self-
deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other.” In Deleuze’s account one 
can see how the performance imperative becomes hypostatized as diffuse meritocracy in the post-
disciplinary workplace/corporation: “the corporation works more deeply [than the factory] to impose a 
modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metasability that operate through challenges, contests . . . 
[it] constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motivational force 
. . . The modulating principle of ‘salary according to merit’ has not failed to tempt national education 
itself.” “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” 
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difference, though less obvious, is crucial. At stake in Lazarrato’s description is a shift in the 
paradigm of worker management not simply from the rationalist procedures and protocols of a 
Taylorist or Fordist model to a post-Fordist (and in its cultural code postmodernist) management 
dispostive as described, for instance, by Luc Boltanski and Eva Chiapello in The New Spirit of 
Capitalism, but also from a society of discipline to a ‘modulating’ rather than modeling society 
of control, as (another looming figure of post-Fordist philosophies of subject and materialism) 
Giles Deleuze formulates it a half decade before Lazarrato in contradistinction to Foucault.  
  Even as the performance imperative of Walser’s novel anticipates these discourses, the 
break or difference it marks from earlier concepts of labor and work (including Marx and 
Engel’s) is far more eclectic, historically and conceptually, and might best be situated in another, 
perhaps more anachronistic context: a concept of work that that can’t quite draw a dividing line 
between a vita activa and a vita contemplativa and ultimately between art and life. The 
performance imperative only superficially belongs to the rationalizing and, later, irrationalizing 
organizational apparatuses of work described in Kracuer’s study and in theories of immaterial 
labor. But two points are crucial in this regard that demonstrate how a nexus of performance and 
invention in Walser’s Leistungsroman plays out on a formal level and suggests a different 
understanding of literary action and the “work” of art. The first pertains to the way in which the 
work of clerical writing is instrumentalized for the institution, that is to say, placed (or not 
placed) in the service of the firm, household/economy, the second point pertains to the specific 
way in which the assistant’s performance overrides the institutional parameters that attempt to 
contain it and how different kinds of performance escape these. 
 To be sure, as with Helbing, both the disciplinary gaze of the boss and the internalized 
mechanisms of self-control, what Foucault has often referred to as technologies of the self and 
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which, under the rubric of govermentality, belong together with Foucault’s concept of human 
capital and self-entrepreneurship, play an active role in the clerk’s workplace. The former are 
most forcefully at work in the scenes of dictation discussed above, which ensure that any clerical 
writing will ever only be “nachgezeichnet,” a performance that follows the dictates, and is 
dictation, of the inventor who not only closely observes the performance of the clerical worker 
but ultimately puts his own stamp or signature on the finished product. Here performing is 
always performing in the name of: 
“‘Setzen Sie folgendes Inserat auf!’ 
Joseph zog einen Bleistift und ein Notzibuch aus der Tasche. Es wurde ihm folgendes 
diktiert: 
Für Kapitalisten! 
Ingenieur sucht Anschluß an Kapitalisten zwecks Finanzierung seiner Patente. 
Gewinnbringendes, absolut risikofreies Unternehmen. Offerten unter . . .” (47). 
 
When Joseph attempts to give his own textual account of himself and on his own, to write his 
own life-story, he runs up against the problem of this double precarity, namely that giving an 
account of oneself becomes – within the economy of the Leistungsroman -- keeping account, 
inseparable from his clerical “Leistungen” such as “die genaue Gewinnberechung” of Tobler’s 
firm. Joseph’s autobiographical attempt occurs when he turns from studying the essence of the 
advertising-clock (“In das Wesen der Reklame-Uhr drang er immer tiefer ein und glaubte bereits, 
sie vollständig erfaßt zu haben” [31]) to composing a memoir or diary that would describe his 
own essence (“Doch jetzt will ich mein Wesen ein bisschen beschreiben”). The project ends 
poorly: “Der zum Tagebuchschreiben so wenig taugliche Gehülfe legte die Feder beiseite, zerriß 
das Geschriebene und verließ das Zimmer” (94). Even those forms of writing conducted with the 
“private quill” (92) that would signal a different “occupation” than the bookkeeping of the 
Tobler firm, an “occupation” namely with Joseph’s “own, valuable person,” remain under the 
aegis of the firm and its economy. Hence, these writing projects become what they attempt not to 
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be: (self)advertising (like the “Offerte,” “Reklame” and “Inserate” in the text) or bookkeeping 
(the “Zusammenstellung” of the account books Joseph is tasked with). And as with a private 
letter Joseph composes, accounting for oneself ends, like the firm’s finances, in red ink: “Jener 
Brief ist mit einem ersonnenen und erdichteten Gefühl geschrieben worden, er ist wahr, aber er 
ist zugleich eine Erfindung gewesen, herauserfunden aus einem Geist, der erschreckt ist, darüber, 
daß ihm einfachere und näherliegende Beziehungen vollständig mangeln” (93). The letter is 
contrived (“erfunden”) through and through, the fanciful invention of a spirit characterized by 
absolute lack, the spirit of the clerk.58 The letter in question here, composed “briskly” on the 
crossed-out letterhead of the Tobler firm and which the novel reproduces in its entirety, turns 
itself into a version of bookkeeping: “Übrigens bin ich Ihnen ja noch Geld schuldig, nicht wahr, 
und ich bin beinahe froh darüber. Äußere Beziehungen können dann innere lebendiger erhalten” 
(19). Joseph’s bookkeeping of the self finds its most pronounced expression in another 
abandoned writing project taken up when Joseph “found himself with nothing more important to 
occupy himself with:” on a sheet of paper under the title “Schlechte Gewohnheit,” Joseph offers 
an account of his bad habits that itself turns out to be a bad habit: “Auch dies ist ein schlechte 
Gewohnheit, das was ich mache, Gedankenaufnotieren” (186). Joseph tosses his writing into the 
wastebasket.59 The assistant’s written performances – drafting letters, advertisements, brochures 
                                                
58 In other scenes of Walser’s Leistungsroman, the clerk’s constitutive lack can paradoxically become a 
wealth of invention: “Im Korrespondieren ist der Commis ein wahrer Schelm. Er erfindet im raschen 
Fluge Satzbildungen, die das Ersrtaunen von vielen gelehrten Professoren erwecken dürften . . . An 
Commis dürfen sich unbescheidene Dichter und Gelehrte wohl sanft ein Beispiel nehmen. Sie sind es, die 
Dichter namentlich, die hoffen, mit jedem Sprachfetzen, den sie absetzen, berühmt und entschädigt zu 
werden. Wie viel edler unr reicher ist da die Handlungsweise und das Benehmen der Commis, die, so 
ärmlich sie auch äußerlich auftreten mögen, doch einen Reichtum besitzen, der wahrhaft üppig genannt zu 
werden verdient” (Im Bureau, 14-15). 
59 Bookeeping, invention, and poetic ambition havetheir predecessor here in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister: 
Werner dismisses and encourages Wilhelm to burn one of his pieces of poetry as an “Erfindung” not in 
the least “lobenswürdig;” against this he pits “eine der schönsten Erfindungen des menschlichen Geistes:” 
double-entry bookkeeping.  
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and other material “in the interest of the advertising-clock” and other inventions – serves 
ironically as deferral of the anticipated success of invention but also as a deferral of outstanding 
debts; the clerk’s written performances function, therefore, not only as a pastime in the abeyance 
of financial success but, by extension, as the credit that can’t be procured through the investors 
the clerk writes to:   
Man schob den Verfalltag dieser Billetts einfach auf einen Monat hinaus, es war sogar 
riesig nett für Joseph, an den Aussteller der Akzepte schreiben zu dürfen: “Bitte, haben 
Sie noch Geduld. Die Finanzierung meiner Patente läßt nur noch kurze Zeit auf sich 
warten. Bis dahin wird es mir möglich geworden sein, die fälligen Verpflichtungen 
prompt einzulösen.” 
Er hatte mehrere solcher Briefe zu schreiben, und er freute sich über die 
Leichtigkeit, mit der er den gesamten kaufmännischen Stil beherrschte.  
 
With both funds and patents in abeyance, the proper performance demanded of the clerk 
coincides with the improper pastime of the “Fehlleistung;” performed in the interest of invention 
(the advertising-clock and the firm it represents), clerical writing opens onto a different exercise, 
a different performance: honing one’s professional skills. “Joseph wunderte sich wieder einmal 
über die Prägnanz seines Briefstiles, sowie über die Höflichkeitswendungen, die er plötzlich dem 
energischen Ton hie und da einzuflechten wußte.” 
 
Technical Performance 
 Though Leistung is used in Der Gehülfe exclusively for the performance of the clerical 
assistant, its technical valence as a metric of expended energy or machine performance would 
not have been unfamiliar to Walser. In Der Gehülfe, the narrator describes Joseph’s work on a 
brochure that contained “in hübscher Druckschrift, und mit Klischee-Abbildungen versehen, die 
genaue Beschreibung nebst Preistabelle eines kleinen Dampfapparaten, auch einer Toblerschen 
Erfindung.” Walser’s description in Der Gehülfe of the advertisement for this steam-trap device 
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corresponds to an advertisement from the technical office of Carl Dubler in Wädenswil, 
Switzerland, where Walser worked as clerical assistant in 1903. Given the likelihood that the 
same hand drafted the “Gnom” advertisement” and its literary reference in Der Gehülfe, it’s 
perhaps not a stretch to imagine Walser saw in the “Leistung” of the steam trap device, an echo 
of his employer’s performance imperative, or vice versa. The advertisement from Dubler’s office 
depicting this device known as the “Gnom,” would seem to follow the instructions given to 
Joseph Marti in Der Gehülfe: “Vor allen Dingen galt es, diesen Dampfbehälter den zahlreichen, 
in der Umgebung von Bärenswil und weiter im Land herum verstreuten Fabriken und 
mechanischen Werkstätten anzupreisen.” Certainly the ad does this work of “anpreisen,” 
celebrating the steam device as the ‘smallest and cheapest’ of its kind. Listed under the 
specifications of the device is a quantitative measurement of the device’s performance according 
to size: the steam trap device, available in eight different sizes – the smallest of which, at a width 
of 5 centimeters, could be held snugly between index finger and thumb, as a depiction shows – 
can ‘process’ up to 15,000 liters of water per hour. This sense of Leistung, typical for the 
language of technical specs (such as a computer’s performance) and notably absent from 
Walser’s literary text, 60 marks a semantic branching out of the word that participates in a 
                                                
60 On the semantic spectrum of performance in this sense see Jon Mckenzie, Perform or Else, esp. 52. 
Mackenzie’s sense of performance is quite a bit more capacious than mine: he attempts to link occupation 
and technical performance with cultural and artistic performance in a “general theory of performance” 
while avoiding any “overarching semantic” of the term. Mckenzie speaks of ‘organizational performance’ 
in the workplace, i.e. ‘perform—or else: you’re fired!’ and attributes this sense of performance not to 
older organizational models of work (Taylorist or Scientific Management) but to what he calls 
‘Performance Management’ (decentralized, post-war, ‘attune[d] to economic processes that are 
increasingly service-based, globally oriented and electronically wired, similar to Lazaretto, see discussion 
of immaterial labor below); principles of performance management are “not uniformity, conformity, and 
rationality, but diversity, innovation, and intuition” – Mckenzie speaks of the ‘ars poetica’ of 
organizational management. Mackenzie relates Cultural Performance to the vaudeville stage and locates it 
in performance studies as well, defined as ‘embodied enactment of cultural forces’ (8). Technological 
performance: “When we talk about how a car performs, or when we ask about the performance 
specifications of a computer, we are citing a sense of performance used by engineers, technicians, and 
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nineteenth-century paradigm shift to a conceptualization of human and machine performance 
alike in thermodynamic terms of energy conservation and expenditure.61 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, steam power marks one particularly pronounced instance of this paradigm 
shift. As a number of accounts suggest, James Watt’s invention of the steam engine at the end of 
the 18th century not only solidified the rise of kinetics as a science of motion but provoked 
                                                                                                                                                       
computer scientists” and: “Although performance functions as a working concept in a number of technical 
sciences and an array of manufacturing industries, although its application in the computer sciences is so 
vast that it has been institutionalized in High Performance Computing Centers, and although product 
information and marketing campaigns have placed this highly technical performance in our garages, 
kitchens, and living rooms, despite all this, technological performance has largely escaped the critical 
attention of historians and philosophers of science. Although technologies perform, very few researchers 
have asked, “What is this performance?” and “How does it function in different scientific and technical 
fields” (11). On Mckenze, see also Ngai, Our Aesthetic Experiences.  
61 Anson Rabinbach’s book The Human Motor tracks this discourse. 
Figure 2. Advertisement for Carl Dubler’s 
“Gnom” steam trap device from Robert 
Walser: Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten 
  186 
complex philosophical, scientific, and literary reflection on the relation between human and 
mechanical energy, reflections that concerned the capabilities of the human body as much as 
what moves the universe. In particular, by recasting the labor of the human body in its image, the 
steam engine allowed for a linkage between human and technological performance. Leistung 
thereby moves from ethics (fulfilling an obligation; performing a task) to physics (with Walser, 
one could now say to aesthetics/literature as well). To be sure, Walser’s brief nod to steampower 
is not meant as an invocation of this technological history, though notably in the context of this 
techonological history the small steam trap device is not a source of power, like the steam 
engine, but ultimately an “Ableiter,” a valve meant to efficiently redirect excess energy by 
discharging condensation. Like the assistant or “Gehülfe,” the steam trap serves a facilitative or 
auxiliary and not a primary or generative function. Rather than point to a coincidence of literary 
text and historical context, or document “a shift in what doing, acting, and producing mean,” as 
has been argued for Goethe’s Faust in a similar context,62 And its force does not lie in how its 
emphasis on performance and invention provides the formal or aesthetic basis for what 
discourses on human labor and production are circumscribing around 1900. Mapping the 
performance of its technological inventions onto the performance of its protagonist, Walser’s 
novel underscores the division of labor between engineer and clerk. The clerk’s Leistungen 
aligns him, as the word suggests, with the mechanical inventions it is his job to praise. As one of 
the clerk’s many mental ‘monologues’ about his performance in Der Gehülfe puts it: “Das 
Schicksal der Reklame-Uhr zum Beispiel, hat es mich wirklich auch an allen Fasern meines Ichs 
angepackt?” If human and machine become increasingly networked in Walser’s novel, this is not 
a cybernetic point but suggests instead that the realization of one cannot be separated from the 
                                                
62 The context is a shifting sense of what constitutes work and laborious activity. See Vogl, Kalkül und 
Leidenschaft, 336. 
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realization of the other.  
  Not incidentally, then, the realization of inventions and the clerk’s life in the novel 
comes to pivot on a type of performance that is figured in energetic terms and that underwrites 
human and machine performance alike. This performance principle, moreover, is articulated in 
the novel in what one could call the novel’s theory of life:63 
Du bist jetzt, Herr Angestellter [. . . ] wieder in der Villa Tobler, merke dir das, und die 
Reklame-Uhr schießt dir als ein flügelschlagender Vogel über den etwas poetisch, wie es 
scheint, veranlagten Kopf. Der weichliche Sonntag ist vorüber, und der harte, robuste 
Werktag hat dich soeben wieder angepackt [. . .] Bleibe nur ruhig der “Alte” [. . .] das wird 
weniger schaden, als wenn du dir plötzlich einreden wolltest, ein vollkommen “Neuer” zu 
werden. So von einem Tag auf den andern wird man kein Neuer [. . .] Wenn aber einen 
“das Leben vernachlässigt,” [. . .] so muß man gegen diese in der Tat unwürdige 
Vernachlässigung ankämpfen [. . . ] und nicht am heiterhellen Tag und an Abenden voll 
wehmütigen Sonnenuntergangscheines mit alten Freundinnen über das “Vergangene” 
reden. [. . .] Dagegen wird man sich seiner Pflichten zu erinnern haben, da Sonntage und 
Sonntagsausflüge zufälligerweise nicht ewig andauern, und wird müssen zugeben, daß 
diese Pflichten bislang von einem gewissen Gehülfen auch so ein wenig “vernachlässigt” 
worden sind, gerade wie das Leben es mit diesem Herrn selber bis jetzt getan hat. Und die 
“Kopflosigkeit”? Ist sie nun endgültig beseitigt worden? So schnell füllen sich Köpfe nicht 
an, das muß erarbeitet werden. Dulde du nur keine Trägheit in dir, und so wird, meint man, 
nach und nach schon etwas in deinen Kopf kommen. Die Reklame-Uhr liegt am Boden 
und jammert nach flüssigen Kapitalien. Nun also, gehe auf sie zu, stütze sie, damit sie sich 
wieder langsam, Glied für Glied, erheben und sich in der Meinung und im Urteil der 
Menschen ein für allemal befestigen kann. Eine deines Geistes, wenn du willst, würdige 
und nutzbringende Aufgabe. Sorge du nur auch dafür, daß aus dem Schützenautomaten 
bald Patronen herausfallen, zaudere nicht so lange, zieh energisch am Hebel, die Maschine, 
die von Herrn Tobler, deinem Herrn und Meister, so ingeniös erdacht und ausgeführt 
worden ist, wird sich dann schon in Bewegung setzen. Keine Gefühle jetzt. Man spaziert 
nicht immer, man leistet auch einmal etwas [. . . ] (140-141). 
 
Life’s motor is not development or change, becoming something new, but a kind of agonism: 
                                                
63 As Campe has suggested elsewhere, as a form(ation) of life that requires its own theory, novels 
frequently articulate their own theories of life. See “Form and Life in the Theory of the Novel.” Campe’s 
points about the intersection of realization/actualization and animate or vivid depiction, of enargeia and 
energeia, especially in Blackenberg’s theory of the novel and its rhetoric, might well apply to Walser’s 
scene here in which the narrator’s rhetorical attempts to vividly bring before the reader’s eyes (in a 
second-person refraction of the protagonist’s mind) the assistant’s ‘inner story’ (lively 
depiction/enargeia/pro ommaton, in Campe’s description) coincide with the charge to animate and realize 
both the inventions and life of the assistant (what Campe calls the trope of Wirklichwerden in 
Blanckenburg/energeia, becoming-real, actualization). 
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performance as a struggle against life’s indifference; realization becomes, in this context, a kind 
of energetics that is about action/doing and animation at once. Leistung will determine the 
success of this realization. The project of finding capital articulated here is, as the etymology of 
the word suggests, structurally similar to the language in which the performance imperative is 
articulated in the novel: filling one’s head, as it were, with the Leistung of working on the 
inventions. To recall, this is not a promethean foresight but an epimethean Nachdenken “in 
einem Kopf, der sich zu einem wirklich nutzbringenden und geschäftefördernden Nachdenken 
verpflichtet finden sollte” Mental “Leistung,” one could thus say, is a kind of energetic practice: 
‘pulling energetically on a lever,’ operating a machine, under the economic imperative of finding 
capital. In the Leistungsroman, the interiority of its hero, what goes on in the “head” of the 
assistant, whether “Nachdenken” or “Bedenken” stands under the sign of a material “Leistung.” 
Performance, Invention, or Realization? 
 Blumenberg’s example of the spoon-making layman, Cusa’s handyman, suggests a 
relation between performance and invention in which the modest and mechanical activity of the 
craftsman generates an immodest transvaluation of human achievement and performance; the 
transvaluative force of this example lies in the discrepancy between the lowly activity of spoon-
making and the lofty cosmological status it enables, between the humility of the layman figure 
and the pride that he claims for himself. Cusa’s layman looks, as Blumenberg suggests, not to 
nature but to the quotidian world of man-made things for his sense of place within the cosmos; 
and finds in the spoon a confirmation of his creative power, a confirmation of the genuine 
novelty of his craft insofar as the spoon embodies an idea that breaks from all previous exempla. 
While the “irony of tone” that Cusa’s illiterate layman uses vis-à-vis his superiorly-minded 
interlocutors (the rhetorician and the philoshoper) – the way in which the idiota, as Blumenberg 
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suggests, shows “no regard for the inequality in the perquisites” of the conversation – is 
something that Walser’s blissfully lowly clerks share with the Renaissance idiot, the 
craftsmanship of the clerk can make no such claim to this cosmological status. The 
“transvaluation of values” then that Blumenberg sees in Cusa’s craftsman – a point Blumenberg 
consistently makes regarding Cusa throughout his writings on technology – cannot be the same 
for the performance of Walser’s clerks, for whom performance or achievement is either 
something to be resisted, sublimated, or redirected; performance in Walser is an imperative and 
for this reason hardly a source of “Selbstbewusstsein” as it is for the spoonmaker. The 
transvaluation of Cusa’s spoonmaker depends, Blumenberg argues, on multiple factors: firstly, 
on the Leistung exceeding the realm of sheer necessity; the invention is not a solution to a 
problem, a response to a deficit in nature, or an aim to satisfy a material need but the realization 
of a novel possibility to which other concerns, such as crafting an instrument for eating, are 
secondary. Secondly, this transvaluation has linguistic prerequisites: it requires that a language 
exist in which performance can be verbalized as such. In other words, Cusa’s spoonmaker 
responds to a rhetorical problem, namely what Blumenberg refers to as an egestas verborum of 
technology and its inventors.64 Particularly for the mechanical arts this is a problem: the high-
                                                
64 Interesting in this regard is, as will be discussed below, the language used to describe the inventions in 
Der Gehülfe: the advertising clock is imagined as a bird and the ammunition vending machine is 
compared to a tree trunk. These metaphors of nature invoke a trope of invention as imitation of nature. 
While the inventions are distinctly represented as imitative, the idea that they imitate nature is misleading: 
The mechanisms and construction of Tobler’s inventions, as described in the novel, are utterly non-
organic; only their forms, perhaps, resemble natural ones (i.e. the bird-shaped clock). In his discussion of 
invention and imitation of nature, Hans Blumenberg suggests that this solves a sort of nominal problem 
for human “Leistung” by providing a metaphor through which to figure human achievement: “Der Topos 
der Nachahmung ist eine Deckung gegenüber dem Unverstandenen der menschlichen Ursprünglichkeit, 
die als metaphysische Gewaltsamkeit vermeint ist” (Blumenberg, Ästhetische und metaphorologische 
Schriften, 15). These topoi thus ‘soften’ the metaphysical blow of invention’s technicity by drawing on 
familiar schema. In essence, for Blumenberg, technology is characterized by a striking “Sprachlosigkeit.” 
This is why inventors, in contrast to poets and painters, lack a form of expression for the phenomena they 
create. For nearly four centuries, from Leonardo da Vinci via Lilienthal to the Wright brothers, for 
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degree of inventive self-characteristic of poets and fine artists, who have available to them a 
large arsenal of “categories and metaphors, reaching all the way to anecdotes . . . that allows 
them, if only negatively, to say how the creative process might now be understood,”65 is 
unavailable to those engaged in the technical arts of invention and handiwork. While Cusa’s 
spoon-maker offers a first gesture towards providing this language by distinguishing his 
“performance” from that of painters and sculptors, he will in fact have to wait for the French 
Encyclopédie before the performance of his mechanical art receives its proper recognition and 
language.66 
                                                                                                                                                       
instance, the airplane was described in ornithological terms: as an imitation of the flight of birds. But, as 
Blumenberg points out, the airplane can be called genuine invention precisely to the degree that it breaks 
from its dream of imitating the flight of birds; it’s solution to the problem of flight comes not from birds 
but from technology: the combustion engine and, more drastically, the propeller. Since nothing in nature 
rotates, as Blumenberg points out, the propeller as a rotating device is absolutely technical, “also weder 
von imitatio noch von perfectio herzuleiten.” The topos of the imitation of nature is thus, precisely in this 
regard, less a ‘genetic explanation’ than a coping mechanism used to confront the seeming illegitimacy 
that technological inventions claim for humans. Blumenberg goes so far as to “audaciously” wonder if the 
airplane is not so radically immanent to a process of technological development that the Wright brother’s 
would have flown their plane even if birds never existed. As Blumenberg suggests elsewhere, in reference 
to Marx, this technological process could be uncovered with a “Geistesgeschichte der Technik” that 
breaks with explanatory models predicated on individual human action. A critical history of technology 
would, in Marx’s words cited by Blumenberberg, show “just how little any invention of the 18th century 
belongs to a single individual.” Quoted in Blumenberg, Geistesgeschichte der Technik, 14. On the 
propeller in Blumenberg, see Müller-Sievers, “Kyklophorology;” On rotation and literature, see Müller-
Sievers, The Cylinder. 
65 Blumenberg, “Methodologische Probleme einer Geistesgeschichte der Technik” in Schriften zur 
Technik.  
66 As Blumenberg notes, the Encyclopédie is the moment when the mechanical arts are reevaluated and 
rehabilitated, “out of a sphere of mute mechanisms and techniques,” the encyclopedia generates “a 
potential component of a new intellectual world” – Goethe ridicules the encyclopedia’s fetishism of the 
world of things and craftsmanship in Dichtung und Wahrheit: he describes the experience of reading the 
encyclopedia as such: “it’s as if one were going between the innumerable moving spools and looms in a 
great factory, and with all that rasping and rattling, with all those mechanisms that confuse the eye and the 
senses, with all that incomprehensibility of a shop in which things converge in manifold ways [vor lauter 
Unbegreiflichkeit einer auf das Mannigfaltigste ineinander greifenden Anstalt], observing all that goes 
into producing a piece of cloth, one starts to feel disgusted by the coat on one’s own back.” Quoted in 
Blumenberg. Foucault, in fact, mentions the encyclopedia as evidence for the connection between 
analyses of representations and signs and the analysis of wealth that underwrites his larger argument 
about the classical episteme – the encyclopedia links language and economy. The physiocrat Quesnay, 
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 Walser’s Leistungsroman might be read as responding to both of these aspects. For the 
questions it poses in narrative form are the following: can performance become a form of life sui 
generis and what is the proper language for performance.  As will be shown, the two questions 
are intricately entwined in Walser’s novel and indeed it could be said that the metapoetology of 
Walser’s novel is the entwinement of these two questions.  
 Walser’s clerks also look to the world of things, to the material world of the workplace, 
to their feathers and pens, for their sense of position in the world, but these things more 
frequently serve to disturb or distress the performance of the clerk and, as will be discussed later, 
often question the security of the clerk’s position; the inventiveness of the clerk, to the extent 
they can make claim to any invention at all, is always already not their own even when the clerk 
serves as exemplum for the poet and scholar. This is what separates clerk from 
engineer/inventor. Walser’s numerous reflections on the modest handiwork of writing are 
tempered by the melancholic realization that this craft might never become the writer’s own, that 
it might remain nothing more than a drudging, mechanic kind of work, or amount to something 
entirely useless (In Das letzte Prosastück, which connects writing to craftsmanship, Walser’s 
narrator exclaims: “For ten years I continuously wrote small prose pieces that seldom proved to 
be useful”). Walser’s Leistungsroman thus figures a different version of reification than does 
Cusa’s layman. Reification in the Leistungsroman is not that of homo faber, which, as Hannah 
Arendt suggests, consists in adding a durable thing to the world of human artifice,67 but a 
reification that reduces the clerk to the material environment in which he works. Helbing voices 
this fear quite literally: “Wenn ich im Bureau stehe, werden meine Glieder langsam zu Holz, das 
                                                                                                                                                       
Foucault notes, wrote the article on ‘Évidence’ and the economist Turgot wrote the article on etymology. 
See Foucault, The Order of Things. 
67 See the chapter on work in Arendt, The Human Condition. 
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man wünscht, anzünden zu können, damit es verbrenne: Pult und Mensch werden Eins mit der 
Zeit.”68 
 But the reification that unfolds on the level of content in Walser’s Leistungsroman is not, 
at least not primarily, a lament about or critique of the alienated conditions of the contemporary 
writer forced to invent under strict performance demands. Nor does it gesture towards a solution 
through a Hegelian resuscitation of the “self-confidence” that issues, as Blumenberg suggests, in 
“no historically self-evident” way from the achievement of Cusa’s craftsman. The image of the 
reified clerk is the Leistungsroman’s trope and poetology at once: insofar as this trope organizes 
writing as a mode of “Leistung,” the work of art will have to run its path through the mechanical, 
non-liberal art of performance (the trope thus offers a different notion of work); and the crux of 
the novel will become the unfolding realization of the clerk’s performances (the form-giving task 
of the novel will turn to the reification of the clerk’s life as performance or misperformance). In 
Der Gehülfe, then, the clerk’s reflections in his numerous soliloquies (“Selbstgespräche”) on 
performance can be read as articulations of this poetology: “Is it something real and substantial, 
                                                
68 Groves makes Helbing’s ergonomics into the subject of his essay on furniture in Walser, calling it 
“possibly the only instance where the writer and the desk perfectly conform to each other – the only 
fulfillment of ergonomic principles in his [Walser’s] novels.” “Unbecoming Furniture,” 3. Groves writes 
of this passage: “In (the) light of this conflagration of writer and desk, Walser draws attention to the 
position and posture that furniture imposes on the writer” (4). But the trope of incineration might point to 
a different context as well. In a short prose text titled “Asche, Nadel, Bleistift und Zündholzchen” (1915), 
which in a speculative reflection on the value and utility of everyday material objects that would 
otherwise seem worthless, links the poet’s pencil with ash and a book of matches, Walser describes how 
the lighting of a match constitutes the greatest event in the match’s life, “das, wo es seinen Daseinszweck 
erfüllt und seinen Liebesdienst erweist, den Feuertod sterben muß” (323). The simultaneous destruction 
and realization of the match’s purpose in the act of lighting is part of a greater dialectic, as Walser’s text 
suggests: “Streichhölzchen muß elendiglich verbrennen, jämmerlich zugrunde gehen, wo es seinen 
lieblichen Nutzen dartut, wo es erwacht aus der Trägheit, Untätigkeit und Nutzlosigkeit, wo es zeigt, was 
es wert ist, wo es im Eifer erglüht, zu dienen und seine Pflicht und Schuldigkeit zu tun . . . Seine 
Lebensfreude ist sein Tod und sein Erwachen auch schon sein Ende. Wo es liebt und dient, stürzt es auch 
schon entseelt zusammen” (323). This dialectic could be applied to the writer-turned-wood in Walser’s 
work as well: The writer might not necessarily strive to unbecome furniture, as Groves sees it, but, as 
subject to a performance imperative that demands the writer, like the match, awaken from ‘sluggishness, 
inaction, and uselessness,’ the alienated and reified writer-turned-desk who desires to ignite himself faces 
a similar paradoxical consummation/destruction. 
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that I’m able to offer . . . what kind of services have I performed to this day for Mr. Tobler?” The 
question of the clerk as service provider – the performance question – is in fact a poetological 
one. Real is the operative word here. For providing something real is not only the crux of the 
performance principle for the clerk who wonders whether what he performs is anything 
substantial at all and whether this performance will qualify him as something real; this notion of 
real is moreover tied to the novel’s notion of invention as a “Realisierung.” To recall, the realism 
of the novel, Walser writes, lies precisely in how nothing is invented. 
 The logic of the technical inventions, by contrast, lies precisely in how they are 
“ingeniously contrived and executed” (“ingeniös erdacht und ausgeführt,” my emphasis). These 
inventions, designed more to “enrapture” and “dazzle” than change the world, are not products of 
inspiration and have little to do with a moment of Eureka! Indeed, the ideas behind them are “not 
exactly new” but instead “honed and refined, and cleverly transferred to a quite different realm 
of life.” The advertising clock and the ammunition vending machine are remarkable not for the 
degree to which they solve a problem or respond to necessity – the conventional trope of 
invention – but in their effect as “extremely attractive” or “decorative,” and the extent to which 
they combine ornament with utility. The advertising clock is a ‘delicately painted’ clock to be 
hung in train stations, restaurants, hotels, etc. that allows travelers and passer-byers to know the 
time and set their own watches accordingly while offering various “fields” in which ‘top firms’ 
can pay to place their advertisements; the ammunition vending machine is a “practical and 
simple” device that works “resplendently” (“glänzend,” which is also used to describe Tobler’s 
“Unternhemen” in a brochure) with its inner construction of “three reciprocally operating levers” 
and hopefully makes bullets as available as chocolate: “ein Ding, ähnlich den 
Schokoladenautomaten, die die reisenden Menschen auf Bahnhöfen und in allerlei öffentlichen 
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Lokalen antreffen, nur entsprang dem Schützenautomaten nicht eine Platte Süßigkeit, 
Pfefferminz oder dergleichen, sondern ein Paket scharfer Patronen.” The technical inventions of 
the novel thus dazzle precisely for the marginal but elegant work they do in refining, honing, and 
transferring ideas: turning chocolate to bullets, timekeeping to advertising. In this regard, 
Tobler’s inventions are less the product of a promethean ‘fore-thought,’ an act of radical 
invention, than an epimethean after-thought, a “nützliche[s], geschäftefördernde[s] Nachdenken” 
that realizes ideas belatedly, one could say. This “Nachdenken” parts ways with a sense of 
invention as creation out of nothing to operate instead, like the firm’s accounting books, as an act 
of “Zusammenstellung:” a putting together that is not “Erfindung” in the sense of genius 
invention but in the older (pre-1800) sense of inventio, the rhetorical canon that marks the search 
for topoi; and as such a matter of finding the proper “Aufstellung” for a pre-existing technical 
idea.  
 If Tobler’s invention lies in the extent to which it transposes an older idea (automated 
vending or mechanical timekeeping) to a different ‘area of life’, then the highest measure of an 
invention’s success is to be found in its sheer ubiquity: “Die Reklame-Uhr kann übrigens beinahe 
überall im In- und Ausland Aufstellung finden.” In this, the rhetorical, sense of invention, it 
becomes possible to understand the novel’s logic of invention – carrying over (“übertragen”) an 
idea to another “area of life” – in a figurative way as well. The relation then between the 
invention and its preceding idea, the “Schützenautomat” to automated vending for instance, is 
one of metaphor: the ammunition vending machine as a material(ized) figure of automated 
commerce.  
 It is precisely as a metaphor of commerce that the “Leistung” of the “not exactly new” 
inventions can be seen: they figure an entrepreneurial fantasy of self-financing. Insofar as both 
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the advertising-clock and the ammunition vending machine enjoy the “advantage” that they can 
be linked with “Reklamewesen” through the advertising “fields” they offer for rent, they are 
designed to “brilliantly” generate a profit that would finance their own “costs of fabrication.” 
The technical inventions, qua advertising, pay for themselves; and, as Joseph imagines in a scene 
of “Nachdenken” so intense it leads to an actual ‘soliloquy’ (“mit sich selbst zu reden”), if the 
success of the advertisements might exceed the costs of production and lead to a “schönen 
Haufen Geld” (one notices here the ‘alchemistic’ move again: frozen assets via ‘liquid money’ 
back to a solid heap). In other words, the “advertising” function of the inventions realizes, as 
embodied metaphor, the economic imperative to make money liquid in a circulation of 
“Kapitalien” back to their source, a cycle not unlike the rotating mechanism in the ammunition 
vending machine which ensures that with each dispensing of a pack of cartridges an “erneute 
Reklame umittelbar und exact an die kreisrunde Öffnung [schiebt] . . . indem sich der 
Papierreifen stückweis umdrehte.” The “inner construction” of the automated vending machine, 
carried over from that of the chocolate vending machine, finally becomes a metaphor of 
commerce as well: imagining commercial transactions as a synchronized play of levers (“sich 
gegenseitig bediendenen Hebeln”) that, once activated by the human hand, ends in an “elegant” 
delivery of a good. With self-financing inventions, liquid capital becomes as “easy to reach” and 
“easy to grasp” (“bequem zu befassen”) as the lever and grip of the “Schützenautomat.” Except 
that for Tobler it doesn’t: if the inventions are meant to operate as self-financing advertising-
machines, they cannot self-advertise and the efforts of Tobler and his assistant to draft and print 
advertisements soliciting “connections to capitalists” or praising Tobler’s enterprise 
(“Glänzendes Unternehmen,” “Höchster Gewinn bei absoluter Risikolosigkeit”) fail with the 
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realization of the inventions.69 
 The engineer and assistant define invention in terms of realization in very different ways. 
As the engineer exclaims in an extended speech on invention: “Die Ideen müssen sich 
verwirklichen.” The kind of realization imagined by the engineer and his assistant is not a 
Platonic doctrine of ideas nor does it suggest realization as the actualization of what is potential 
or possible. Rather, for both clerk and engineer realization is an economic matter:70 if eidectic 
realization seems to suggest for the engineer an autonomous dynamic of the ideas themselves, 
expressed in a language that locates the agency of realization in the ideas themselves (the ideas 
“must realize themselves,” they “aspire” to embodiment, the idea and “not [the inventor]” “wants 
to achieve something [etwas erreichen] . . . to reach everything,” “An idea perishes or it 
                                                
69 Here, a certain connection between advertisement and sham (Schein) emerges. See, for instance, Defoe 
on projects:” “A mere projector, then, is a contemptible thing, driven by his own desperate fortune to such 
a strait that he must be delivered by a miracle, or starve; and when he has beat his brains for some such 
miracle in vain, he finds no remedy but to paint up some bauble or other, as players make puppets talk 
big, to show like a strange thing, and then cry it up for a new invention, gets a patent for it, divides it into 
shares, and they must be sold [. . .] But the honest projector is he who, having by fair and plain principles 
of sense, honesty, and ingenuity brought any contrivance to a suitable perfection, makes out what he 
pretends to, picks nobody’s pocket, puts his project in execution, and contents himself with the real 
produce as the profit of his invention.” Defoe’s distinction between the “mere” and the “honest” projector 
differentiates between the ‘false’ novelty of the bauble, an ostentatious ornament or trinket, and the 
invention of ‘honest’ projectors who contribute to the “public advantage” through improvement. With his 
ornamental and marginally useful inventions that aim to generate liquid money, Tobler would seem to 
belong amongst Defoe’s swindling “mere projectors.” Because he fails, Tobler would seem to remain a 
mere projector. As Krajewski points out, when projects becomes “glänzende Leistung,” “gelobte 
Erfindung,” or “funktionierendes Geschäft” they are no longer projects but products. See Krajewski, 
Projektemacher, 23.  
70 Vogl especially will argue that invention in the novel is for Leibniz also an economic matter – but 
economic in how it grapples with the problem of contingency and teleological order. The quite different 
sense of economic suggested by realization in Walser’s novel, which is always tied to locating “capital,” 
might in fact also find resonance in Leibniz, who, as Blumenberg notes, drafted a plan in 1675 for an 
exhibition of new inventions, curiosities, and oddities, natural and technological alike. Blumenberg 
quotes Leibniz to show how a path is paved in the way technological performance and invention is 
understood from the “demonstration of the nevertheless-possible to the socially-acceptable market for 
‘brilliant novelties’ [geistvollen Neuerungen].” This catalogue of human-made devices replaces the 
curiosity cabinet by offering not only a show of intellectual achievement and, quoting Leibniz, “beautiful 
prospects,” but also the opportunity to “get publicity” for one’s invention and “make a profit,” “A general 
market for inventions would emerge,” writes Leibniz. See Blumenberg, “Methodologische Probleme.”  
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triumphs”), this dynamic ultimately proves to be the performance of enterprise itself. The logic 
of necessity that subtends the engineer’s notion of (self-)realizing ideas ultimately amounts to 
kind of entelechy of the firm. Ideas, in other words, are like the entrepreneur, who is “obliged to 
risk everything” and the clerk who wants to perform something substantial: they become real, or 
solvent, through their “Leistung.” This is, in turn, what links the role of the entrepreneur in 
invention to the self-realizing agency of the ideas. As the engineer reasons in his ‘last-stand’ 
speech on invention, “An invention is work, but it is not a risk – a mere noble thought rattles the 
edifice of the world not in the slightest. Ideas must be put into practice, thoughts aspire to be 
embodied.” Invention happens, therefore, not simply because an idea is so forceful that it must 
find actualization; it requires furthermore an entrepreneurial body (the arm and leg of the 
“Unternehmer”) and spirit (the daring “Wagnis”). The idea behind an invention is, like the risk 
or venture of the enterpriser, nothing without the practice of the entrepreneur, who becomes, as it 
were, agent and executor of the idea.71 A risk or venture [“Wagnis”] must be brought out of the 
                                                
71 Der Gehülfe, one could argue, not only constitutes a novel of the clerk but includes as a subnovel the 
story of the entrepreneur or “Unternehmer,” a figure that is, as Walser’s engineer-entrepreneur exclaims, 
“obligated to risk not just something but everything.” Only a few years after Walser’s novel, economist 
Werner Sombart will draft a “Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen” titled Der 
Bourgeois (1913) in which he attempts to define the entrepreneurial spirit of the contemporary bourgeois. 
Participating in the discourse that constitutes a proper science of management or Betriebswirstschaftslehre 
at the time, Sombart will make central to the entrepreneurial spirit the organizational talent of the 
entrepreneur to “assess/judge people according to their performance capacities” [Menschen auf ihre 
Leistungsfähigkeit hin zu beurteilen”], to employ the right people in the right positions in order to achieve 
a “maximum of performance,” and to “drive” [anzutreiben] them in such a way as to “really actualize the 
highest degree of activity possible with regards to their performance capacity” (71) – most crassly: “the 
director of any enterprise achieves their results [vollbringen ihre Leistungen] ultimately through the 
application of extreme methods of force” (121). A major part of Sombart’s book, one could say, is a tacit 
account of how this “Leistung” becomes a dominant social/economic value in the early 20th century. For 
Sombart, it is tied to a culture of success which results from “comparing two phenomena with one 
another, in order to measure them against each other and to attribute the higher value to the one that is 
larger/greater;” “over time,” writes Sombart, when one of the phenomena becomes greater, this is “what 
we call having success.” Having success “always means getting ahead of others, becoming more, 
achieving more [mehr leisten], having more than others,” in short, writes Sombart, the same “moment of 
infinity” that characterizes “Erwerbsstreben.” Perhaps not incidentally, in his account of the modern 
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“attic, laboratory, the notepad, the drawing board” and into the “light of the world” by the 
entrepreneur if it is to become more than a “mere, luxurious daydream,” just as the idea requires 
the arm and leg of the entrepreneur to “gain a foothold” in the world.72 Invention is the venture 
of an entrepreneurial realization of ideas that depends on the material performance of the 
entrepreneur. As the clerk says of his relation to the inventions: “Was mich selber betrifft, so 
glaube ich fest an die Möglichkeit einer Realisierung derselben, und ich glaube deshalb daran, 
weil es meine Pflicht ist, weil ich dafür bezahlt werde.” This difference is everything: while the 
engineer highlights the necessity of realization, attributing such necessity to the agency of ideas, 
the clerk believes in the realization of the inventions because it falls under his job description, 
that is, the Leistungs-imperative. 
 Walser’s Leistungs-theory of invention does not root invention in the persona of the 
inventor, just as little as it attributes invention to the autodynamic of technological development 
itself. Instead, it defines invention as the work of Leistung itself, which is always marginal and 
relational vis-à-vis what precedes it. Premised less on fulfilling a social function or satisfying a 
need (invention as the mother of necessity), invention in Der Gehülfe is not the production of 
novelty but the achievement/performance of refining and transferring an idea from one sphere to 
another. As the narrator comments on the Marksmen’s Vending Machine, “the idea itself, then, 
                                                                                                                                                       
business man, Sombart most clearly sees the “shift in values” and “change in soul” that characterizes this 
bourgeois spirit not in business but in sports where the main question is “who achieves the highest 
performance” [wer vollbringt die meßbar höchste Leistung”] (224). Performance is, to summarize 
Sombart, a key metric of economic and social competition in the era of bourgeois man. See also Moretti, 
The Bourgeois, n. 32, 35. In the Franco- and Anglo-Saxon contexts, the term entrepreneur in a business or 
economic context is an invention of the 19th century. Prior to the importation of the word in English-
language economics, British writers refer to this figure that undertakes risky ventures as a projector (See 
Defoe, Krajewski, Projektemacher). In France, entrepreneur has military, political, legal, and economic 
usages. See “Entrepreneur” in Dictionary of Untranslatables. The English term “undertaker” is a cognate 
of the German ‘Unternehmer,’ which eventually becomes primarily confined to mortuary work.  
72 On the venture in literature see Literatur als Wagnis/Literature as a Risk: DFG-Symposium 2011, 
Monika Schmitt-Emans (ed.).  
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was not entirely new: it was a concept that had been honed and refined [eine verfeinerte und 
verschärfte], and cleverly translated to a different realm of life [auf ein anderes Lebensgebiet 
geschickt übertragene].” This notion of honing and refining what isn’t exactly new marks the 
point of intersection in the novel between technological and literary invention; it marks the 
meeting point of a contemporary notion of genius, tied up with the mythical figure of the 
inventor as scientist or engineer,73 with an older notion of genius that located the genius’ 
production of novelty, the genius invention or “Erfindung” in the aesthetic [and earlier in the 
aesthetic’s imitation of nature]74 – and abandons both. 
Walser’s Preis-Leistungsverhältnis 
A brief look at a short story published by Walser almost 20 years later that also makes reference 
to the eponymous assistant of Walser’s earlier novel gives a sense of the tangled relationship 
between writing and economy in Walser’s work. “Der Goldfabrikant und sein Gehilfe” tells of a 
gold producer named Ortografikus, who together with his assistant Angelus or Gehilfikus, is in 
                                                
73 For an analysis of the modern myth of genius, Einstein, see Barthes, “The Brain of Einstein” in 
Mythologies. With Einstein, genius seems to shift from invention to discovery, without shedding the 
characterisitic of originality; with this shift invention does become a tweaking or honing more than a 
production of novelty, and depends very much on the performance/achievement/merit of the genius. On 
Einstein, see also note 31 in this chapter.  
74 Kant’s Third Critique offers, of course, a definite of aesthetic genius in terms of exemplary originality 
as a figure that creates “that for which no determinate rule can be given.” Kant restricts genius to art and 
explicitly rules out the possibility that the scientific or technological inventor could be called genius 
because this type of inventor still relies on, rather than gives, rules: “But even if one thinks or writes for 
himself, and does not merely take up what others have thought, indeed even if he invents a great deal for 
art and science, this is still not a proper reason for calling such a great mind . . . a genius, since just this 
sort of thing could also have been learned.” Kant then proceeds to take down one of the earliest modern 
myths of genius, Newton, by separating Newton’s work from fine art proper: “Thus everything that 
Newton expounded in his immortal work on the principles of natural philosophy . . . can still be learned; 
but one cannot learn to write inspired poetry.” In an earlier account of the production of novelty in 
literature, Breitinger – notably in precisely the same vocabulary as Walser’s novel despite the 150-year 
distance – explicitly rules out the idea that invention could ever just be what Walser’s narrator calls the 
engineer’s invention, namely ‘clever translation.’ Breitinger: “ . . . one [does not] need to believe that 
man’s industry/diligence, thirsty and eager for the new, has after many centuries already contrived and 
invented everything that can be said, so that nothing remains for us but the glory of being a clever 
translator.”   
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the business of creating gold which enables him to live in “unsäglichstem Überfluss” (300) by 
delivering two tons of gold a day to the Reichsbank. The details of this process are different than 
one might expect:  
“Die Sache ging so vor sich: der Goldhersteller sandte das kostbare Material, in Kisten 
verpackt, dem überausgeschickten, willfährigen Kommis zu, der das Zeug auspackte, es 
in einem hierfür tauglichen Offen umschmolz, und die Ware banklich verwertete” (299). 
Conspicuously missing here, as at least one commentator has pointed out, is any mention of the 
fabrication of gold in the first place – the description begins with the transport of the material 
and foregrounds the activities and character of the clerk. More puzzling is the fact that the 
alchemy the text cites is reversed: instead of the transubstantiation and valorization of base to 
precious metals, the assistant re-melts the gold which is then valorized as a “Ware” at a bank. 
Later, after Ortografikus’ excessive gold fabrication upsets the “Volkswirtschaft,” the narrator 
reports “Der Chef scheffelte fort und fort aus dem Nichts Gold heraus, das Verfahren muß ganz 
zauberhaft gewesen sein” (300) – the magic of this act is its absence in the text: referred to only 
cathecrestically or in the subjunctive: in the words of Ortografikus’ daughter, his gold fabrication 
is the “Schreiben seiner Prosastücke.”75  What Walser’s text represses with this cathecresis is an 
                                                
75 When the “väterliche Unterstützung” is delivered to Ortografikus’ daughter by the assistant, the 
daughter cryptically remarks: “Nehmen Sie sie nur wieder, tragen Sie sie zu ihm hin, der sich meinen 
Vater nennt, es aber nicht ist, da er mich beim Schreiben seiner Prosastücke total vergißt, unil sagen Sie 
ihm, es sei mir um sein Antlitz, um seine Person, nicht um sein Geld zu tun.” Many commentators see 
this as a reference to Ortografikus’ ‘Goldherstellerberuf’ and thus as a metapoetological analogy of 
writing prose and creating gold. Walsers kleine Erzählung verwirrt und verdoppelt die Logiken des 
monetären Diskurses – und die verknüpft diesen im zweiten Teil mit einem Diskurs über das Schreiben, 
in dem allerdings die Dimension der Ursprünglichkeit ebenso ausgblendet wird wie im Prozeß der 
Goldherstellung. Mit dem literarischen Text teilt das fabrizierte Gold das Schweigen um die Umstände 
seiner Produziertheit. Genau in ihrer Verschwiegenheit aber werden diese zum Problem” (Kammer, 213); 
‘Walser’s text might be read as an ironic allegory of the neo-Romantic image of the poet in the early 20th 
century, which exposes a fantasy of the poet-author as an ascetic producer of texts whose value is 
removed from the economy of signs – a phantasy of originary value-production (in the name of….) as 
dubious scorcery’ (Kammer). Kammer reads it as a “kleine Geschichte literarischer Ökonomie” that is 
more than a poetological reflection on authorship and property: “Sie setzt,” Kammer writes, “die 
zeitgenössischen Verhältnisse, in denen Literatur immer schon Ware ist, voraus und umschreibt in 
‘humoristischer’ Überbietungslogik die Folgen, die sich daraus für die Produktion ästhetischer Texte 
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Ur-Schreibszene – a scene of writing tied to a notion of sovereign authorship and its 
accompanying imperatives of inspiration, originality, and genius – the alchemy of writing gold. 
Very obviously, Walser’s gold producer Orthografikus is a personified figure of the disciplining 
conventions of proper writing, orthography, that haunt Walser’s texts since his early collection of 
the schoolboy Fritz Kocher’s essays up to the “Goldfabrikant” text, originally written as one of 
Walser’s microscripts that are not orthographic and indeed first condemned as a 
“selbsterfundene, nicht entzifferbare Geheimschrift.” In the “Goldfabrikant,” orthography is 
aligned with the improper art of a magical if excessive fabrication of gold (the way in which this 
act perturbs the “Volkwirtschaft” in Walser’s text invokes a long history of improper and proper 
economies since Aristotle’s condemnation of usury as an unnatural chrematistics) and cast as a 
truly ‘selbsterfundenes Geheimschreiben’ one could say. The act of invention, or “Erfindung” - 
‘the hidden abode of production’ – is replaced by a repackaging and transport, a “Verwertung.” 
The second part of the story elucidates this logic of writing and value when it turns its attention 
to “etwas  . . .Wertloses” – namely, the figure of Ortografikus’ neglected daughter Hulda. Hulda 
runs her own business, a “Schreibmaschinerie” or copyist’s office of the type mentioned by 
Kittler at the beginning of his chapter on the typewriter and whose predecessor is featured in 
Melville’s Bartelby. The clerk or Kommis, technically adept at “Verwertung” is the appropriate 
mediator between the father’s scene of fabrication and the copyist’s scene of transcription, 
between father and daughter, just as he mediates between gold fabricator and bank. Ortografikus’ 
assistant visits Hulda on two occasions: once to deliver a meager monthly financial support from 
her father, which she rejects and a second visit when Angelus seeks her services as a copyist to 
                                                                                                                                                       
ergeben” (Kammer, 216); Christian Walt reads the text as a cryptic-hidden review of Max Brod’s Leben 
mit einer Göttin and sees a number of intertextual overlaps; for Walt the text is ultimately a Delezuean 
rhizome. 
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mechanically transcribe, “abmaschineln,” a novel that is itself a copy or “Abschrift” Angelus 
plans to disseminate in various newspapers. Just as the assistant’s second visit (seeking copying 
services as literary recycler) comes to overshadow the first (delivering money under the auspices 
of Ortografikus), so too do the modes of literature invoked in the second – copying, plagiarizing, 
reproducing, and disseminating texts – come to replace the creation ex nihilo of the first. When 
asked what sort of texts Angelus needs type-copied, the assistant replies “Es ist ein Roman, der 
sehr modern ist, worin doch auch wieder nichts Neues erzählt wird. Nur die Art und Weise des 
Erzählens ist neu, und doch haftet auch diesem etwas Hergebrachtes an.” This sentence 
condenses the spectrum of literary industry at stake in this short text and brings to the fore the 
questions of authorship and copyright (Urheber-recht) it contains: the move from an older 
alchemistic trope of fabricating literature as gold (with the magician Urheber-author) out of 
nothing (complete poesis) to a different alchemy of “remelting” and “verwerten” (in the sense of 
re-using or exploiting but also valorizing), (the language of copyright should be clear by now); 
and then a shift to modern media-technologies of the mechanized copying of copies. By folding 
the ‘shoveling-forth’ ex nihilo into a reproduction of the already-existing (in the alchemistic 
trope even original founding is already a counterfeiting) the text makes clear: even the new is 
‘hergebracht,’ conventional, old.76   
The point here is not about bricolage, which as Derrida has famously noted, constitutes 
every discourse as a tinkering with materials ready at hand. To be sure, Walser’s Leistungsroman 
also attests to “the necessity of borrowing one’s concepts from the text of a heritage which is 
more or less coherent or ruined” and also highlights the relation between a compiling assistant 
                                                
76 Benjamin, in a slightly different context, picks up on the logic of writing at stake here: “Alles scheint 
ihm verloren, ein Wortschwall bricht aus, in dem jeder Satz nur die Aufgabe hat, den vorigen vergessen 
zu machen.” Benjamin, “Robert Walser,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, bk. 1, 324-328.  
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and an engineer-author of a total text, the “absolute origin” the creator ‘out of nothing,’ as 
Derrida writes. But Walser’s Leistungsroman aims not at upsetting the antropo-theological 
discourse of text production but instead at reorienting the Preis-Leistungsverhältnis of literature, 
its value.  
Walser knew the economy of invention, the economy of the Leistungsroman, was tricky. 
As Carl Seelig reports, Walser claims to have composed Der Gehülfe in six weeks for a novel 
competition. With nothing coming to mind, Walser claims he decided to write about his position 
as an assistant to an engineer-inventor (who really did go bankrupt and really did patent an 
advertising-clock and other inventions). When upon submitting the novel Walser was asked to 
name his price, he suggested an honorarium of 8000 Mark. The novel was returned without any 
further comment two days later. The honorarium was laughably high, the director of the 
publisher later responded. “Ich brauchte fast nichts zu erfinden,” Walser wrote of Der Gehülfe; 
“Das Leben hat es für mich besorgt.” More than a citation of the novel’s source in life – which 
would become a cornerstone of Lukács theory of the novel a decade later – Walser’s comment 
together with his story about the rejected honorarium suggests a glaring discrepancy in Preis-
Leistungs-Verhältnis (lots of reward for little work). Or maybe it suggests an entirely different 
economy to the Leistungsroman; one in which, like Max Brod notes in his essay on Walser, the 
invention of prose is always inadequately remunerated.77 If Walser frequently imagines his prose 
as a kind of handwork (“[ich bin] eine Art handwerklicher Romancier . . . [ich] schneidere, 
schustere, schmiede, hobble, klopfe, hämmere oder nagle . . . Zeilen zusammen, deren Inhalt 
man sogleich versteht”), the concept of invention that underwrites it is one that aspires to a very 
different sense of Leistung, one that gains its contours in needing to invent almost nothing. The 
                                                
77 “Es ist wirklich unmöglich, diesen Dichter nach Gebühr zu loben” (78). Max Brod, “Kommentar zu 
Robert Walser” in Über Robert Walser, ed. Katharina Kerr. 
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danger and virtue of the margin this “almost” circumscribes is that the public will find one’s 
work, to quote one of Walser’s reviewers, “kotzlangweilig.”78 The Leistungsroman nevertheless 
places a wager on a kind of minimal literature, a literature in which (almost) nothing is invented. 
Unlike the novel of disillusionment, which for Lukács escapes the double bind of the novel’s 
formal dissonance, the Leistungsroman has no irony left to leverage. Its play is repeatedly 
captured again, anew, by the demand, “etwas zu leisten.” 
 
                                                
78 Attributed to Max Liebermann, See Wanderungen mit Robert Walser, 50. 
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CONCLUSION 
Geld oder Leben:  
Value and the Human Sciences 
 
 
“Kunstwerke ziehen Kredit auf eine Praxis, die noch nicht begonnen hat und von der keiner zu 
sagen wüßte, ob sie ihren Wechsel honoriert” 
Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie 
 
 
In its analysis of value forms in prose works from 1836 to 1905 – superfluousness and 
need in Tieck, credit and debt in Keller, and Leistung and invention in Walser – this study has 
attempted to show how economic problems of value bear complex implications for literary form, 
motivating the filtering of narrative information as necessary or superfluous, the concatenation of 
events and generation of plot out of structures of obligation and quid-pro-quo, or the forms of 
literary action which life takes in the modern novel. In this way, this dissertation has argued, 
literature addresses the problem of its own value as commodity, as work, and as art. Through the 
lens of the distinct and specific forms of value conjured in the literary texts in this study a 
relation between the economic and the literary comes into view that begins on the level of motif 
(for instance the promissory note in Keller, the written advertisement in Walser, or the pawned 
literary text in Tieck) and extends to the deeper structure and form of the literary text.1 Pointing 
to the ways in which the economic motivates the literary text in the case of Tieck, Keller, and 
Walser, this study has suggested that the relation between the economic and the literary is neither 
chiefly epistemological nor chiefly tropological or semiological but what one might call practical 
or functional; it is rooted both in literary technique or Verfahren and in literature’s relation to the 
lifeworld, in the specific struggle for meaning and validity – for Gültigkeit – that characterizes 
                                                
1 On the hermeneutic problems the motif presents for relating object and representation or thing and 
structure in the literary text see Eva Geulen, Worthörig wider Willen, 36-42.  
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the problem of value more largely. In this sense, then, the relation between the economic and the 
literary is poetic: it concerns the production of meaning. To recall Blumenberg’s interpretation of 
the relation between meaning and value posited by Simmel in the latter’s Philosophie des 
Geldes: value can be understood as a “funktionale Spezifikation von Bedeutsamkeit, die auf die 
Objektivierung des Vergleichs und damit der Tauschbarkeit tendiert, ohne je das subjektive 
Moment ganz preiszugeben, das im ‘empfundenen’ Wert des Begehrten steckt.”2 In a certain 
sense, the poetics of the texts discussed here each put this theory to the test, probing the degree to 
which a subjective basis of meaning can hold up against what looks to be an objective law of 
(capitalist) value, an imperative to exchangeability and commensurability. Can the subjective 
“Habitus” of the poor tailor in Keller’s Kleider machen Leute be exchanged for the good life? Is 
the clerk’s strange desire to perform well or provide adequate service in Walser’s 
Leistungsroman a sign of subjugation to a metrics of merit, achievement, and job performance, 
imposed from without, or the basis for a different value system altogether? 
Tieck’s novella, to give a further example, frames its poetics – a dramatic confrontation 
between poetic fantasy and prosaic reality played out in narrative form – as a dispute regarding 
the proper “Verbrauch” of rented property (Des Lebens Überfluss, 239). The poetic problem is 
thereby transposed onto the political economic one in a manner that raises the following 
questions: can the protagonist’s subjective evaluation of what is necessary and superfluous claim 
validity against a law of value codified by the property relation? Who or what institution 
determines the thrifty or luxurious “consumption” of rented property? And does the legal 
codification of this use efface the protagonist’s subjective projection or attribution of value onto 
the staircase? These political economic questions become actual problems of meaning-making 
                                                
2 Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, 87. 
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when the “Verbrauch” of the staircase is turned into the crux of novella’s poetics: it marks not 
only the protagonist’s rejection of the prose of the world (and his response to the prose texts he 
reads: Robinson Crusoe, Siebenkäs, Chaucer, Don Quixote) but also constitutes the act which, 
“schlimmer als Einbruch,” violates the bourgeois prosaic order and in its frivolity and Überfluss 
provides the novelistic event – the police, I recall, call the “Verbrauch” of the stairs “über die 
Beispiele” – worthy of a kind of prosaic literature: “Das wird in der Stadtchronik kommen,” one 
officer remarks (242, 244). Meaning – Bedeutsamkeit – and political economy are intricately 
intertwined in Tieck – as in Keller and Walser – around a problem of value rooted in life.  
In specific ways, therefore, each of the authors addressed in this study grapple with the 
problem of life and value, of life and Bedeutsamkeit, in the literary text. Value, it seems, surfaces 
in these literary texts when the political economy of prosaic life is at stake (not coincidentally the 
problem of value takes the form of a social relation between tenant and landlord, creditor and 
debtor, employer and employee in these texts). In this regard, the texts analyzed here anticipate 
and extend beyond the role that value will come to occupy in constellation with the term life in 
the human sciences as they emerge as a cohesive field in the course of the nineteenth and 
especially by the middle of the twentieth century.  
It would be difficult to underestimate the centrality of value in the emergence of the 
human sciences around 1900. Frederick Beiser, in a history of German philosophy from 1840 to 
1900, names the “question of the value of life” the “major problem of German Philosophy in the 
second half of the nineteenth century,”3 one first raised in the context of Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism or Nietzsche’s nihilism but which extends long into the twentieth century: to 
Dilthey’s attempts to ground the Geisteswissenschaften in the understanding of life experience, 
                                                
3 Frederick Beiser, After Hegel, 12. 
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to Weber’s ‘value-free’ science,4 to Simmel’s psychologically-inflected Philosophie des Geldes, 
to Heinrich Rickert’s neo-Kantian philosophies of value, and to Max Scheler’s 
phenomenological theories of value, to name only a few instances. Indeed, around 1900 value is 
a term that circulates widely across a dense network of semantic spheres; it operates 
simultaneously as a term in ethics, aesthetics, economics, and psychology, and seeks to name 
what it is that distinguishes the human sciences from other modes of knowing the world.5 The 
Grimm Dictionary points out by the time Nietzsche would speak of an Umwertung aller Werte in 
1886, value had become a highly fashionable and indispensable word.6 For all its prevalence, 
however, the term proves notoriously difficult to ground. In a letter to his teacher, the neo-
Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert, Simmel describes this difficulty of talking about value – a 
difficulty he encountered in 1900 when drafting his magnum opus, Die Philosophie des Geldes, 
whose main analytical term is value: “Über meine Werththeorie stöhne und verzweifele ich. 
                                                
4 On Weber see Frederic Jameson’s essay “The Vanishing Mediator.” See also Jameson’s remarks on 
value in The Political Unconscious, in which he describes the “paradox of the very notion of value itself,” 
i.e. the belated emergence of value as a problem, something that “becomes visible as abstraction [. . .] 
only at the moment in which it has ceased to exist as such” (250). Jameson reads both Nietzsche’s 
nihilism and Weber’s Wertfreiheit as symptoms of the fact that “the very idea of value [. . . ] comes into 
being at the moment of its own disappearance and of the virtual obliteration of all value by a universal 
process of instrumentalization” (The Political Unconscious, 251).  
5 Cf. Johannes Erich Heyde’s Grundlegung der Wertlehre, which attempts to answer the question “was 
Wert sei, was sein Wesen sei.” Inspired by an emerging phenomenology, and with reference to 
Schopenhauer, Heyde’s philosophical goal in defining value is to question what is otherwise assumed to 
be unquestionable or selbstverständlich. “Dass man alles Das, was sich von selbst versteht, sich zum 
deutlichen Bewusstsein bringe, um es als Problem aufzufassen. Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und 
Paraliopmena, vol. 2, § 3, Über Philosophie und ihre Methode, quoted in Heyde, 2. John Dewey succintly 
summarizes the emergence of value as a problem in philosophy in the following way: “Classical 
philosophy identified ens, verum; and bonum, and the identification was taken to be an expression of the 
constitution of nature as the object of natural science. In such a context there was no call and no place for 
any separate problem of valuation and values, since what are now termed values were taken to be 
integrally incorporated in the very structure of the world. But when teleological considerations were 
eliminated from one natural science after another, and finally from the sciences of physiology and 
biology, the problem of value arose as a separate problem.” Dewey, Theory of Valuation, 192.  
6 “Darüber hinaus nimmt wert geradezu den charakter eines schlag- und modewortes an, 'das alle welt bei 
passender und unpassender gelegenheit im munde führt.'” Heyde, quoted in “Wert” in Deutsches 
Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, cols. 460-471.  
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Gerade das Allerelementarste macht mir bisher unüberwundene Schwierigkeiten.”7 In a previous 
letter, Simmel had specified the reasons for the headache and “Deprimiert[heit]” value caused 
him. Naming his theory of value the “toten Punkt” of his text, Simmel suggests that the concept 
of value not only marks “denselben regressus in infinitum, wie die Kausalität” but also contains a 
“circulus vitiosus [. . .] weil man, wenn mann die Verknüpfungen weit genug verfolgt, immer 
findet, daß der Werth von A auf den von B, oder der von B nur auf den von A gegründet ist” 
(quoted in “Editorischer Bericht” to Philosophie des Geldes, 727). The relativism that Simmel 
runs up against here – its relationality and resistance to reduction to the substantial properties of 
an object – haunts, indeed, the many attempts to address value around 1900 and extends, as for 
instance Herrnstein Smith and Guillory argue, to the present moment. While it would lie beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to address how the various contributions to a constellation of value 
and life around 1900 dealt individually with the problem of relativism, this study can point to the 
desideratum for an account of how the difficulties in addressing value in the human sciences 
relate to the political economy of value as it has been addressed here. Such an account might 
begin with tracing a genealogical trajectory of thinking value and life from Dilthey, who makes 
value one of the crucial categories for grasping life’s “Zusammenhang” (as opposed to the 
“bloße Relation” of cause and effect),8 to Simmel, who turns to money to address the problem of 
value and life and finds that the “Oberfläche des wirtschaftlichen Geschehens” leads him to “die 
letzten Werte und Bedeutsamkeiten alles Menschlichen;”9 and finally to Georg Lukács, who, 
                                                
7 Georg Simmel to Heinrich Rickert, August 15, 1898, quoted in “Editorischer Bericht” to Philosophie 
des Geldes, 727.  
8 Wilhelm Dilthey, Entwürfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft in Seminar: Philosophische 
Hermeneutik, ed. Gadamer and Boehm, 197. 
9 See Hans Blumenberg’s essay on Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes, from which this conclusion takes its 
title. Hans Blumenberg, “Geld oder Leben: Eine metaphorologische Studie zur Konsistenz der 
Philosophie Georg Simmels” in Ästhetische und Metaphorologische Schriften, 177-192. 
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strongly influenced by both Dilthey and Simmel, will pick up the problem of value and life as the 
problem of form and life.
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